Fidel Perez-Sebastian

CAPITAL-SKILL COMPLEMENTARITY? EVIDENCE FROM A PANEL OF COUNTRIES*

Since Griliches (1969), researchers have been intrigued by the idea that physical capital and skilled labor are more complementary than physical capital and unskilled labor. In this paper we consider the cross-country evidence for capital-skill complementarity using a time-series cross-section panel of 73 developed and less developed countries over a 25-year period. We focus on three empirical issues. First, what is the best specification of the aggregate production technology to address the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis? Second, how should we measure skilled labor? Finally, is there any cross-country evidence in support of the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis? Our main finding is that there is some empirical support for the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis in our macro panel data set.

Patents, R&D and Lag Effects: Evidence from Flexible Methods for Count Panel Data on Manufacturing Firms

This paper investigates the relationship between patents and research and development expenditures using new longitudinal patent data at the firm level for the U.S. manufacturing sector from 1982 to 1992. The paper also develops a new class of count panel data models based on series expansion of the distribution of individual effects. Estimation results from various distributed lag and dynamic multiplicative panel count data models show that the contemporaneous relationship between patenting and R&D expenditures continues to be strong, accounting for over 60% of the total R&D elasticity. The lag effects are higher than have previously been found for the 1970s data.

Can Transition Dynamics Explain the International Output Data

This paper studies the transition dynamics predictions of an R&D-based growth model, and evaluates their performance in explaining income disparities across nations. We find that the fraction of the observed cross-country income variation explained by the transitional dynamics of the model is as large as the one accounted by existing steady-state level regressions. Our results suggest that the traditional view of a world in which nations move along their distinct balanced-growth paths is as likely as the one in which countries move along adjustment paths toward a common (very long-run) steady state.

The Natural Resource Curse and Fiscal Decentralization

Natural resource abundance is a blessing for some countries, but a curse for others. We show that differences across countries in the degree of fiscal decentralization can contribute to this divergent outcome. Using a large panel of countries covering several decades and various fiscal decentralization and natural resource measures, we provide empirical support for the novel hypothesis. We also study a model that combines political and market mechanisms under a unified framework to illustrate how natural resource booms may create negative effects in fiscally decentralized nations.

Convergence in a Dynamic Heckscher–Ohlin Model with Land

Convergence among nations that share the same preferences and technologies is a key result of the closed-economy neoclassical growth framework that has received substantial support in the data. However, Heckscher–Ohlin versions of the two-sector neoclassical growth model predict that nations that differ in their capital–labor ratios may not converge to the same steady state, even if they are identical in all other aspects. This is a puzzling result that warns us about potential dangers of international trade. In this paper we show that when land, an input in fixed supply, is introduced into the model, international trade in goods no longer limits the capacity of poor nations to catch up with the advanced world.

Heterogeneous Vertical Tax Externalities, Capital Mobility, and the Fiscal Advantage of Natural Resources

How do state tax rates respond to federal tax shocks? This paper presents a novel mechanism of heterogeneous vertical tax externalities across state-levels of fiscal advantage, showing that tax increases can be expansionary -- even without their reinvestment. States rich in natural resources have a fiscal advantage in the inter-state competition over production factors which allows them to respond better to increases in federal taxes and, consequently, attract capital from other parts of the nation. We add heterogeneity in fiscal advantage levels to an otherwise standard model of vertical tax externalities and horizontal tax competition. The model shows that, irrespective of federal redistribution, the contractionary effect of a federal tax increase can be overturned in fiscally advantaged states, through an increase in their tax base. Using the case of the U.S., and narrative-based measures of federal tax shocks a-la Romer and Romer (2010), we provide empirical evidence for the various aspects of this mechanism. Specifically, our baseline estimates indicate that, controlling for federal transfers, a 1% increase in the GDP share of capital-related federal taxes at the beginning of a year increases the growth rate of the per capita tax base by approximately 0.7% in high fiscal advantage states at the end of it.

The public and private marginal product of capital

Why does capital not flow to developing countries as predicted by the neoclassical model? What are the direction and degree of capital misallocation across nations? We revisit these questions by removing public capital from total capital to achieve a more accurate estimate of the marginal productivity of private capital. We calculate marginal product of capital schedules in a large sample of advanced and developing countries. Our main result is that, in terms of the Lucas Paradox, private capital is allocated remarkably efficiently across nations. Tentative estimates of the marginal productivity of public capital suggest that the deadweight loss from public capital misallocation across countries can be much larger than that from private capital.

Federal Tax Policies, Congressional Voting, and the Fiscal Advantage of Natural Resources

What determines legislatorsvoting behavior over federal tax policies? Conventional wisdom points primarily at party a¢ liation. This paper presents a novel mechanism of voting patterns across state-levels of scal advantage. We construct a political economy model of scal federalism with state scal asymmetries that originate in heterogeneity in natural resource abundance, representing a non-mobile source of income that provides a scal advantage in the inter-state scal competition. The model shows that representatives of natural resource rich states are more willing to vote in favor of federal tax increases, despite the lower net scal bene ts their states receive. This occurs because these states can reduce their tax rates as a response to an increase in the federal tax rate, and hence attract capital from the rest of the nation to the extent of increasing their pre-shock tax base. Data on roll-call votes in the U.S. Congress over major changes in federal tax bills in the post WW-II period support the predicted voting patterns. Speci cally, we nd that elected o¢ cials of resource rich states are more (less) supportive of capital-related federal tax increases (decreases), controlling for their party a¢ liation, ideology, federal transfers, and economic conditions. Our results indicate that the scal advantage channel is as dominant as party a¢ liation in driving legislatorsvoting decisions over federal tax policies.

Quality Upgrading and the Stages of Diversification

This paper explores the contribution of product quality upgrading in the process of export diversification. To do this, the paper builds a multisector model following Eaton and Kortum (2002) in which product quality is incorporated as a key feature. The model is then calibrated to generate predictions about the degree of export diversification in a number of East Asian countries. It is shown that quality upgrading is a key factor to understand the changes in the degree of export diversification in the majority of countries in our sample.