Shankha Chakraborty

Bank-based versus market-based financial systems: A growth-theoretic analysis

We study bank-based and market-based financial systems in an endogenous growth model. Lending to firms is fraught with moral hazard as owner-managers may reduce investment profitability to enjoy private benefits. Bank monitoring partially resolves the agency problem, while market-finance is more ‘hands-off’. A bank-based or market-based system emerges from firm financing choices. It is not possible to say unequivocally which of the two systems is better for growth. The growth rate depends, crucially, on the efficiency of financial and legal institutions. But a bank-based system outperforms a market-based one along other dimensions. Investment and per capita income are higher, and income inequality lower, under a bank-based system. Bank-based systems are more conducive for broad-based industrialization. A temporary income redistribution, under both financial systems, results in permanent improvement in per capita income as well as income distribution.

Fertility choice under child mortality and social norms

In most demographic transitions, declines in child mortality precede declines in net fertility rates. Variants of the Barro–Becker model of fertility fail to deliver this link. A simple extension, the inclusion of social norms regarding fertility, generates the desired effect.

Costly Intermediation and the Poverty of Nations

Distortions in private investment due to credit frictions, and in public investment due to corruption and bureaucratic inefficiencies, have both been suggested as important factors in accounting for the cross-country per capita income distribution. We introduce two modifications to the standard one-sector neoclassical growth model to incorporate these distortions. The model is calibrated using data from 79 countries to examine the quantitative implication of these margins. We find that financial frictions account for less than 2% of the cross-country variation in relative income. Even accounting for mismeasurement, financial frictions can typically explain less than 5% of the income gap between the five richest and the five poorest countries in the world. Distortions in the public investment process, on the other hand, seem more promising. There is both more variation in the measured value of the public capital distortion and it can account for more than 25% of the income gap between the richest and poorest countries in our sample.

The Quality of Public Investment

Macro-level estimates of the productivity of public capital are typically larger than micro-level estimates. The evidence also shows sizable cross-country differences in the quality of public capital. A general equilibrium growth model is introduced to explain both facts. The productivity of firms specializing in differentiated intermediate inputs depends on public capital whose provision is subject to bureaucratic corruption. Higher corruption lowers the quality of public capital and discourages specialization as well as development. Persistent difference in this quality results from multiple equilibrium levels of corruption. Simple calculations show that (i) relatively small micro-level productivity effects of public capital generate large macro-level effects, and (ii) quality differences in public capital can potentially explain a large fraction of the income gap between rich and poor nations.

The culture of entrepreneurship

We study the cultural process through which a society inculcates an entrepreneurial spirit. People work for a guaranteed wage or operate a firm whose risky return depends on business expertise. The latter is culturally acquired, within the family or outside, and people may choose an occupation different from the one they were socialized into. A cultural bias towards safer occupations from colonial and post-colonial policies leads to stagnation where entrepreneurs do not upgrade technology because of their proficiency with existing methods. An aggregate productivity shock can tip this economy towards growth led by established businesses. A human capital shock where existing business expertise is less useful is more disruptive; growth occurs through the emergence of a new class of entrepreneurs. We conclude that culture is not destiny: it adapts even when some cultural traits do not.

What do Information Frictions do

Numerous researchers have incorporated labor or credit market frictions within simple neoclassical models to (i) facilitate quick departures from the Arrow-Debreu world, thereby opening up the role for institutions, (ii) inject some realism into their models, and (iii) explain cross country differences in output and employment. We present an overlapping generations model with production in which a labor market friction (moral hazard) coexists along with a credit market friction (costly state verification). The simultaneous presence and interaction of these two frictions is studied. We show that credit frictions have a multiplier effect on economic activity, by directly affecting investment and indirectly through the unemployment rate. The labor market friction, on the other hand, affects unemployment in the short- and long-run but has only a short-run effect on capital accumulation.

Contraception and the Demographic Transition

Inspired by the historical English experience, we modify the Beckerian paradigm of fertility by incorporating costly, societal influence on contraception. Heterogeneous, generationally‐linked households choose between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ contraception. The modern has a higher fixed but lower variable cost of averting childbirths. Initially the rich adopt the modern, which unleashes society‐wide diffusion. Eventually everyone switches, lowering fertility further and across households. Hastening the switch is falling child mortality. Quantitative experiments suggest contraception was a vital link between the historical mortality and fertility transitions, though not the latter’s proximate cause. Implications for more recent transitions are discussed.

Fertility Choice Under Child Mortality and Social Norms

A cornerstone of demographic transition theory is that declines in infant and child mortality plausibly explain the onset of fertility decline in most countries. Simple versions of the Barro-Becker model of fertility choice have trouble delivering this link. We propose an extension, the inclusion of societal norms regarding family size, which, even with logarithmic preference over surviving children, can generate this link.