Ferruccio Ponzano
University of Eastern Piedmont
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Featured researches published by Ferruccio Ponzano.
Archive | 2008
Guido Ortona; Stefania Ottone; Ferruccio Ponzano
During the last sixty years, the Italian electoral system has changed three times, proportional representation. From 1993 to 2005, a new mixed electoral system (three quarters of the seats were elected by plurality, while the remaining seats were filled by proportional representation) was adopted. Finally, in December 2005, a new electoral system reintroduced the proportional representation and introduced for the first time a majority prize. The aim of our analysis is twofold. We want to compare the goodness of these electoral systems and, at the same time, to check whether other electoral systems would have provided a better performance.
Review of Law & Economics | 2011
Peter Lewisch; Stefania Ottone; Ferruccio Ponzano
While second-party punishment is suitable in small groups, third-party punishment is much more common in large societies, where it is generally recognized as a social norm enforcement device that may guarantee social stability. However, in large societies, the presence of a potential additional third-party punisher who observes the norm violation and decides to intervene becomes more probable. The question arises as to whether third-party punishment would be robust with respect to an enlargement of the pool of potential altruistic punishers, namely the introduction of a second potential punisher. The relevance of this question is evident because, should the case be that the presence of several potential third-party punishers activates free-riding attitudes, third-party punishment may decline or even collapse altogether. In our paper we compare, by means of an economic experiment, punishment by a single third party (the Stand-Alone case) with punishment by third parties (In-Group environment). Shifting punishment choices into this “enlarged environment” allows us to study, in a systematic way, the complex relationship between the punisher’s expectations about her/his peer’s punishment decisions and her/his own punishment choices. Our data suggest that individual punishers are heterogeneous as to their individual punishment characteristics and the presence of a second punisher affects their choices to a certain extent. Consequently, the implementation of voluntary punishment depends on the distribution of types within the population. This result allows both to put into discussion the extreme emphasis devoted to voluntary third-party punishment as the “golden cornerstone” of spontaneous social order and to explain why large developed societies need institutional legal systems as the root of stability.
Frontiers in Psychology | 2016
Giulia Andrighetto; Nan Zhang; Stefania Ottone; Ferruccio Ponzano; John D'Attoma; Sven Steinmo
This study examines cultural differences in ordinary dishonesty between Italy and Sweden, two countries with different reputations for trustworthiness and probity. Exploiting a set of cross-cultural tax compliance experiments, we find that the average level of tax evasion (as a measure of ordinary dishonesty) does not differ significantly between Swedes and Italians. However, we also uncover differences in national “styles” of dishonesty. Specifically, while Swedes are more likely to be either completely honest or completely dishonest in their fiscal declarations, Italians are more prone to fudging (i.e., cheating by a small amount). We discuss the implications of these findings for the evolution and enforcement of honesty norms.
PLOS ONE | 2016
Nan Zhang; Giulia Andrighetto; Stefania Ottone; Ferruccio Ponzano; Sven Steinmo
As shown by the recent crisis, tax evasion poses a significant problem for countries such as Greece, Spain and Italy. While these societies certainly possess weaker fiscal institutions as compared to other EU members, might broader cultural differences between northern and southern Europe also help to explain citizens’ (un)willingness to pay their taxes? To address this question, we conduct laboratory experiments in the UK and Italy, two countries which straddle this North-South divide. Our design allows us to examine citizens’ willingness to contribute to public goods via taxes while holding institutions constant. We report a surprising result: when faced with identical tax institutions, redistribution rules and audit probabilities, Italian participants are significantly more likely to comply than Britons. Overall, our findings cast doubt upon “culturalist” arguments that would attribute cross-country differences in tax compliance to the lack of morality amongst southern European taxpayers.
Annals of Operations Research | 2014
Matteo Migheli; Guido Ortona; Ferruccio Ponzano
According to commonsense wisdom, under proportionality a small centrist party enjoys an excess of power with reference to its share of seats (or votes) due to the possibility of blackmailing the larger ones. This hypothesis has been challenged on a theoretical ground, with some empirical support. In this paper we use simulation to test its validity. Our results strongly provide evidence that the hypothesis is actually wrong. What occurs is a transfer of power from the periphery of the political spectrum towards the center, but the major gainers are the large centrist parties and not the small ones.
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | 2018
Emanuele Lo Gerfo; Alberto Pisoni; Stefania Ottone; Ferruccio Ponzano; Luca Zarri; Alessandra Vergallito; Erica Varoli; Davide Fedeli; Leonor J. Romero Lauro
When making decisions, people are typically differently sensitive to gains and losses according to the motivational context in which the choice is performed. As hypothesized by Regulatory Focus Theory (RFT), indeed, goals are supposed to change in relation to the set of possible outcomes. In particular, in a promotion context, the goal is achieving the maximal gain, whereas in a prevention context it turns into avoiding the greatest loss. We explored the neurophysiological counterpart of this phenomenon, by applying Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) and recording the motor evoked potentials (MEPs) in participants taking part in an economic game, in which they observed actions conveying different goal attainment levels, framed in different motivational contexts. More than the actual value of the economic exchange involved in the game, what affected motor cortex excitability was the goal attainment failure, corresponding to not achieving the maximal payoff in a promotion context and not avoiding the greatest snatch in a prevention context. Therefore, the results provide support for the key predictions of RFT, identifying a neural signature for the goal attainment failure.
Review of Law & Economics | 2015
Peter Lewisch; Stefania Ottone; Ferruccio Ponzano
Abstract This paper analyses, by means of an economic experiment, the impact of a vertical review on third-party punishment. Whereas the existing empirical literature has studied, under many different aspects, third-party costly punishment as such, it has not addressed the impact of a second “instance” (competent to overrule punishment decisions by the first punisher) on the incidence and amount of such first-instance punishment and the underlying unwanted behaviour (“stealing”). In this paper, we apply experimental methodology that allows us to construct in the lab the counterfactual context for a direct institutional comparison that we cannot find in real life. In particular, we examine first of all whether and how the presence of a second “vertical” punishment layer (i.e. of a “second instance”) affects the amount of punishment imposed in the first instance. Secondly, we check whether the presence of a second level of punishment has a deterrent effect on the underlying (undesired) behaviour. Finally, we examine the level of satisfaction of the victims in all scenarios. In our experiments, we find that the introduction of a second (vertical) tier of punishment increases (i) the level of punishment provided for in the first instance, (ii) deterrence with regard to the underlying behaviour (i.e. a reduction in the number of “thefts” being committed), and also (iii) the level of satisfaction for victims. Real-world applications of this study are plentiful, including the organisation of courts and the appeals process as a whole. Our evidence confirms that the presence of an “instance” (a second tier of legal decision making) is, other things equal, likely to generate beneficial effects.
Archive | 2015
Stefania Ottone; Ferruccio Ponzano; Giulia Andrighetto
In this paper we study how people from different European countries would react, in terms of tax compliance, to institutional changes. We choose an experimental setting and we focus on two features of the tax system – efficiency and tax rate. We develop our analysis in three countries characterized by different systems: Italy, Sweden, UK. The main finding is that participants from different countries react with the same intensity to efficiency changes but not to increases in the tax rate. In all countries tax compliance decreases as tax rate increases, but the reaction is stronger in Italy and softer in UK. Policy implications – mostly focused on fiscal harmonization - follow.
Archive | 2015
Francesco Farina; Stefania Ottone; Ferruccio Ponzano
A real-effort experiment is conducted in order to detect preferences for one of three different models of Welfare State characterized by different schemes of tax-and-transfers. Experimental subjects have to choose (both under and without veil of ignorance concerning their position in the society created in the lab) among: a) a baseline proportional scheme, where the State is neutral with respect to risk heterogeneity; b) an actuarially-fair scheme where low-ability and low-earnings subjects bear individual full responsibility for risk exposure; c) a progressive scheme where mutual risk insurance spreads risk across all subjects, so that low-ability and low-earnings individuals are compensated. The aim is to investigate how subjects posit with respect to the task performed by the Welfare State, which is the interaction between inequality of opportunity and income inequality facing low-ability and low-earnings individuals due to their relatively higher risk exposure. Our most relevant finding is that preference is not much motivated by a justice principle, but mainly by the expectation on one’s own position in the society.
ECONOMIA PUBBLICA | 2008
Ferruccio Ponzano
La secessione delle province in Italia - The secession of Italian provinces is an institutional phenomenon that affects our country from North to South since the 90s and is far from a conclusion. The aim of this paper is to analyse this institutional change, starting from the Constitutional and legislative contexts (articles 114 and 133 of the Constitution and the 267/2000 law). After a brief description of the eight new provinces that were born in 1992 and a survey of the related literature, I consider the presence of an «organizing committee» of the secession that makes a sunk investment to obtain a benefit from the rent of the new offices. I use a model of rent-seeking neglecting any implication for citizens. JEL H70, H72, H77