Gordon D. A. Brown
University of Warwick
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Featured researches published by Gordon D. A. Brown.
Psychological Review | 2000
Gordon D. A. Brown; Tim Preece; Charles Hulme
A computational model of human memory for serial order is described (OSCillator-based Associative Recall [OSCAR]). In the model, successive list items become associated to successive states of a dynamic learning-context signal. Retrieval involves reinstatement of the learning context, successive states of which cue successive recalls. The model provides an integrated account of both item memory and order memory and allows the hierarchical representation of temporal order information. The model accounts for a wide range of serial order memory data, including differential item and order memory, transposition gradients, item similarity effects, the effects of item lag and separation in judgments of relative and absolute recency, probed serial recall data, distinctiveness effects, grouping effects at various temporal resolutions, longer term memory for serial order, list length effects, and the effects of vocabulary size on serial recall.
Psychological Review | 2007
Gordon D. A. Brown; Ian Neath; Nick Chater
A model of memory retrieval is described. The model embodies 4 main claims: (a) temporal memory--traces of items are represented in memory partly in terms of their temporal distance from the present; (b) scale-similarity--similar mechanisms govern retrieval from memory over many different timescales; (c) local distinctiveness--performance on a range of memory tasks is determined by interference from near psychological neighbors; and (d) interference-based forgetting--all memory loss is due to interference and not trace decay. The model is applied to data on free recall and serial recall. The account emphasizes qualitative similarity in the retrieval principles involved in memory performance at all timescales, contrary to models that emphasize distinctions between short-term and long-term memory.
Cognitive Psychology | 2006
Neil Stewart; Nick Chater; Gordon D. A. Brown
We present a theory of decision by sampling (DbS) in which, in contrast with traditional models, there are no underlying psychoeconomic scales. Instead, we assume that an attributes subjective value is constructed from a series of binary, ordinal comparisons to a sample of attribute values drawn from memory and is its rank within the sample. We assume that the sample reflects both the immediate distribution of attribute values from the current decisions context and also the background, real-world distribution of attribute values. DbS accounts for concave utility functions; losses looming larger than gains; hyperbolic temporal discounting; and the overestimation of small probabilities and the underestimation of large probabilities.
Psychological Science | 2010
Christopher J. Boyce; Gordon D. A. Brown; Simon Christopher Moore
Does money buy happiness, or does happiness come indirectly from the higher rank in society that money brings? We tested a rank-income hypothesis, according to which people gain utility from the ranked position of their income within a comparison group. The rank hypothesis contrasts with traditional reference-income hypotheses, which suggest that utility from income depends on comparison to a social reference-group norm. We found that the ranked position of an individual’s income predicts general life satisfaction, whereas absolute income and reference income have no effect. Furthermore, individuals weight upward comparisons more heavily than downward comparisons. According to the rank hypothesis, income and utility are not directly linked: Increasing an individual’s income will increase his or her utility only if ranked position also increases and will necessarily reduce the utility of others who will lose rank.
Industrial Relations | 2008
Gordon D. A. Brown; Jonathan Gardner; Andrew J. Oswald; Jing Qian
What makes workers happy? Here we argue that pure ‘rank’ matters. It is currently believed that wellbeing is determined partly by an individual’s absolute wage (say, 30,000 dollars a year) and partly by the individual’s relative wage (say, 30,000 dollars compared to an average in the company or neighborhood of 25,000 dollars). Our evidence shows that this is inadequate. The paper demonstrates that range-frequency theory – a model developed independently within psychology and unknown to most economists – predicts that wellbeing is gained partly from the individual’s ranked position of a wage within a comparison set (say, whether the individual is number 4 or 14 in the wage hierarchy of the company). We report an experimental study and an analysis of a survey of 16,000 employees’ wage satisfaction ratings. We find evidence of rank-dependence in workers’ pay satisfaction.
Psychological Science | 2006
James S. Adelman; Gordon D. A. Brown; José F. Quesada
Word frequency is an important predictor of word-naming and lexical decision times. It is, however, confounded with contextual diversity, the number of contexts in which a word has been seen. In a study using a normative, corpus-based measure of contextual diversity, word-frequency effects were eliminated when effects of contextual diversity were taken into account (but not vice versa) across three naming and three lexical decision data sets; the same pattern of results was obtained regardless of which of three corpora was used to derive the frequency and contextual-diversity values. The results are incompatible with existing models of visual word recognition, which attribute frequency effects directly to frequency, and are particularly problematic for accounts in which frequency effects reflect learning. We argue that the results reflect the importance of likely need in memory processes, and that the continuity between reading and memory suggests using principles from memory research to inform theories of reading.
Psychological Review | 2005
Neil Stewart; Gordon D. A. Brown; Nick Chater
In unidimensional absolute identification tasks, participants identify stimuli that vary along a single dimension. Performance is surprisingly poor compared with discrimination of the same stimuli. Existing models assume that identification is achieved using long-term representations of absolute magnitudes. The authors propose an alternative relative judgment model (RJM) in which the elemental perceptual units are representations of the differences between current and previous stimuli. These differences are used, together with the previous feedback, to respond. Without using long-term representations of absolute magnitudes, the RJM accounts for (a) information transmission limits, (b) bowed serial position effects, and (c) sequential effects, where responses are biased toward immediately preceding stimuli but away from more distant stimuli (assimilation and contrast).
Trends in Cognitive Sciences | 2010
Christopher T. Kello; Gordon D. A. Brown; Ramon Ferrer-i-Cancho; John G. Holden; Klaus Linkenkaer-Hansen; Theo Rhodes; Guy C. Van Orden
Scaling laws are ubiquitous in nature, and they pervade neural, behavioral and linguistic activities. A scaling law suggests the existence of processes or patterns that are repeated across scales of analysis. Although the variables that express a scaling law can vary from one type of activity to the next, the recurrence of scaling laws across so many different systems has prompted a search for unifying principles. In biological systems, scaling laws can reflect adaptive processes of various types and are often linked to complex systems poised near critical points. The same is true for perception, memory, language and other cognitive phenomena. Findings of scaling laws in cognitive science are indicative of scaling invariance in cognitive mechanisms and multiplicative interactions among interdependent components of cognition.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences | 2009
Stephan Lewandowsky; Klaus Oberauer; Gordon D. A. Brown
Many models of short-term memory (STM) ascribe an important role to temporal decay and forgetting because of the passage of time alone. We argue against decay as the primary form of forgetting from STM, and suggest that new experimental methodologies and recent models provide new perspectives on the old issue of the causes of forgetting. We show that several classic sources of evidence for time-based forgetting can be re-interpreted in terms of an interference-based view, and that new experiments provide compelling evidence against decay. We conclude that progress requires moving beyond demonstrations of qualitative effects and focusing instead on testing quantitative predictions of models.
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review | 2004
Stephan Lewandowsky; Matthew Duncan; Gordon D. A. Brown
Time-based theories expect memory performance to decline as the delay between study and recall of an item increases. The assumption of time-based forgetting, central to many models of serial recall, underpins their key behaviors. Here we compare the predictions of time-based and event-based models by simulation and test them in two experiments using a novel manipulation of the delay between study and retrieval. Participants were trained, via corrective feedback, to recall at different speeds, thus varying total recall time from 6 to 10 sec. In the first experiment, participants used the keyboard to enter their responses but had to repeat a word (called thesuppressor) aloud during recall to prevent rehearsal. In the second experiment, articulation was again required, but recall was verbal and was paced by the number of repetitions of the suppressor in between retrieval of items. In both experiments, serial position curves for all retrieval speeds overlapped, and output time had little or no effect. Comparative evaluation of a time-based and an event-based model confirmed that these results present a particular challenge to time-based approaches. We conclude that output interference, rather than output time, is critical in serial recall.