Hans Bernhard Schmid

Strukturuntersuchungen an Siliziden

Die Struktur der isotypen Phasen V3Si2, Nb3Si2, Ta3Si2 und Cr3Si2 wurden nach dem Vorschlag vonAronsson (RaumgruppeD2d11) gerechnet. Die rontgenographische Analyse dieser Phasen spricht mehr fur eine Zusammensetzung von M5Si3.

BEYOND SELF-GOAL CHOICE: AMARTYA SEN'S ANALYSIS OF THE STRUCTURE OF COMMITMENT AND THE ROLE OF SHARED DESIRES

In the current debate on economic rationality, Amartya Sens analysis of the structure of commitment plays a uniquely important role (Weirich 2004: 387ff.). However, Sen is not alone in pitting committed action against the standard model of rational behavior. Before turning to Sens analysis in section 2 of this paper, I shall start with an observation concerning some of the other relevant accounts.

Evolution by Imitation. Gabriel Tarde and the Limits of Memetics

Meme theory confronts us with a rather unflattering image of ourselves. In Daniel C. Dennetts words, conscious selves are nothing but the ‘vehicles’ or ‘nests’ of the true heroes of the evolutionary story of culture, the memes. In the memetic view, cultural evolution is not about ‘us’, but about ‘them’: the units of culture such as the ones mentioned by Richard Dawkms: “tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes fashions, ways of making pots or of building arches”. In this paper, I shall take a critical look at some premises of this memetic ‘shift of perspective’, which turn out to be highly problematic. In a first step, the memetic image of the self as a ‘meme nest’ shall be traced back to its neo-Darwinian origins. Meme theory is built directly on the model of genetic evolution (I). As some considerations concerning the ontology of memes shall reveal, there are fundamental differences between genes and memes which cannot be accounted for within the memetic view (II). In a third step, Gabriel Tardes idea of ‘evolution by association’ shall be introduced as a convincing alternative to the memetic idea of cultural evolution. Writing almost a century before the term ‘meme’ was even coined, Tarde put forth a theory, which already contained much of the insights that make memetics attractive to the social sciences. More than that, Tarde was safe from the fatal memetic tendency to model cultural evolution too closely on genetic evolution (III). In the concluding section (TV), I shall come back to the initial question concerning the place of the self in society: what is our role in cultural evolution in a Tardean view?

Social Reality – The Phenomenological Approach

Phenomenological investigations about social reality could be argued to center around three general concepts: Social and Institutional Facts, Collective Intentionality and Values. Even though it is certainly not possible to speak of one unified theory that phenomenology as such puts forward about social reality, the systematic interconnections between these concepts make the single contributions of phenomenologists tesserae of a larger mosaic. This introduction is an attempt to sketch this mosaic by situating these notions within the debate about social ontology as conducted by phenomenologists roughly from 1910 to 1927. It also highlights the systematic connections between phenomenological insights and contemporary discussions on social ontology.

Can Brains in Vats Think as a Team

Abstract The specter of the ‘group mind’ or ‘collective subject’ plays a crucial and fateful role in the current debate on collective intentionality. Fear of the group mind is one important reason why philosophers of collective intentionality resort to individualism. It is argued here that this measure taken against the group mind is as unnecessary as it is detrimental to our understanding of what it means to share an intention. A non-individualistic concept of shared intentionality does not necessarily have to get stuck with some collectivist super-agent. Rather, the specter of the group mind arises from a deep-seated ‘Cartesian’ preconception concerning intentionality, which we should try to overcome. *I am greatly indebted to Raimo Tuomela for his comments. Also, I wish to thank Michael Bratman, Fabienne Peter, Richard Raatzsch and Katrin Meyer.Abstract The specter of the ‘group mind’ or ‘collective subject’ plays a crucial and fateful role in the current debate on collective intentionality. Fear of the group mind is one important reason why philosophers of collective intentionality resort to individualism. It is argued here that this measure taken against the group mind is as unnecessary as it is detrimental to our understanding of what it means to share an intention. A non-individualistic concept of shared intentionality does not necessarily have to get stuck with some collectivist super-agent. Rather, the specter of the group mind arises from a deep-seated ‘Cartesian’ preconception concerning intentionality, which we should try to overcome. *I am greatly indebted to Raimo Tuomela for his comments. Also, I wish to thank Michael Bratman, Fabienne Peter, Richard Raatzsch and Katrin Meyer.

What Kind of Mode is the We-Mode?

The concept of the we-mode plays a central role in Raimo Tuomela’s work. In his account, the we-mode is the form of intentionality at work in joint action. The suggestion is that typical forms of joint action involve collective intentionality, and that the distinction between individual intentionality and collective intentionality concerns the intentional mode rather than just the content of the intentional attitudes in question. This paper examines this claim and argues for a plural subject view of collective intentionality.

Trying to Act Together

When people act jointly, their mind is usually on their shared goal rather than on each other. It seems clear, however, that any intention to participate in a shared intentional activity involves some “background sense” of the other participants as participating, or intending to participate. This chapter addresses the question of the nature and kind of the attitude in question. It is argued against a number of received accounts that it is a special kind of interpersonal trust that combines cognitive and normative elements in a particular way.

Symposium on rationality and commitment: Introduction

In his critique of rational choice theory, Amartya Sen claims that committed agents do not (or not exclusively) pursue their own goals. This claim appears to be nonsensical since even strongly heteronomous or altruistic agents cannot pursue other peoples goals without making them their own. It seems that self-goal choice is constitutive of any kind of agency. In this paper, Sens radical claim is defended. It is argued that the objection raised against Sens claim holds only with respect to individual goals. Not all goals, however, are individual goals; there are shared goals, too. Shared goals are irreducible to individual goals, as the argument from we-derivativeness and the argument from normativity show. It is further claimed that an adequate account of committed action defies both internalism and externalism about practical reason.

The Phenomenological Approach to Social Reality

Phenomenological investigations about social reality could be argued to center around three general concepts: Social and Institutional Facts, Collective Intentionality and Values. Even though it is certainly not possible to speak of one unifi ed theory that phenomenology as such puts forward about social reality, the systematic interconnections between these concepts make the single contributions of phenomenologists tesserae of a larger mosaic. This introduction is an attempt to sketch this mosaic by situating these notions within the debate about social ontology as conducted by phenomenologists roughly from 1910 to 1927. It also highlights the systematic connections between phenomenological insights and contemporary discussions on social ontology.

Communal Feelings and Implicit Self-Knowledge. Hermann Schmalenbach on the Nature of the Social Bond

It is widely accepted in the received literature that the decisive feature in the constitution of community, and indeed its ontological core, is some sort of collective acknowledgement of the community, and mutual recognition between the members. A prominent version of this claim is that communities exist insofar as their members believe they exist, and that the communal bond is mutual sympathy. Yet this view is at odds with rather obvious facts: community members often dislike each other, and are far from acknowledging the existence of any such bond. How can these phenomena be accommodated in the view that community is a matter of attitude rather than of brute objective facts? This paper suggests an answer that is inspired by the work of the German phenomenologist Hermann Schmalenbach (1885–1950). The claim is that the basic communal ties are plural implicit self-knowledge of the participants as members of the community. Implicit self-knowledge is often not reflectively transparent. Community members are plurally self-aware without thinking of themselves in “we”-terms. Where individuals consciously conceive of themselves as members, the community is turned into what Schmalenbach proposes to call a communion.