Peter Debaere

Fractured politics? The comparative regulation of shale gas in Europe

ABSTRACT European countries have developed strikingly different responses to shale gas and fracking. Some have imposed outright bans, while others have issued permits and even awarded generous tax breaks to the industry. To explain this puzzling variance, this article builds a theoretical framework that focuses on energy security, economic competitiveness, the party composition of government, public opinion, multilevel governance and democratic tradition. It then conducts a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) of the regulation of shale gas in 16 European Union member countries. We find that the level of public concern is a sufficient condition for restrictive regulation. Other conditions only work in combination with others, while energy security and democratic tradition have no impact on the regulation of shale gas and fracking. The findings indicate that the uptake of shale gas is not simply a function of structural factors such as geology or population density, but rather the result of political factors.

The European Union in the Gx system

In order to fully understand internal EU coordination for the G7, G8, and G20, it is imperative to highlight certain elements of the organization, functioning, and relevance of these forums.

The EU’s Role and Performance within the G20 in the Area of Finance and Development

In response to the global financial crisis of 2008, the G20 started meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government. From then onwards, the G20 has quickly risen to become the most prominent forum for international economic cooperation. The President of the eurogroup, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, even stated that the value of the euro is more appropriately discussed in the G20 than in the eurogroup (Blade, 2013). Soon, the G20 agenda expanded to embrace other topics as well such as development, food security and employment.

Rising Powers and IMF Governance Reform

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has long been under fire for not adapting to the changing world order. Quotas and votes of a number of emerging markets and developing countries (EMDCs) are said to be out of line with their growing economic weight. Another element of con-tention is the actual veto power of the United States, given the 85% threshold for a range of important decisions. In contrast, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) as a group lacks a veto. Europe, in its turn, with eight of the 24 chairs, seems to be overrepresented in the Executive Board, the Fund’s most relevant decision-making body. A 2010 reform package was meant to address these shortcomings. However, on closer inspection it appears to be quite modest. What is more, most of the package has not been implemented yet, with several deadlines already missed. This chapter discusses the reform and its follow-up, and advances explanations for the outcomes. Part of the research is based on interviews. Between March 2011 and April 2012, we carried out 19 interviews of six Executive Directors, four Alternate Executive Directors, five Senior Advisors, both from advanced economies (9) and EMDCs (6), as well as four senior IMF staff members. We also interviewed three European officials involved in IMF matters. The interviews were granted upon condition of anonymity.

Introduction to the Cases

Whereas Chapter 4 has explored the level of coordination for the G7, G8, and G20, the chapters in Part III attempt to explain why that level of coordination varies across the Gx system. Internal EU coordination does not only differ across the three Gx forums, but also within a single Gx forum such as the G20. As set out in the introduction, eight cases have been selected for this research question, each comprising one or several dossiers in the period 2008–2012 (see Table 1.1). The next chapters examine how each of our six variables function in these cases and dossiers. But first, this chapter provides a brief introduction to the cases and dossiers.

Towards an Explanatory Framework

This final chapter summarizes the main findings and combines insights into a tentative explanatory framework for internal EU coordination for the G7, G8, and G20. Next, some general reflections are made on the role of the EU23, the EU4, and the EU institutions and the influence of the external context. Finally, six areas for further research are suggested.

Analytical and Conceptual Framework

This chapter lays down the conceptual and analytical foundation of this study. First, it develops a definition of internal EU coordination. Research on the role of the EU in international institutions regularly deals, implicitly or explicitly, with coordination. Yet, remarkably, a comprehensive conceptualization of EU coordination in the context of international organizations is still lacking. Consequently, a multidisci-plinary approach is used to define and conceptualize EU coordination in this study. Then, based on our definition of coordination, a scale with four levels of coordination is constructed to measure EU coordination for the G7, G8, and G20.

EU Coordination Practices for the Gx System

This chapter examines the level of internal EU coordination for the G20, G8, and G7. In a detailed manner, it maps out the different processes for each Gx forum by focusing on the what, how, where, and who. It provides a comprehensive overview of the (informal) procedures, the actors and committees involved, and the evolution over time (at least from 2008 to 2012). The assessment of the level of internal EU coordination for the G20, G8, and G7 chiefly relies on interviews with key players in the EU’s coordination processes and official documents. This qualitative assessment is complemented by results from the survey. By triangulating these multiple data sources, each aspect of the EU’s preparation for the G7, G8, and G20 is scored on the coordination scale. To recall, the scale entails four levels of interaction ranging from (1) no interaction to (2) information sharing, (3) consultation, and (4) group decision making (see Chapter 3). This chapter proceeds by first looking at how coordination has developed for the G20. Next, the level of internal coordination for the G8 and G7 are assessed. Finally, the role of the European Parliament is briefly discussed before some tentative conclusions are drawn.