Guido Ortona

On the Xenophobia of Non-discriminated Ethnic Minorities

Sometimes the leaders of ethnic minority groups behave in a way that may promote xenophobia. A simple two-subject model is used to find out when this behaviour is rational. The conditions are briefly discussed with reference to the Italian case. An appendix illustrates the definition of xenophobia adopted in the paper.

New experiments on the endowment effect

Abstract This paper reports on some new experiments on the so-called endowment effect, i.e. the overevaluation of an asset due to possession of it. If the payoffs are high and fictitious, the effect is very strong. But if the payoffs are (relatively) high and real, the effect seems to fade away. It is argued that the endowment effect may be displaced by rational behaviour if the gains at stake are worthwhile. Two possible explanations of the effect are suggested. The first is at odds with economic rationality, while the second is not. Further experiments are required to resolve the question.

Explaining attitudes towards the euro: Design of a cross-national study

AbstractThe aim of this paper is to provide essential background material relating to the accom-panying papers in this special issue. It presents a brief description of the ‘Psychology of theEuropean Monetary Union’ project. This involved a questionnaire study of attitudes towardsthe euro, which was fielded in each of the 15 member states of the European Union in thesummer of 1997. We describe the development of the common survey instrument, and outlinethe rationale and methods pursued in sampling particular conceptual domains. The paper alsodetails the sampling procedures used in each country, together with the response rates andsample sizes attained. Finally, it o•ers a brief cross-national comparison of overall attitudes tothe euro. O 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.PsycINFO classification: 2229; 3920JEL classification: D63; D84; E52; F33Keywords: Control; Currency; Euro; Expectations; Equity; European union; Economic andmonetary union; Money; National identity; Satisfaction; Values

Choosing the Electoral System: Why Not Simply the Best One?

The paper illustrates a simple empirical rule to choose the best electoral system for a Parliament.

A Simulative Assessment of the Italian Electoral System

During the last sixty years, the Italian electoral system has changed three times, proportional representation. From 1993 to 2005, a new mixed electoral system (three quarters of the seats were elected by plurality, while the remaining seats were filled by proportional representation) was adopted. Finally, in December 2005, a new electoral system reintroduced the proportional representation and introduced for the first time a majority prize. The aim of our analysis is twofold. We want to compare the goodness of these electoral systems and, at the same time, to check whether other electoral systems would have provided a better performance.

Comparison of Electoral Systems: Simulative and Game Theoretic Approaches

Simulation may be a useful tool to address some basic problems concerning the choice of the electoral system. A case study is analyzed as an example. The utility of including power indices is discussed. A simulation program is illustrated.

Come funzionano i sistemi elettorali: un confronto sperimentale

The paper concerns the choice of an electoral system for a 100-member parliament. Nine electoral system have been simulated through a specific program. They have been evaluated with reference to representativeness and to governability, as resulting from given indexes. A system is considered dominant if ti scores higher than any other with reference to both indexes. No dominant system results. There are some indications that the improvement from the use of complicate voting (e.g. Borda counting) is not large. The Condorcet performance of the systems is influenced by the structure of the preferences; this casts some doubts on previous experimental results.

Competition among parties and power: an empirical analysis

According to commonsense wisdom, under proportionality a small centrist party enjoys an excess of power with reference to its share of seats (or votes) due to the possibility of blackmailing the larger ones. This hypothesis has been challenged on a theoretical ground, with some empirical support. In this paper we use simulation to test its validity. Our results strongly provide evidence that the hypothesis is actually wrong. What occurs is a transfer of power from the periphery of the political spectrum towards the center, but the major gainers are the large centrist parties and not the small ones.

PLURALITY, PROPORTIONALITY, GOVERNABILITY AND FACTIONS

Common sense suggests that majoritarian parliaments produce more efficient governments than proportional ones, because fewer decision‐makers are involved. Empirical evidence offers only limited support for this claim. A possible explanation is that the true decision‐makers are not actually the parties, but rather the factions within them. We consider some stylised real proportional cases, i.e. Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, and use simulation to assess the weight that factions must have for governability to be lower in first‐past‐the‐post than in threshold proportionality. Overall, our results provide support for the hypothesis suggested.

De bello omnium(i) contra omnes(j)

The paper suggests a new theory of mass ethnic violence. Theoretical explanations so far provided admit not rational behaviors. It is argued that mass ethnic violence may develop among fully rational subjects if some plausible conditions hold.