Eduardo L. Giménez

Optimal Allocation of Land Between Productive Use and Recreational Use

This paper is an inquiry into the optimal allocation of time and natural areas to recreational uses, which have the feature of being a pure and continuous public good. We address this issue with a comprehensive approach. A static rational general equilibrium framework is developed in which heterogeneous agents allocate land and time endowments between alternative uses. This modeling has important advantages. First, Pareto-optimal and voluntary-contribution equilibrium allocations are obtained in a unified set-up. Second, the suboptimality result of the decentralized equilibrium, the free-rider problem on the provision of this nonexcludable public good, and different mechanisms to return the economy to its first-best are analyzed. Finally, a methodological critique is made of some empirical literature, and it is suggested that our theoretical microeconomic-based structure seems to be a suitable starting point for empirical research.

Endogenous Fertility, Pension Programs and Intergenerational Welfare

Abstract This paper shows that the existence of a technology or any kind of commitment which allow agents to transfer wealth to the future accounts for fertility control. If only an intra-family market exists, the equilibrium fertility rate is higher than when a simple welfare state or financial markets are introduced. Therefore the introduction of pension programs both decreases fertility and, subsequently, puts the sustainability of the welfare state in trouble.

The microeconomics of family business

This paper is to be published in Elgar Family Business Research Handbook, Volume 2, edited by Sanjay Goel, Sabine Klein Panikkos Poutziouris, and Kosmas Smyrnios. Corresponding author: José Antonio Novo, Departamento de Fundamentos da Análise Económica, Facultade de C.C. Económicas e Empresariais, Campus de Elviña s/n, 15071 A Coruña, Spain. Universidade de Vigo; egimenez@uvigo.es Universidade de A Coruña; janp@udc.es

Chapter 26 – Endogenous Fertility, Pension Programs and Intergenerational Welfare

Publisher Summary This chapter discusses various aspects of endogenous fertility, pension programs, and intergenerational welfare. The existence of a technology or any kind of commitment allows the agents to transfer wealth to the future, and accounts for fertility control. If only an intrafamily market exists, the equilibrium fertility rate is higher than when a simple welfare state or financial markets are introduced in the chapter. The introduction of pension programs both decreases fertility and, subsequently, puts the sustainability of the welfare state in trouble. The mature individual can manipulate the price of the intrafamily security, while deciding the number of children. Increasing the number of descendants may increase the supply of the intrafamily security and, consequently, the price of the intrafamily security decreases. The presence of a risk-less technology to transfer income to the future, as the pension system is, weakens intrafamily relations and, consequently, descendants become less important for the parents. The designing of an optimal intergenerational welfare state based on an actuarial fairness pension, which considers the introduction of a fertility policy but based on intergenerational efficiency and fairness.