Eduardo Levy Levy-Yeyati

To Float or to Fix: Evidence on the Impact of Exchange Rate Regimes on Growth

We study the relationship between exchange rate regimes and economic growth for a sample of 183 countries over the post-Bretton Woods period, using a new de facto classification of regimes based on the actual behavior of the relevant macroeconomic variables. In contrast with previous studies, we find that, for developing countries, less flexible exchange rate regimes are associated with slower growth, as well as with greater output volatility. For industrial countries, regimes do not appear to have any significant impact on growth. The results are robust to endogeneity corrections and a number of alternative specifications borrowed from the growth literature. (JEL F31, F41)

On the Endogeneity of Exchange Rate Regimes

The literature has identified three main approaches to account for the way exchange rate regimes are chosen: i) the optimal currency area theory; ii) the financial view, which highlights the consequences of international financial integration; and iii) the political view, which stresses the use of exchange rate anchors as credibility enhancers in politically challenged economies. Using de facto and de jure regime classifications, we test the empirical relevance of these approaches separately and jointly. We find overall empirical support for all of them, although the incidence of financial and political aspects varies substantially between industrial and non-industrial economies. Furthermore, we find that the link between de facto regimes and their underlying fundamentals has been surprisingly stable over the years, suggesting that the global trends often highlighted in the literature can be traced back to the evolution of their natural determinants, and that actual policies have been little influenced by the frequent twist and turns in the exchange rate regime debate.

To Float or to Trail: Evidence on the Impact of Exchange Rate Regimes

We study the relationship between exchange rate regimes and economic growth for a sample of 154 countries over the post-Bretton Woods period (1974-1999), using a new de facto classification of regimes based on the actual behavior of the relevant macroeconomic variables. In contrast with previous studies, we find that, for developing countries, less flexible exchange rate regimes are strongly associated with slower growth, as well as with greater output volatility. For industrial countries, on the contrary, regimes do not appear to have any significant impact on growth. The results are robust to endogeneity corrections and a number of alternative specifications borrowed from the growth literature.

Sovereign Debt in the Americas: New Data and Stylized Facts

In this paper, we introduce the first comprehensive database on sovereign debt systematically compiled to ensure comparability, for all countries in the Americas, and use this new data to highlight the main stylized facts regarding sovereign debt for developing America in the last two decades. We find that debt ratios in developing America are comparable to those in developed countries and have remained stable since the late nineties. By contrast, the composition of debt in the region has changed significantly, shifting from foreign currency external to local currency domestic debt. This onshoring and dedollarization of sovereign debt, contrary to conventional wisdom, has not come at the expense of a shortening of maturities. Furthermore, we find that onshoring is correlated with the level economic development and country size, and with the presence of institutional investors.

Crises, Contagion, and the Closed-End Country Fund Puzzle

This paper analyzes the behavior of closed-end country fund discounts, including evidence from the Mexican and East Asian crises. It finds that the ratio of fund prices to their fundamental value increases dramatically during a crisis, an anomaly that we denote the “closed-end country fund puzzle.” Our results show that the puzzle relates directly to the fact that international investors are less (more) sensitive to changes in local (global) market conditions than domestic investors. This asymmetry implies that foreign participation in local markets can help dampen the effect of a crisis in asset prices in the originating country, at the cost of amplifying contagion to noncrisis countries.

Market discipline under systemic risk - evidence from bank runs in emerging economies

The authors show that systemic risk exerts a significant impact on the behavior of depositors, sometimes overshadowing their responses to standard bank fundamentals. Systemic risk can affect market discipline both regardless of and through bank fundamentals. First, worsening systemic conditions can directly threaten the value of deposits by way of dual agency problems. Second, to the extent that banks are exposed to systemic risk, systemic shocks lead to a future deterioration of fundamentals not captured by their current values. Using data from the recent banking crises in Argentina and Uruguay, the authors show that market discipline is indeed quite robust once systemic risk is factored in. As systemic risk increases, the informational content of past fundamentals declines. These episodes also show how few systemic shocks can trigger a run irrespective of ex-ante fundamentals. Overall, the evidence suggests that in emerging economies, the notion of market discipline needs to account for systemic risk.

Global Financial Safety Nets: Where Do We Go from Here?

An analysis of the performance of the global financial safety net during the 2008-2009 crisis, and an evaluation of its new components, indicates that, from an emerging markets perspective, the net remains full of holes despite recent stitches. This paper therefore proposes an effective and workable international lender of last resort (ILLR) for systemic liquidity crises based on: i) an automatic trigger to access the facility; ii) unilateral country prequalification to the facility during Article IV consultations; and iii) liquidity funded by the world’s “issuers of last resort.” These principles would support a reliable and broad-based ILLR without the carrying costs associated with inefficient reserve hoarding, which would actually work as an effective preventive facility with minimal room for moral hazard.

Market Discipline in Emerging Economies: Beyond Bank Fundamentals

This paper studies how institutional factors and systemic risks (driven by macroeconomic conditions) prevalent in emerging economies may impact market discipline among banks (traditionally understood as market responses to bank fundamentals). First, we discuss how certain institutional features of emerging economies (underdeveloped capital markets, pervasive government ownership of banks, greater guarantees, inadequate disclosure and transparency) may affect market responses to bank risk. Second, using the recent Argentine crisis as an illustration, we argue that systemic risks may exert an overwhelming impact on market behavior, overshadowing the link between the latter and bank fundamentals. Thus, market discipline, while missing in the traditional sense, may be indeed quite robust once systemic risks are factored in. We conclude that in emerging economies the analysis of market discipline should take into account the importance of institutional and systemic factors.

The Cost of Reserves

The cost of holding international reserves to self insure against foreign currency liquidity runs is typically estimated as the sovereign spread on the risk-free return on reserves paid on the debt issued to purchase them. However, to the extent that reserves lower the probability of a run-induced default, they reduce the spread paid on the stock of sovereign debt, adding to the marginal benefits of reserve accumulation. This paper illustrates this aspect numerically, showing that the costs of reserves, as typically measured, may have been considerably overstated.

State-Owned Banks: Do They Promote or Depress Financial Development and Economic Growth?

This paper surveys the theoretical and empirical literature on the role of state-owned banks and also presents some new results and a robustness analysis. After having discussed whether there is a theoretical justification for the presence of state-owned banks, the paper focuses on their performance. Three basic facts emerge: (i) state-owned banks located in developing countries are characterized by lower profitability than comparable privately owned banks; (ii) there is no evidence that the presence of state-owned banks promotes economic growth or financial development; and (iii) the evidence that state-owned banks lead to lower growth and financial development is not as strong as previously thought. The paper concludes that we still do not know enough to pass a final judgment on the role of state-owned banks and hence more research is needed.