Hiau Looi Kee

Estimating Trade Restrictiveness Indices

The objective of this paper is to provide indicators of trade restrictiveness that include both measures of tariff and nontariff barriers for 91 developing and industrial countries. For each country, the authors estimate three trade restrictiveness indices. The first one summarizes the degree of trade distortions that each country imposes on itself through its own trade policies. The second one focuses on the trade distortions imposed by each country on its import bundle. The last index focuses on market access and summarizes the trade distortions imposed by the rest of the world on each countrys export bundle. All indices are estimated for the broad aggregates of manufacturing and agriculture products. Results suggest that poor countries (and those with the highest poverty headcount) tend to be more restrictive, but they also face the highest trade barriers on their export bundle. This is partly explained by the fact that agriculture protection is generally larger than manufacturing protection. Nontariff barriers contribute more than 70 percent on average to world protection, underlying their importance for any study on trade protection.

Import Demand Elasticities and Trade Distortions

To study the effects of tariffs on gross domestic product (GDP), one needs import demand elasticities at the tariff line level that are consistent with GDP maximization. These do not exist. The authors modify Kohlis (1991) GDP function approach to estimate demand elasticities for 4,625 imported goods in 117 countries. Following Anderson and Neary (1992, 1994) and Feenstra (1995), they use these estimates to construct theoretically sound trade restrictiveness indices, and GDP losses associated with existing tariff structures. Countries are revealed to be 30 percent more restrictive than their simple or import-weighted average tariffs would suggest. Thus, distortion is nontrivial. GDP losses are largest in China, Germany, India, Mexico, and the United States.

Is Protectionism on the Rise? Assessing National Trade Policies During the Crisis of 2008

To understand the role of trade policies in the crisis of 2008, this paper constructs the overall trade restrictiveness indices for a wide range of countries using their tariff schedules in 2008 and 2009. The index summarizes the trade policy stance of a country, taking into account the share of each good in trade as well as its corresponding import demand elasticity. Results show that there is no widespread increase in protectionism via tariff policies since the global financial crisis has unfolded. While many countries have adjusted tariffs upward on selected products, only a handful of countries, such as Malawi, Russia, Argentina, Turkey and China focus on products that have significant impacts on trade flows. The United States and the European Union, by contrast, rely mainly on anti-dumping duties to shield domestic industries. Overall, while the rise in tariffs and anti-dumping duties in these countries may have jointly caused global trade to drop by as much as US

Export variety and country productivity

43 billion during the crisis period, it explains less than 2 percent of the collapse in world trade.

On the Measurement of Product Variety in Trade

The authors study the link between export product variety and country productivity based on data from 34 industrial and developing countries, from 1982 to 1997. They measure export product variety by the share of U.S. imports on the set of goods exported by each sampled country relative to the world. It is a theoretically sound index which is consistent with within-country GDP maximization, as well as cross-country comparison. They construct country productivity based on relative endowments and product variety. Increases in output product variety improve country productivity as the new mix of output may better use resources of the economy, and improve allocation efficiency. Such effects depend on the elasticity of substitution in production between the different varieties. The more different the varieties are in terms of production, the more efficient it is to use the endowments of the economy when a new variety is available, which leads to productivity gains. In addition, as suggested in the literature, export product variety depends on trade costs, such as tariffs, distance, and transport costs. Such trade cost variables are used as instruments to help the authors identify the effects of export variety on country productivity. Empirical evidence supports their hypothesis. Overall, while export variety accounts for only 2 percent of cross-country productivity differences, it explains 13 percent of within-country productivity growth. A 10 percent increase in the export variety of all industries leads to a 1.3 percent increase in country productivity, while a 10 percentage point increase in tariffs facing an exporting country leads to a 2 percent fall in country productivity.

Markups, Entry Regulation, and Trade: Does Country Size Matter?

Product variety plays an important role in the theoretical work on monopolistic competition and trade, and recent empirical work has begun to quantify this for aggregate and disaggregate import demands. The authors discuss the measurement of product variety in trade, using a broad cross-section of industrial and developing countries and disaggregating across sectors. The authors calculate the export variety of countries in their sales to the United States, and relate the export variety indexes to country productivities. They confirm that countries with greater product variety in exports also have higher productivity. This may be due to their development of and access to these products.

Estimating Productivity When Primal and Dual TFP Accounting Fail: An Illustration Using Singapore's Industries

Actual, and potential competition is a powerful source of discipline on the pricing behavior of firms with market power. The authors develop a simple model that shows that the effects of new entry, and import competition on industry price-cost markups, depend on country size. The authors predicted that barriers to domestic entry would have a stronger anti-competitive effect in large countries, while barriers to foreign entry (imports) would have a stronger effect in small countries. After estimating markups for manufacturing sectors in forty-one industrial, and developing countries, they test these hypotheses, and find that the hypotheses cannot be rejected by the data. For example, although Indonesia, and Italy impose the same number of regulations on the entry of new firms, the effect of the regulations on manufacturing markups is twenty percent greater in Italy because of its larger size. Similarly, while Chile and Zimbabwe have the same import penetration ration, the market discipline effect of imports is thirteen percent greater in Zimbabwe because of its smaller size.

Tariffs, Entry Regulation and Markups: Country Size Matters

Abstract For both primal and dual TFP growth accounting to properly account for productivity growth, assumptions of constant returns to scale and perfect competition are necessary. This paper shows that without these assumptions, while both TFP growth accounting measures remain equal if factor shares are constant, they are also equally bad at measuring productivity growth. This paper proposes a structural regression to estimate productivity growth based on more general production and cost functions. Using Singapores industries as illustrations, this paper finds that the assumptions are widely rejected, and the estimated productivity growth exceeds both the accounting measures. When the same methodology is applied to the aggregate Singapore data, the estimated productivity growth is 4.4 percent per year, significantly higher than that of Youngs (1992) and Hsiehs (2002).

Market Access for Sale: Latin America's Lobbying for US Tariff Preferences

Actual and potential competition is a powerful source of discipline on the pricing behavior of firms. This paper extends the empirical literature on the pro-competitive impact of policy reforms by investigating the effects on price markups of barriers to both domestic and foreign entry in a sample of developed and developing countries. While both are found to be important determinants of industry markups, we find that country size affects the impact of tariffs and domestic entry regulation. Country size dampens the impact of the former and strengthens the effect of the latter.

A Model on Knowledge and Endogenous Growth

This paper assesses the foreign lobbying forces behind the tariff preferences that the United States grants to Latin American and Caribbean countries. The basic framework is the one developed that is extended to explain the relationship between foreign lobbying and tariff preferences. Results suggest that returns to Latin American and Caribbean exporters lobbying for tariff preferences in the United States are around 50 percent. The reason for these large returns is the relatively low estimated weight given to social welfare in the U.S. governments objective function when deciding whether or not to grant tariff preferences to Latin American and Caribbean exporters.