Frank Bovenkerk

Organized crime and ethnic reputation manipulation

Criminologists often use culture andethnicity to explain crime. In thistradition, organized crime is presentedwith an exotic flavor and the list oftransnational criminal organizations readslike an inventory of ethnic minorities andforeign groups. But the relation betweenethnicity and organized crime isproblematic to say the least. In the courseof our research on several groups active inthe Netherlands (Turkish and Kurdish heroindealers, Yugoslav and Russian-speaking mafiosi, Colombian cocaine dealers andNigerian prostitutes), we have learned toreverse the assumed causal relationship.Ethnic reputation manipulation is essentialto committing crime. This article arguesthat criminal groups and individualsexploit and construct ethnicity in variousways as they engage in criminal activities.Either concealing or emphasizing specificethnic reputations, they are able toaddress any number of audiences (insiders,outsiders, the law).

RACISM, MIGRATION AND THE STATE IN WESTERN EUROPE: A CASE FOR COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Comparative studies of post-1945 migration into Western Europe, and of the political and ideological responses to migration, have become increasingly common. While these studies demonstrate a number of common processes, their particular mode of expression can differ substantially from one country to another. This requires the development of a theoretical framework which is formulated at a level of generality which can encompass the historical specificity of, and variation between, particular instances, yet which permits a general explanation which is sensitive to that specificity and variation. The framework offered in this paper proposes a comparative analysis of the migration of four analytically distinct categories of person which highlights the role of the state in the reproduction of the imagined community of nation. That role is carried out in the context of a more general process of the regulation of scarcity, in the course of which people are simultaneously included in and excluded from the hierarchy of economic, political and ideological positions in the nation-state. Of special interest is the content of the processes of signification and categorisation that are generated in the inclusionary and exclusionary processes. The countries selected for analysis are France, the Netherlands and Britain.

Wanted : Mafia boss : essay on the personology of organized crime

Despite an abundance of mafia romaticism both in litarary form and in social science the psychological study of personality of prominent organized crime figures is almost completely absent. Criminological attempts to understand how the mafia kingpins mind works have failed so far because they are based on the mistaken view that underworld leadership would not require a certain level of skills and knowledge. Thus I have constructed a theoretical portrait of a maffia boss using the Five Factor Personalityy Model thatt is also used for personal selection purposes. I then suggest that personality traits that predict leadership success in the legitimate business world such as extraversion, controlled impulsiveness, a sense of adventure, megalomania, annd Narcissistic Personality Disorder, are all equally suitable triats for a career in organized crime.

Comparative Studies of Migration and Exclusion on the Grounds of “Race” and Ethnic Background in Western Europe: A Critical Appraisal

Comparative studies of migration into Western Europe and of the expression of racism within the various countries of Western Europe have become increasingly common. These can be divided into three relatively distinct categories on the basis of their intentions and objectives. However, they all share the weakness of being unable to explain both the commonality and the specificity of migration flows and the political and ideological character of the reaction to these migrations. Hence, they highlight the need for an alternative methodology and theoretical framework for such comparative analysis.

Artisan Entrepreneurs: Two Centuries of Italian Immigration to the Netherlands

Through recent ethnographic study of European international migration, a new type of temporary migrant has been identified that has been important historically: artisan entrepreneurs. The description of four such Italian groups to the Netherlands (chimney sweeps, mosaic workers, makers of plaster figures and ice-cream vendors) demonstrates how the demands of their trades have shaped their social histories.

Loverboys in the Amsterdam Red Light District: A realist approach to the study of a moral panic:

In the Netherlands the English word ‘loverboys’ describes pimps who use their seductive skills to exploit young girls as prostitutes. Public interest and concern has been enormous. But no images of or interviews with loverboys have appeared in the media. This article examines the 10-year-long history of the phenomenon as a classic moral panic constructed by the media, social workers and politicians. Our analysis also seeks to get behind the media representations, using discovery research methods from urban ethnography to show that a subculture has grown in the world of prostitution where this recruiting method is used. Our dual track investigatory approach demonstrates that both developments – the rise of a moral panic and the emergence of a new type of prostitution – are inexorably intertwined.

Crime and the multi-ethnic society: A view from Europe

The old questions about possible relationships between “race” or ethnicity and crime are shown to be unsatisfactory as they have been based on the wrong assumption that race and ethnic background constitute natural categories. The author discusses recent crime patterns in Europe —and in The Netherlands in particular — that have emerged as a result of societies becoming multiethnic. His research agenda includes the study of contrasting crime profiles, patterns of police selectivity, discrimination and racist violence, culture conflict and internationally organized crime.

Crime among young Moroccan men in the Netherlands: Does their regional origin matter?

High crime rates among second-generation immigrants are usually attributed to the ethnic group’s weak socioeconomic position in the host society. The causes of crime can, however, also be sought in their native countries or regions. Owing to a lack of empirical data, this has rarely been tested. The Netherlands is an exception: small-scale ethnographic case studies among young Moroccan men in Dutch cities suggest that their regional background and culture, particularly if they are from the less developed Rif Mountains area, may explain their high crime rates. In this article we examine whether this applies to the results of a quantitative study on all the Moroccan male juveniles in the Netherlands. At the individual level, our unique dataset is a combination of their native regions, criminal records (ever suspected of a crime) and demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Logistic regression analysis shows that current socioeconomic position is a strong predictor of ever having been suspected of a criminal offence, and the impact of geographical descent, directly or indirectly via socioeconomic position in the Netherlands, is negligible. Accordingly, our findings on Moroccans in the Netherlands do not warrant our questioning the common explanation of the immigrant–crime connection in criminology and suggest further research to determine the specific host society’s features that explain the overrepresentation of ethnic groups in crime statistics.

Urban Knights and Rebels in the Ottoman Empire

The appearance of Turks and Kurds in the international organised crime scene is fairly recent (1960s) and connected to the establishment of emigrant colonies in the European countries France, Cyprus, Germany, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain. However, we can trace back to Turkey a well-established underworld with deep historical roots. Some specific cultural traits – courage, fearless manliness and a code of honour – can still be found in present-day Turkish mafia families. In this contribution we describe three distinct criminal traditions. First, from the thirteenth century onwards, there are recurrent political and religious rebellions (prophetic movements) against the patrimonial bureaucratic political organisation of the Ottoman Empire. The figure of the kabadayi (urban knight) stands for a second tradition of informal leaders of urban neighbourhoods who sell forced protection, settle disputes and who protect the poor against oppressive administrations. The third tradition of rebels who took to the mountains after having been treated unjustly (efe or eskiya) resembles the western type of Robin Hood folklore. It is not so simple to appreciate the double standards of the rebels as they sometimes act in favour of the poor and at other times collaborate with the government against them.

Organized Crime in Former Yugoslavia

Until well into the 1990s, Yugoslavia’s general crime pattern seemed to follow the smooth path of modernization, with violent crime on the decrease and property crime on the rise, as outlined in the theory propounded by criminologists such as Louise Shelley (1981). Even in 1992, with the wars starting, the Belgrade-based Institute of Criminological and Sociological Research published a report for UNICRI (the UNESCO organization dealing with crime) entitled Development and Crime, which showed that traditional crimes such as honour killings and blood feuds, as well as “stealing wood from the forest” had declined, although urbaniza- tion and industrialization had generated a sharp rise in theft. The dark ages of Bal- kan history with its proverbial cruelty were over and, judging from its criminologi- cal profile, Yugoslavia seemed to have become a “normal” country. Then on March 12, 2003 Serbia’s Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic was killed by a sniper sent by the Belgrade mafia, probably the group from the Zemun suburb. Djindjic was the leader of the Democratic Party that had begun to carry out reforms that would have brought Serbia back to a welcoming Western Europe. Some political commentators in for- mer Yugoslavia expressed the belief that Djindjic himself was compromised when he accepted the assistance of organized crime in 1990 to come to power and especially when he handed over former president Milosevic to the Yugoslavia Tribunal in the Hague. Djindjic was assassinated presumably to prevent him from purging politics of the criminal element. What has happened in former Yugoslavia between 1980 and 2003 that has now brought the country back to its darkest ages? In this article I will try to make the case that the rise of the mafia is closely connected to the Wars of Partition in the 1990s and the corruptive Milosevic regime between 1988 and 2000.