Sacha Dierckx

European unions and the repoliticization of transnational capital: labor's stance regarding the Financial Transaction Tax (FTT), the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)

This article argues that labor and social movements should repoliticize the transnationalization of capital in production and finance. The neoliberal era has demonstrated the power asymmetry between global capital and national labor. It seems that academics, trade unions, and progressive politicians have accepted this upscaling of capital to the global level as an irreversible fact that cannot be challenged. This article claims that progressive labor and social movements should, first, repoliticize the power of global capital and, second, try to scale down capital. The article studies three cases from the European Union to examine whether trade unions are trying to repoliticize, and succeeding in repoliticizing, global capitals power. It is concluded that repoliticizing and challenging the power of transnational capital is not impossible, but not easy either, and that trade unions need to focus more on these struggles.

Rising Powers and IMF Governance Reform

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has long been under fire for not adapting to the changing world order. Quotas and votes of a number of emerging markets and developing countries (EMDCs) are said to be out of line with their growing economic weight. Another element of con-tention is the actual veto power of the United States, given the 85% threshold for a range of important decisions. In contrast, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) as a group lacks a veto. Europe, in its turn, with eight of the 24 chairs, seems to be overrepresented in the Executive Board, the Fund’s most relevant decision-making body. A 2010 reform package was meant to address these shortcomings. However, on closer inspection it appears to be quite modest. What is more, most of the package has not been implemented yet, with several deadlines already missed. This chapter discusses the reform and its follow-up, and advances explanations for the outcomes. Part of the research is based on interviews. Between March 2011 and April 2012, we carried out 19 interviews of six Executive Directors, four Alternate Executive Directors, five Senior Advisors, both from advanced economies (9) and EMDCs (6), as well as four senior IMF staff members. We also interviewed three European officials involved in IMF matters. The interviews were granted upon condition of anonymity.