Hanno Sauer

Educated intuitions. Automaticity and rationality in moral judgement

Moral judgements are based on automatic processes. Moral judgements are based on reason. In this paper, I argue that both of these claims are true, and show how they can be reconciled. Neither the automaticity of moral judgement nor the post hoc nature of conscious moral reasoning pose a threat to rationalist models of moral cognition. The relation moral reasoning bears to our moral judgements is not primarily mediated by episodes of conscious reasoning, but by the acquisition, formation and maintenance – in short: education – of our moral intuitions.

Morally irrelevant factors: What's left of the dual process-model of moral cognition?

Current developments in empirical moral psychology have spawned a new perspective on the traditional metaethical question of whether moral judgment is based on reason or emotion. Psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists such as Joshua Greene argue that there is empirical evidence that emotion is essential for one particularly important subclass of moral judgments: so-called “deontological judgments.” In this paper, I scrutinize this claim and argue that neither the empirical evidence for Greenes dual process-theory of moral judgment nor the normative conclusions it is supposed to yield can be maintained. More specifically, I argue that the evidence from neuroimaging relies on a problematic reverse inference, that the behavioral data are flawed, and that the findings from focal brain damage do not support the model. From a normative point of view, Greene fails to show that we ought to discount the intuitions that give rise to deontological judgments because they respond to morally irrelevant factors: firstly, I show that they do not pick up on the factors Greene deems to be morally irrelevant in the first place, and secondly, I argue that there generally is reason to trust our deontological intuitions.

Promoting inequality? Self-monitoring applications and the problem of social justice

When it comes to improving the health of the general population, mHealth technologies with self-monitoring and intervention components hold a lot of promise. We argue, however, that due to various factors such as access, targeting, personal resources or incentives, self-monitoring applications run the risk of increasing health inequalities, thereby creating a problem of social justice. We review empirical evidence for “intervention-generated” inequalities, present arguments that self-monitoring applications are still morally acceptable, and develop approaches to avoid the promotion of health inequalities through self-monitoring applications.

Between Facts and Norms: Ethics and Empirical Moral Psychology

This chapter traces the history of moral psychology from David Hume to modern empirical philosophy. It is argued that the progression of philosophical thinking about morality and the tensions between empirical and normative questions—asking “what is” versus asking “what ought to be”—provide important context for current research. This chapter focuses on the “gap” between facts and norms and outlines how key debates in philosophy—about moral relativism, free will, leading a virtuous life, and others—can be informed by empirical work.

Current Perspectives in Moral Psychology

Moral psychology has undergone a renaissance in recent years. Methodological and theoretical advances promise new perspectives on old questions—and as academic disciplines become less siloed, the potential for cross-disciplinary collaboration becomes even greater. In this chapter, we ask leading scholars to offer their views on the future of moral psychology. Biologist and primatologist Frans de Waal, philosopher Hanno Sauer, social anthropologist Paolo Heywood, and marketing scholar Verena Wieser share their thoughts on recent developments and their implications. The chapter ends with a conversation between philosophers Edouard Machery and John M. Doris—two founders of modern moral psychology—about how the field has progressed in the academy.

Winner of the Philosophical Explorations Essay prize 2012 : 'Educated intuitions. Automaticity and rationality in moral judgement' (vol 15, pg 255, 2012)

Philosophical Explorations, Volume 15, Issue 3, September 2012, pp. 255-275 Winner of the Philosophical Explorations Essay prize 2012: ‘Educated intuitions. Automaticity and rationality in moral judgement’ by Hanno Sauer DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2012.706822 The author of the above article has two affiliations: Institute for Philosophy, University of Leiden and Department of Philosophy, University of Groningen