George W. Rathjens

What is to be Done

It is now time to turn from theory to a brief consideration of practice—to ask the question, if something like the analysis given in the preceding chapters is correct, then what, if anything, does it demand that we do? At the end of chapter one, it was pointed out that, considered analytically, Holt’s works consist of three main components. First, they contain a positive or constructive account of what he considers the ‘best learning’, the sorts of conditions that promote such learning, and the sorts of conditions that are hostile to it. Secondly, they contain a critique of education, which is justified by appeal to the foregoing account of ‘best learning’. And thirdly, they contain a range of practical strategies, aimed at mitigating the problems of education (especially compulsory schooling) and maximising the opportunity of acquiring the ‘best learning’. This third component was of great significance to Holt. Although there is a sense in which Holt’s work is ‘utopian’, in that it criticises some foundational cultural assumptions and envisages a possible society that exists nowhere, he is, at the same time, a deeply practical, realistic thinker. He does not offer airy plans for grand social reconstruction, addressed to nobody in particular; rather, he tries to answer the question of what can be done by us, here and now. In the words of one of his book titles, he wants to answer the question: What do I do Monday?

Reassessing nuclear nonproliferation policy

Unresolved proliferation problems are as serious issues for the Reagan Administration as East-West relations and dependence on imported oil. The linkage of nuclear weapons to power reactors is debatable, but developing and industrialized countries alike feel that nuclear power is an important option. A review of Carter policies finds them flawed in several respects. Although they heightened worldwide concern about proliferation, they fell short because (1) most governments and the nuclear industry reacted negatively; (2) they offered no way to deal with countries which construct only weapons facilities; (3) they did not help the US image as a reliable supplier; (4) no realistic fuel-cycle alternatives emerged; and (5) little has been done about fuel assurances and international spent-fuel storage. Past policies need to be restructured under new premises to deal effectively with the motivation to acquire nuclear weapons. The effort should stress collective rather than unilateral action and a renewed effort for a comprehensive test ban treaty. 10 references. (DCK)