Ilaria Gabbatore

A broad assessment of theory of mind in adolescence: The complexity of mindreading

The aim of this research was to provide an articulated assessment of several different ToM components, namely first- vs. third-person, egocentric vs. allocentric, and first- vs. second-order ToM, in preadolescence and adolescence. Our expectations for the sample of 80 juveniles that participated in the research were that: (1) ToM abilities would improve with age; (2) participants would perform better at first-person than at third-person tasks; (3) participants would perform better at first-order than at second-order tasks; (4) girls will perform systematically better than boys. We also explored possible differences in performance (5) in the allocentric vs. the egocentric perspectives as well as (6) in the comprehension of different types of mental states, namely desires, beliefs and positive and negative emotions. Overall our expectations were confirmed. Our data confirmed that all ToM aspects we investigated keep maturing during preadolescence and adolescence.

Assessment of pragmatic impairment in right hemisphere damage

Abstract Aim of the present study is to provide a multifocal assessment of pragmatic abilities in patients with right hemisphere damage (RHD). Pragmatics refers to the ability to use language and non-verbal expressive means (e.g., gestures) to convey meaning in a given context, and it also involves the appropriate use of connotative elements such as rhythm and prosody. Patients with RHD frequently report a wide range of pragmatic disorders: despite the heterogeneity of their clinical profiles, these difficulties can seriously undermine their ability to effectively communicate in everyday situations. We analysed the performance of 17 patients with RHD and 17 healthy controls using the Assessment Battery for Communication, a clinical tool for assessing a wide range of pragmatic phenomena - both in comprehension and production - and considering different expressive means. The results suggest patients have difficulties both in comprehending and producing pragmatic phenomena of differing complexity; in particular, patients seem to be significantly impaired when dealing with non-verbal modality, i.e., gestures and facial expressions. Moreover a hierarchical cluster analysis revealed the presence of a number of clusters corresponding to different outcomes of pragmatic performance, in line with the heterogeneity of communicative profiles following RHD frequently reported in the literature.

Sincere, deceitful, and ironic communicative acts and the role of the theory of mind in childhood

The aim of the study is to investigate the relationship among age, first- and second-order Theory of Mind and the increasing ability of children to understand and produce different kinds of communicative acts – sincere, ironic, and deceitful communicative acts – expressed through linguistic and extralinguistic expressive means. To communicate means to modify an interlocutor’s mental states (Grice, 1989), and pragmatics studies the inferential processes that are necessary to fill the gap, which often exists in human communication, between the literal meaning of a speaker’s utterance and what the speaker intends to communicate to the interlocutor. We administered brief video-clip stories showing different kinds of pragmatic phenomena – sincere, ironic, and deceitful communicative acts - and first- and second-order ToM tasks, to 120 children, ranging in age from 3 to 8 years. The results showed the existence of a trend of difficulty in children’s ability to deal with both linguistic and extralinguistic pragmatic tasks, from the simplest to the most difficult: sincere, deceitful, and ironic communicative acts. A hierarchical regression analysis indicated that age plays a significant role in explaining children’s performance on each pragmatic task. Furthermore, the hierarchical regression analysis revealed that first-order ToM has a causal role in explaining children’s performance in handling sincere and deceitful speech acts, but not irony. We did not detect any specific role for second-order ToM. Finally, ToM only partially explains the observed increasing trend of difficulty in children’s pragmatic performance: the variance in pragmatic performance explained by ToM increases between sincere and deceitful communicative acts, but not between deceit and irony. The role of inferential ability in explaining the improvement in children’s performance across the pragmatic tasks investigated is discussed.

Cognitive Pragmatic Rehabilitation Program in Schizophrenia: A Single Case fMRI Study

Introduction. The present study was intended to evaluate the effects of a rehabilitative training, the Cognitive Pragmatic Treatment (CPT), aimed at improving communicative-pragmatic abilities and the related cognitive components, on the cerebral modifications of a single case patient diagnosed with schizophrenia. Methods. The patient underwent two functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) sessions, before and after the treatment. In order to assess brain changes, we calculated the Amplitude of Low Frequency Fluctuation (ALFF) index of the resting-state fMRI signal, which is interpreted as reflecting the intensity of the spontaneous regional activity of the brain. Behavioural measures of the patients communicative performance were also gathered before and after training and at follow-up. Results. The patient improved his communicative performance in almost all tests. Posttraining stronger ALFF signal emerged in the superior, inferior, and medial frontal gyri, as well as the superior temporal gyri. Conclusions. Even if based on a single case study, these preliminary results show functional changes at the cerebral level that seem to support the patients behavioural improvements.

Why pragmatics and theory of mind do not (completely) overlap

Aim of the paper is to discuss the extent to which pragmatics, i.e., the ability to use language and other expressive means to convey meaning in a specific interactional context, overlaps with Theory of Mind (ToM), i.e., the ability to ascribe mental states to oneself and the others. We present empirical data available in the current literature concerning the relation between these two faculties, with specific reference to the developmental and clinical domains. Part of the literature we take into account appears to show that ToM does correlate with pragmatic ability; however, other studies appear to show that pragmatic ability alone cannot explain the empirical differences of performance across different kinds of pragmatic tasks, and therefore that another, at least partially different faculty is required to account for human communication. We argue that to conceive pragmatics as a sort of subcomponent of ToM, and thus to conflate or reduce the notion of pragmatics into the (wider) notion of ToM, is not theoretically correct and a possible cause of methodological confusion in the relevant empirical research. It thus turns out to be necessary that the two faculties be investigated with separate theories as well as different experimental tasks.