Fabio Mendez

Trade structure and economic growth

Abstract How do the number of trade partners and the concentration of trade among partners affect the economic growth of a country? We refer to these characteristics as the structure of trade, and explore this question empirically in this study. We find that the structure of trade, independently of the level of trade itself, has an important effect on the rate of economic growth. The results of the study suggest that the number of trading partners is positively correlated with growth across all countries, and this effect is more pronounced for rich countries. Trade concentration is positively correlated with growth for all countries, and the effect is concentrated in poor countries. Previous work has overlooked these characteristics of trade, although we find them to be quite relevant and that they could lead to new ways of understanding the trade – growth relationship.

The cyclicality of skill acquisition: evidence from panel data

This paper presents new empirical evidence regarding the cyclicality of skill acquisition activities. The paper studies both training and schooling episodes at the individual level using quarterly data from the NLSY79 for a period of 19 years. We find that aggregate schooling is strongly countercyclical, while aggregate training is acyclical. Several training categories however behave procyclically. The results also indicate that firm-financed training is procyclical while training financed through other means is countercyclical; and that the cyclicality of skill acquisition investments depends significantly on the educational level and the employment status of the individual.

Policy Makers' Preferences, Party Ideology, and the Political Business Cycle

We generate a time-series of relative preferences of policy makers for inflation stability using a sample of 24 countries in order to study the behavior of political parties. Such behavior is essential in both the partisan cycle models and the opportunistic political cycle analysis. Our evidence tends to support the partisan view, with right-wing parties exhibiting a higher preference towards stabilizing inflation than left-wing parties, while obtaining mixed results on the opportunistic behavior of incumbent parties. Finally, when we analyze the behavior of separate ideologies, we find overwhelming support of party resemblance on election year and evidence favoring an opportunistic conduct by right-wing parties.

AIDS, Human Capital and Growth

We use an overlapping generations model of human capital accumulation to study the impact of the AIDS crises on growth. In our model, the AIDS crisis lowers life expectancy and thus the incentive to save and accumulate physical capital. Moreover, the AIDS crisis lowers the returns to human capital investment by creating large numbers of AIDS orphans. We calibrate the model to sub-Saharan economies. If infection rates are around 15-20 percent of the adult population, as they are in countries like Zambia and Botswana, growth rates of per capita income drop about 30-40%. Moreover, the growth rate effects persist beyond the (perhaps counterfactual) end of the AIDS crisis.

The value of legal housing titles: An empirical study

This paper estimates the value of legal housing titles using a Costa Rican urban housing survey conducted in 1997. The general results obtained regarding the value of legal titles to the average individual are consistent with past estimations found in the literature, but the implications for policy are new; as some groups are shown to value legal titles more than others. The criterion used to create these groups was inspired by the theoretical guidelines provided by past literature and could be easily reproduced by policy makers who may wish to target these types of individuals

Hierarchical Human Capital and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence

We embed an N-level human-capital hierarchy in a growth model and demonstrate that the hierarchical structure generates an optimal investment program with phases of stock depletion and expansion in the stocks of the various levels of humancapital. We then take the implications of the model to data from a diverse sample of countries and find patterns of stock expansion and contraction consistent with the theoretical model. We also illustrate how allowing for hierarchical human-capital formation might contribute to the empirical growth literature.

OPTIMAL GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS AND RED TAPE IN AN ECONOMY WITH CORRUPTION

We study an economy where agents are heterogeneous in entrepreneurial ability, and may decide to become workers or entrepreneurs. The government is motivated by a production externality to impose regulations on entrepreneurship, and sets a level of red tape -administered by public officials-to test regulation compliance. In an environment where some officials are corrupt, we study what are the optimal levels of regulations and red tape, and to what extent such policies reduce the welfare losses created by corruption. For each level of externalities, we find that high and low levels of corruption create qualitatively different distortions, which in turn changes the nature and reach of optimal policies. Under low levels of corruption and externalities, the government sets low levels of regulations and minimal red tape, and with these policies achieves the first best allocation. When externalities and corruption are above a threshold, only a second best allocation can be achieved. Moreover, when externalities are large, mandating higher levels of red tape is a Pareto improving policy.

Privatization, Deregulation, and Capital Accumulation

In this paper, we study how the privatization and deregulation of intermediate goods industries influence capital accumulation. Our model is solved under three alternative scenarios: (i) the intermediate sector is composed of a public monopoly under government control; (ii) the intermediate sector is dominated by a private monopoly; and (iii) the intermediate sector is competitive. The comparison of these models suggests that the income benefits of state-tomarket transitions are mostly due to increased competition on the deregulated market and that the privatization of state enterprises is not likely to generate significant changes in the economy when the public monopoly is replaced by a private monopoly. We find that elimination of monopoly rights can increase aggregate income significantly.

Does Inefficiency Justify Privatization? The Case of Intermediate Industry Monopolies

We use an infinitely lived agent model in which an intermediate good is provided either by a public or a private monopolist to study the effects of privatization on steady state levels of income. We allow for public sector inefficiencies(x-inefficiency) which shift down the intermediate goods technology as well as bureaucratic inefficiencies which decrease the amount of tax revenue which will actually be allocated to public investment. We solve the model numerically for reasonable parameter values. The results of the model indicate that the benefits of this type of privatizations depend crucially on the size of the relative inefficiency of public firms and the amount of public investment. Furthermore, the gains from privatization are found to be strongly related to the balance sheet of the public firm that is privatized. Privatization of public firms which run deficits (surpluses) typically generate increases (decreases) in steady state consumption.

A Note on Licenses in the Presence of Corruption

Abstract We study the effectiveness of licenses in environments with corruption. We expand the standard model so that bribery is feasible not only when licenses are granted but also when enforced or verified. This modification alters many prior results on bribery and licensing significantly. Specifically, we show that in some cases penalties for bribery at the license-granting stage complement penalties for bribery at the permit-enforcement stage. In other cases, they act as substitutes for each other. These results are especially important for often used regulatory policies in which licenses are used in conjunction with some form of subsequent license verification. Thus, our model suggests that studying the impact of bribery at the license-granting stage should not be conducted without simultaneously studying bribery at the permit verification stage.