Jakob Skovgaard

EU climate policy after the crisis

In the period 2009–2011, Member States discussed whether the EU should increase its emissions reduction target for 2020 beyond the existing 20%. This discussion has not resulted in any agreement, the different actors being deeply divided between those calling for a step-up to a higher target (for instance 30%) and those opposed to any kind of increase. The division can be seen as a result of a conflict between policy frames. The economic crisis has deepened the division between those who see climate-change policy as detrimental to growth and those seeing it as beneficial to growth. Whereas the latter group – including the UK and DG Climate Action –subscribe to the green growth policy frame, the former – including Poland – subscribe to the ‘trade-off policy frame’. Many Member States have been internally divided between proponents and opponents of a step-up, often with environment ministries in the former camp and finance and economics ministries in the latter.

The Limits of Entrapment: The Negotiations on EU Reduction Targets, 2007-11

In 2007, the EU decided to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 20/30 per cent, something which was considered a proof of the EUs willingness to take on high targets independently of others. In the period 2009–11, the EU was debating but could not reach an agreement on stepping up to a 30 per cent reduction target. This raises the question: why did the EU go from being capable of adopting high targets independently of others to being incapable of agreeing whether it should increase its mitigation effort? It is argued that whereas actors sceptical of a high target could be rhetorically entrapped in 2007, such entrapment was impossible in the 2009–11 period. The lack of entrapment can be explained in terms of changes in the international and socio‐economic contexts, which led to changes in the policy processes and the normative environment, which again made effective entrapment impossible.

Learning about Climate Change: Finance Ministries in International Climate Change Politics

In the course of the last four years, finance ministries have increasingly become involved in the international climate change negotiations. Their involvement has to a large degree been an outcome of the framing of climate change as a market failure. This framing calls for an active climate change policy and is at odds with the framing of climate change policy that was previously predominant in finance ministries: that it constitutes expenditure to be avoided. The persistence of both framings has led to clashes within and between finance ministries with respect to climate change. The article calls for further research focusing on the role of the two frames and of finance ministries as actors in climate change politics.

The devil lies in the definition: competing approaches to fossil fuel subsidies at the IMF and the OECD

Fossil fuel subsidy reform has in recent years been addressed by international economic organizations including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The two organizations have differed significantly in how they define fossil fuel subsidies. The IMF’s definition constitutes a radical break with previous definitions by including environmental externalities, while the OECD’s is more conventional. The article explores the factors that explain why these international economic organizations have approached fossil fuel subsidies so differently. The exact definition of fossil fuel subsidies is contested. Furthermore, fossil fuels subsidies can be framed in ways that emphasize, respectively, their macroeconomic, fiscal, environmental, and distributive consequences. The article finds that institutional interaction lifted OECD involvement in fossil fuel subsidies to a new level, whereas the impetus to address fossil fuel subsidies within the IMF came largely from the IMF staff. In both cases, the organization’s bureaucracy constituted the most important factor shaping how the organizations addressed such subsidies and hence the main reason why they differ in how they approach fossil fuel subsidies.

Limiting costs or correcting market failures? : Finance ministries and frame alignment in UN climate finance negotiations

Finance ministries are increasingly involved in UN climate finance negotiations, yet this development received very limited attention in the literature on climate finance or climate negotiations. It is not obvious from the literature on bureaucratic politics how these ministries will position themselves on climate finance: they may frame climate finance as expenditure to be limited or as an instrument for correcting the market failure of climate change. This paper investigates which frames have characterised the positions of finance ministries on key issues in the climate finance negotiations, and whether the use of a given frame corresponds to particular factors. Case studies of Denmark, India, Indonesia and the USA based on official documents and interviews show that the position of each finance ministry is generally consistent with one particular frame. The Indonesian and Danish finance ministries predominantly framed climate finance as a way of correcting a market failure. The Indian Ministry of Finance emphasised Common but Differentiated Responsibilities, which fits with the budget frame. The US Treasury’s position similarly fits with the budget frame while sharing elements of the market failure frame. Finance ministries that had the lead on climate finance were more likely follow the budget frame. The use of both frames cuts across the divide between industrialised and emerging economies. With the exception of the USA, left- and right-wing governments were equally likely to adopt either frame. These findings indicate that strengthening finance ministry forums built around the market failure frame can be a way of reducing norm fragmentation.

Special issue: managing fragmentation and complexity in the emerging system of international climate finance

Climate finance occupies the lion’s share of funding under international environmental agreements (UNEP 2012: 467–469), and its volume is likely to increase substantially if current multilateral targets are fulfilled. At the landmark summit under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Paris in 2015, countries recognized the ‘‘urgent need to enhance the provision of finance’’ to assist developing

The Politics and Governance of Energy Subsidies

Energy subsidies are an important tool through which governments can support domestic energy production and protect energy consumers. However, the exact size of these subsidies in many countries remains unclear. More importantly, energy subsidies have a variety of positive and negative economic, environmental and social effects, and it remains unclear how and under which political conditions negative effects stemming from energy subsidies could be mitigated. This chapter addresses these issues by examining the reasons why countries choose to subsidise energy production and consumption, the scope and effects of energy subsidies, and options for reform. The chapter also highlights the roles played by various international institutions in governing energy subsidies. It concludes with outlining areas for further inquiry.

Greener than expected? EU finance ministries address climate finance

Climate finance constitutes an integral part of the European Union’s climate policy. Yet, climate policy is increasingly addressed by non-environmental institutions. In examining the transfer of climate finance from the Environment Council to the Council for Economic and Financial Affairs (ECOFIN) in spring 2009, I analyse how climate finance has been framed in ECOFIN. Two finance ministerial framings quickly became intrinsic to ECOFIN and had a substantial influence on climate finance decisions: securing an effective response to climate change and limiting public expenditure. While policy entrepreneurs managed to build a consensus on most issues around an effective response to climate change, Member States at the October 2009 ECOFIN Council could not agree on a joint position due to some Member States’ emphasis on limiting expenditure. Only the European Council was capable of resolving the issue.