Caitriona McLeish

Biosecurity and stakeholders: The rise of networks and non-state actors

This paper considers the biological weapons problem as a post-disarmament issue requiring ‘management’ or ‘governance’ rather than ‘disarmament’ or ‘arms control’. This allows for a broader analysis of the BW problem, one where a range of relevant issues, threats, challenges and actors can be examined, as well as nation-states, international treaties, terrorist groups and the like. The paper therefore provides a more accurate depiction of the wide range of current efforts to minimise the chances of biology being misused for hostile purposes. It aims to explain how and why networks and non-state actors have emerged to play a bigger role in the governance of biological technologies. Copyright , Beech Tree Publishing.

THE LIFE SCIENCES REVOLUTION AND THE BWC: Reconsidering the Science and Technology Review Process in a Post-Proliferation World

Reviews of science and technology are essential to maintain the strength of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The article provides an overview of recent trends in the life sciences and concludes that the emerging post-proliferation context requires a departure from traditional models of biological weapons nonproliferation based on top-down government controls. The evolving circumstances beg instead for a governance system that brings together all stakeholders—science, industry, government, and the public—and broadens as well as deepens the basis for compliance with the safe and responsible conduct and utilization of life sciences research. The article proposes a governance approach to be adopted by the Seventh BWC Review Conference that includes strong stakeholder involvement and a regular and holistic mechanism for science and technology reviews in the future.

Science and censorship in an age of bio-weapons threat

Concerns about the proliferation of biological weapons and the threat posed by their use, whether by warring nations or terrorists, have assumed greater political prominence in recent years. Between the 1960s and 1990s, the issue occupied a relatively low-level place on the international political agenda. However, widespread concern about biological weapons noticeably increased after 9/11 and the anthrax letters which followed shortly afterwards. In responding to this sense of heightened threat, many governments introduced new legal and defensive measures designed to prevent the misuse of the biological sciences. The USA enacted new measures such as the Provide Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (Patriot) Act 2001 and the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act 2002. These placed new restrictions on physical access to, and work performed with, certain pathogens labelled as ‘dangerous’. Accompanying such legal measures has also been an increase in investment in civilian biodefence: the FY2006 budget for example requests a total of

Evolving Biosecurity Frameworks

5.1 billion for civilian biodefence including a request of

Preventing ‘A Virological Hiroshima’: Cold War Press Coverage of Biological Weapons Disarmament

1.694 billion for activities sponsored by the National Institutes of Health (Schuler, 2005). As well as governments, other groups in society have also responded to this perceived increase in threat by devising and initiating new forms of governance. These could restrict the dissemination of scientific research containing information labelled as ‘security-sensitive’—a term loosely defined as information not easily available from public sources and/or which might be of potential use to terrorists (Bhattacharjee, 2006). Study of these legal measures and new governance proposals is necessary because, made in the name of national security concerns, they seem to be calling for change to internal governance structures of the scientific community. Proposals to restrict dissemination of science, for example, appear to run counter to the idea that scientific enterprise is built upon an open, full exchange of information, as well as counter to underlying idealistic values of scientific knowledge as common property (see for example Merton, 1973; Richelson, 1998; Shea, 2006). Yet these same proposals are regarded by some in Science as Culture Vol. 15, No. 3, 215–236, September 2006

Status quo or evolution: what next for the intersessional process of the biological and toxin weapons convention

The relationship between infectious disease and security concerns has undergone an evolution since the end of the Cold War. What was previously seen as two separate domains – public health and national security – have, through various events and disease outbreaks in the last 15 years, become intertwined and as a result biosecurity policies now need to address a spectrum of disease threats that encompass natural outbreaks, accidental releases and the deliberate use of disease as weapons.

Biosecurity, bioterrorism and the governance of science: The increasing convergence of science and security policy

This article examines representations of biological weapons during a crucial period in the recent history of this form of warfare. The study draws on a corpus of newspaper articles from the US New York Times and the UK Times and Guardian written around the time of the negotiation period of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, the international treaty banning this form of warfare. We argue that a conventional discourse can be found wherein biological weapons are portrayed as morally offensive, yet highly effective and militarily attractive. Interwoven with this discourse, however, is a secondary register which depicts biological weapons as ineffective, unpredictable and of questionable value for the military. We finish with a somewhat more speculative consideration of the significance of these discourses by asking what might have been at stake when journalists and other writers deployed such differing representations of biological warfare.

A Web of Prevention: Biological Weapons, Life Sciences and the Governance of Research

Treaties are more than just pieces of paper. In order to fulfill the obligations set forth on paper, a vitalized process is created that can be affected both positively and negatively by the actions of those who are members and by the geopolitical context in which the treaty resides. It is the actions of those who are party to a treaty that largely determine the success or failure, as each member periodically examines whether the benefits of being part of the treaty outweigh any negative obligations and other costs. In 2001, the members of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) decided upon a series of intersessional meetings which, although instigated as a rescue operation from a series of major internal and external shocks, were judged as useful, and a second series was approved. In December, States Parties to the BWC will gather for a seventh time to review the operation of the treaty and make decisions about the next five years, including whether to approve a third series of annual meetings. But would a third series in its current format be for the good of the BWC? Would a third intersessional process support States Parties in their evaluation that they are better off as members of the BWC? By reviewing the origins of the intersessional process and providing an analysis of activities thus far, the author offers suggestions to be considered for organizing a third intersessional review process.