James Allan Cheyne

Absent-mindedness: Lapses of conscious awareness and everyday cognitive failures

A brief self-report scale was developed to assess everyday performance failures arising directly or primarily from brief failures of sustained attention (attention-related cognitive errors-ARCES). The ARCES was found to be associated with a more direct measure of propensity to attention lapses (Mindful Attention Awareness Scale--MAAS) and to errors on an existing behavioral measure of sustained attention (Sustained Attention to Response Task--SART). Although the ARCES and MAAS were highly correlated, structural modelling revealed the ARCES was more directly related to SART errors and the MAAS to SART RTs, which have been hypothesized to directly reflect the lapses of attention that lead to SART errors. Thus, the MAAS and SART RTs appear to directly reflect attention lapses, whereas the ARCES and SART errors reflect the mistakes these lapses are thought to cause. Boredom proneness was also assessed by the BPS, as a separate consequence of a propensity to attention lapses. Although the ARCES was significantly associated with the BPS, this association was entirely accounted for by the MAAS, suggesting that performance errors and boredom are separate consequences of lapses in attention. A tendency to even extraordinarily brief attention lapses on the order of milliseconds may have far-reaching consequences not only for safe and efficient task performance but also for sustaining the motivation to persist in and enjoy these tasks.

Analytic cognitive style predicts religious and paranormal belief.

An analytic cognitive style denotes a propensity to set aside highly salient intuitions when engaging in problem solving. We assess the hypothesis that an analytic cognitive style is associated with a history of questioning, altering, and rejecting (i.e., unbelieving) supernatural claims, both religious and paranormal. In two studies, we examined associations of God beliefs, religious engagement (attendance at religious services, praying, etc.), conventional religious beliefs (heaven, miracles, etc.) and paranormal beliefs (extrasensory perception, levitation, etc.) with performance measures of cognitive ability and analytic cognitive style. An analytic cognitive style negatively predicted both religious and paranormal beliefs when controlling for cognitive ability as well as religious engagement, sex, age, political ideology, and education. Participants more willing to engage in analytic reasoning were less likely to endorse supernatural beliefs. Further, an association between analytic cognitive style and religious engagement was mediated by religious beliefs, suggesting that an analytic cognitive style negatively affects religious engagement via lower acceptance of conventional religious beliefs. Results for types of God belief indicate that the association between an analytic cognitive style and God beliefs is more nuanced than mere acceptance and rejection, but also includes adopting less conventional God beliefs, such as Pantheism or Deism. Our data are consistent with the idea that two people who share the same cognitive ability, education, political ideology, sex, age and level of religious engagement can acquire very different sets of beliefs about the world if they differ in their propensity to think analytically.

Wandering Minds and Wavering Rhythms: Linking Mind Wandering and Behavioral Variability

Mind wandering is a pervasive feature of human cognition often associated with the withdrawal of task-related executive control processes. Here, we explore the possibility that, in tasks requiring executive control to sustain consistent responding, moments of mind wandering could be associated with moments of increased behavioral variability. To test this possibility, we developed and administered a novel task (the metronome response task) in which participants were instructed to respond synchronously (via button presses) with the continuous rhythmic presentation of tones. We provide evidence (replicated across 2 independent samples) that response variability during the 5 trials preceding probe-caught reports of mind wandering (tuned-out and zoned-out mind wandering) is significantly greater than during the 5 trials preceding reports of on-task performance. These results suggest that, at least in some tasks, behavioral variability is an online marker of mind wandering.

Cognitive style and religiosity: The role of conflict detection

Recent research has indicated a negative relation between the propensity for analytic reasoning and religious beliefs and practices. Here, we propose conflict detection as a mechanism underlying this relation, on the basis of the hypothesis that more-analytic people are less religious, in part, because they are more sensitive to conflicts between immaterial religious beliefs and beliefs about the material world. To examine cognitive conflict sensitivity, we presented problems containing stereotypes that conflicted with base-rate probabilities in a task with no religious content. In three studies, we found evidence that religiosity is negatively related to conflict detection during reasoning. Independent measures of analytic cognitive style also positively predicted conflict detection. The present findings provide evidence for a mechanism potentially contributing to the negative association between analytic thinking and religiosity, and more generally, they illustrate the insights to be gained from integrating individual-difference factors and contextual factors to investigate analytic reasoning.

On the relation of mind wandering and ADHD symptomatology

Mind wandering seems to be a prototypical feature of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). However, an important emerging distinction of mind-wandering types hinges on whether a given episode of mind wandering reflects a failure of executive control (spontaneous mind wandering) or the engagement of controlled processes for internal processing (deliberate mind wandering). Here we distinguish between spontaneous and deliberate mind wandering and test the hypothesis that symptoms of ADHD are associated with the former but not the latter. We assessed ADHD symptomatology and everyday levels of deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering in two large non-clinical samples (Ns = 1,354). In addition, to provide converging evidence, we examined rates of deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering in a clinically diagnosed ADHD sample. Results provide clear evidence that spontaneous, but not deliberate, mind wandering is a central feature of ADHD symptomatology at both the clinical and non-clinical level. We discuss the implications of these results for understanding both ADHD and mind wandering.

Attention failures versus misplaced diligence: separating attention lapses from speed-accuracy trade-offs.

In two studies of a GO-NOGO task assessing sustained attention, we examined the effects of (1) altering speed-accuracy trade-offs through instructions (emphasizing both speed and accuracy or accuracy only) and (2) auditory alerts distributed throughout the task. Instructions emphasizing accuracy reduced errors and changed the distribution of GO trial RTs. Additionally, correlations between errors and increasing RTs produced a U-function; excessively fast and slow RTs accounted for much of the variance of errors. Contrary to previous reports, alerts increased errors and RT variability. The results suggest that (1) standard instructions for sustained attention tasks, emphasizing speed and accuracy equally, produce errors arising from attempts to conform to the misleading requirement for speed, which become conflated with attention-lapse produced errors and (2) auditory alerts have complex, and sometimes deleterious, effects on attention. We argue that instructions emphasizing accuracy provide a more precise assessment of attention lapses in sustained attention tasks.

Absent minds and absent agents: Attention-lapse induced alienation of agency

We report a novel task designed to elicit transient attention-lapse induced alienation (ALIA) of agency experiences in normal participants. When attention-related action slips occur during the task, participants reported substantially decreased self control as well as a high degree of perceived agency attributed to the errant hand. In addition, participants reported being surprised by, and annoyed with, the actions of the errant hand. We argue that ALIA experiences occur because of constraints imposed by the close and precise temporal relations between intention formation and a contrary action employed in this paradigm. We note similarities between ALIA experiences and anarchic hand sign (AHS) and argue that, despite important differences, both ALIA experiences and AHS phenomenology reflect failures of executive control to intervene and cancel contrary affordance-driven habitual motor plans.

Media multitasking and failures of attention in everyday life

Using a series of online self-report measures, we examine media multitasking, a particularly pervasive form of multitasking, and its relations to three aspects of everyday attention: (1) failures of attention and cognitive errors (2) mind wandering, and (3) attentional control with an emphasis on attentional switching and distractibility. We observed a positive correlation between levels of media multitasking and self-reports of attentional failures, as well as with reports of both spontaneous and deliberate mind wandering. No correlation was observed between media multitasking and self-reported memory failures, lending credence to the hypothesis that media multitasking may be specifically related to problems of inattention, rather than cognitive errors in general. Furthermore, media multitasking was not related with self-reports of difficulties in attention switching or distractibility. We offer a plausible causal structural model assessing both direct and indirect effects among media multitasking, attentional failures, mind wandering, and cognitive errors, with the heuristic goal of constraining and motivating theories of the effects of media multitasking on inattention.

Consistency of sustained attention across modalities: comparing visual and auditory versions of the SART.

We develop and assess an auditory version of an increasingly widely used measure of sustained attention, the Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART). In two separate studies, the auditory SART generated slower response times and fewer errors than the visual SART. Proportion of errors, response times, and response time variability were, however, significantly and strongly correlated across the two modalities. The cross-modality correlations were generally equivalent to split-half correlations within modalities, indicating a strong agreement of the assessment of individual differences in sustained attention in the visual and auditory modalities. The foregoing results plus the finding that errors on the auditory SART were reduced suggests that the auditory SART may be a preferred alternative for use with populations with deficits in sustained attention.

Restless Mind, Restless Body

In the present work, we investigate the hypothesis that failures of task-related executive control that occur during episodes of mind wandering are associated with an increase in extraneous movements (fidgeting). In 2 studies, we assessed mind wandering using thought probes while participants performed the metronome response task (MRT), which required them to synchronize button presses with tones. Participants performed this task while sitting on a Wii Balance Board providing us with an index of fidgeting. Results of Study 1 demonstrate that relative to on-task periods, mind wandering is indeed accompanied by increases in fidgeting, as well as increased response variability in the MRT. In Study 2, we observed that only deep mind wandering was associated with increases in fidgeting, whereas task-related response variability increased even during mild mind wandering. We interpret these findings in the context of current theories of mind wandering and suggest that (a) mind wandering is associated with costs not only to primary-task performance but also to secondary-task goals (e.g., controlling extraneous movements) and (b) these costs may depend on the degree to which task-related executive control processes are disengaged during mind wandering (i.e., depth of mind wandering).