Fabrizio De Francesco

Committee governance and socialization in the European Union

ABSTRACT This article reviews theoretically grounded empirical studies on committees in the European Union by focusing on research published from the late 1990s onwards. The aim is to report on the state of the art and to shed light on emerging puzzles, research gaps and promising venues for further research. We examine research questions, theoretical approaches, design, and the main empirical findings. The conclusions provide our critical remarks and suggestions for further research.

Diffusion of regulatory impact analysis among OECD and EU member states

With the exception of few comparative case studies, the literature on regulatory reform and regulatory impact analysis (RIA) tends to focus on internal political actors, activities, and processes. Furthermore, empirical analyses of new public management have overlooked the dynamics of communications among networks of administrative reformers. This article fills these gaps, presenting results of an event history analysis on the diffusion of RIA. It probes rationales for the origin of RIA and administrative capacity explanations in combination with variables referring to international and transnational communication channels of administrative reforms. A hypothesis based on legal origin is also tested. The findings show that the decision to adopt RIA rests on transnational networks as well as administrative variables such as government expenditure and legal origin.

Indicators of Regulatory Quality

Better state regulation is a key component of economic reform. This is the first book to comprehensively explore international experience in the use of Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA), which involves assessing the potential benefits and costs of any regulatory change. The contributors reveal that RIA is being adopted by an increasing number of countries as a route to better regulation with varying degrees of success. The book includes contributions from leading experts on regulatory reform and introduces a range of case studies from developed, developing and transitional economies.

Transfer Agents, Knowledge Authority, and Indices of Regulatory Quality: A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

In the past two decades, international organizations have been designing and promoting transnational benchmarks for evaluating the quality of governance. The World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development have been competing in devising and legitimizing indices across policy areas. Previous studies have demonstrated how international organizations can influence national governments by means of governance indices. However, a comparative analysis is still missing of the choices international organizations have made in establishing their own indices of good governance. By focusing on regulatory reform, this paper attempts to fill this gap. It first sets a framework to compare the different types of authority that organizations can pursue through benchmarking. It then applies this framework to the specific case of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the World Bank, to examine how they differ in their conceptions of and use of policy benchmarking.Abstract In the past two decades, international organizations have been designing and promoting transnational benchmarks for evaluating the quality of governance. The World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development have been competing in devising and legitimizing indices across policy areas. Previous studies have demonstrated how international organizations can influence national governments by means of governance indices. However, a comparative analysis is still missing of the choices international organizations have made in establishing their own indices of good governance. By focusing on regulatory reform, this paper attempts to fill this gap. It first sets a framework to compare the different types of authority that organizations can pursue through benchmarking. It then applies this framework to the specific case of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the World Bank, to examine how they differ in their conceptions of and use of policy benchmarking.

Beyond legal transposition: regulatory agencies and de facto convergence of EU rail liberalisation

ABSTRACT Notwithstanding its maturity, the literature on European Union (EU) compliance tends to overlook the implementation stages beyond the legal transposition of single-market regulatory reforms. This article explains the cross-national variation in the actual implementation of the EU regulatory reform of rail market among the EU-15. The empirical findings highlight the importance of the establishment of national regulatory agencies. Member states with an independent regulatory agency converge faster towards the EU model of liberalization. This conditional effect of EU railway harmonization is enhanced by the presence of new entrants that activate the institutional functions of national independent agencies as enforcers of EU legislation.

L'Air nel processo di riforma della regolazione

The rise of the regulatory state has constrained many European and OECD countries to set up policy tools aimed at governing regulation. Indeed, since the need of social regulation has never been under discussion as a way to protect public interest, governments have focused on improving the quality of regulation. Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) is a decision tool that systematically assesses the negative and positive impacts of proposed and existing regulation. It is a method that supports the decision-making process without aiming to substitute decisions with technocratic tools, enhancing the empirical basis of decisions. In order to communicate information to decision-makers, it takes the form of a short and structured document. This policy making tool has the high potential to cope with the issue of the lack of legitimacy and credibility of regulators, enhancing accountability and transparency of the regulatory process. However, it is only one element of regulatory reform; implementation of RIA needs specific preconditions, i.e. the public management reform, deregulation, and an efficient competition law. This article argues that implementation of RIA is not an easy task, since there are many bias that determine the effectiveness and evolution of this policy tool. Nevertheless, RIA is a dynamic tool, with regard to deregulation, avoidance of unnecessary rules, regulatory quality, and to some extent regulatory management.