Neil Stewart

Decision by sampling

We present a theory of decision by sampling (DbS) in which, in contrast with traditional models, there are no underlying psychoeconomic scales. Instead, we assume that an attributes subjective value is constructed from a series of binary, ordinal comparisons to a sample of attribute values drawn from memory and is its rank within the sample. We assume that the sample reflects both the immediate distribution of attribute values from the current decisions context and also the background, real-world distribution of attribute values. DbS accounts for concave utility functions; losses looming larger than gains; hyperbolic temporal discounting; and the overestimation of small probabilities and the underestimation of large probabilities.

Absolute identification by relative judgment

In unidimensional absolute identification tasks, participants identify stimuli that vary along a single dimension. Performance is surprisingly poor compared with discrimination of the same stimuli. Existing models assume that identification is achieved using long-term representations of absolute magnitudes. The authors propose an alternative relative judgment model (RJM) in which the elemental perceptual units are representations of the differences between current and previous stimuli. These differences are used, together with the previous feedback, to respond. Without using long-term representations of absolute magnitudes, the RJM accounts for (a) information transmission limits, (b) bowed serial position effects, and (c) sequential effects, where responses are biased toward immediately preceding stimuli but away from more distant stimuli (assimilation and contrast).

A social-cognitive model of trait and state levels of gratitude.

Three studies tested a new model of gratitude, which specified the generative mechanisms linking individual differences (trait gratitude) and objective situations with the amount of gratitude people experience after receiving aid (state gratitude). In Study 1, all participants (N = 253) read identical vignettes describing a situation in which they received help. People higher in trait gratitude made more positive beneficial appraisals (seeing the help as more valuable, more costly to provide, and more altruistically intended), which fully mediated the relationship between trait and state levels of gratitude. Study 2 (N = 113) replicated the findings using a daily process study in which participants reported on real events each day for up to 14 days. In Study 3, participants (N = 200) read vignettes experimentally manipulating objective situations to be either high or low in benefit. Benefit appraisals were shown to have a causal effect on state gratitude and to mediate the relationship between different prosocial situations and state gratitude. The 3 studies demonstrate the critical role of benefit appraisals in linking state gratitude with trait gratitude and the objective situation.

Are Probabilities Overweighted or Underweighted When Rare Outcomes Are Experienced (Rarely)

When making decisions involving risky outcomes on the basis of verbal descriptions of the outcomes and their associated probabilities, people behave as if they overweight small probabilities. In contrast, when the same outcomes are instead experienced in a series of samples, people behave as if they underweight small probabilities. We present two experiments showing that the existing explanations of the underweighting observed in decisions from experience are not sufficient to account for the effect. Underweighting was observed when participants experienced representative samples of events, so it cannot be attributed to undersampling of the small probabilities. In addition, earlier samples predicted decisions just as well as later samples did, so underweighting cannot be attributed to recency weighting. Finally, frequency judgments were accurate, so underweighting cannot be attributed to judgment error. Furthermore, we show that the underweighting of small probabilities is also reflected in the best-fitting parameter values obtained when prospect theory, the dominant model of risky choice, is applied to the data.

Prospect Relativity: How Choice Options Influence Decision Under Risk

In many theories of decision under risk (e.g., expected utility theory, rank-dependent utility theory, and prospect theory), the utility of a prospect is independent of other options in the choice set. The experiments presented here show a large effect of the available options, suggesting instead that prospects are valued relative to one another. The judged certainty equivalent for a prospect is strongly influenced by the options available. Similarly, the selection of a preferred prospect is strongly influenced by the prospects available. Alternative theories of decision under risk (e.g., the stochastic difference model, multialternative decision field theory, and range frequency theory), where prospects are valued relative to one another, can provide an account of these context effects.

Sequence effects in categorization of simple perceptual stimuli.

Categorization research typically assumes that the cognitive system has access to a (more or less noisy) representation of the absolute magnitudes of the properties of stimuli and that this information is used in reaching a categorization decision. However, research on identification of simple perceptual stimuli suggests that people have very poor representations of absolute magnitude information and that judgments about absolute magnitude are strongly influenced by preceding material. The experiments presented here investigate such sequence effects in categorization tasks. Strong sequence effects were found. Classification of a borderline stimulus was more accurate when preceded by a distant member of the opposite category than by a distant member of the same category. It is argued that this category contrast effect cannot be accounted for by extant exemplar or decision-bound models of categorization. The effect suggests the use of relative magnitude information in categorization. A memory and contrast model illustrates how relative magnitude information may be used in categorization.

The Cost of Anchoring on Credit-Card Minimum Repayments

About three quarters of credit card accounts attract interest charges. In the US, credit card debt is

Stimulus Intensity and the Perception of Duration

951.7 billion of a total of

Decision by sampling: The role of the decision environment in risky choice

2,539.7 billion of consumer credit. In the UK, credit card debt is £55.1 billion of £174.4 billion of consumer credit. The 2005 US Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act and the 2003 UK Treasury Select Committees report require lenders to collect a minimum payment of at least the interest accrued each month. Thus people are protected from the effects of compounding interest. But including minimum payment information has an unintended negative effect, because minimum payments act as psychological anchors.

Adobe Flash as a medium for online experimentation: a test of reaction time measurement capabilities.

This article explores the widely reported finding that the subjective duration of a stimulus is positively related to its magnitude. In Experiments 1 and 2 we show that, for both auditory and visual stimuli, the effect of stimulus magnitude on the perception of duration depends upon the background: Against a high intensity background, weak stimuli are judged to last longer. In Experiment 3 we show that the effect of intensity becomes more pronounced at longer durations, consistent with the idea that stimulus intensity affects the pacemaker component of an internal clock, and that it is the difference of a stimulus from the background, rather than its absolute magnitude, which influences the rate of the pacemaker. These results urge a modification to the oft-repeated claim that more intense stimuli seem to last longer, and provide an important constraint on any model of human timing.