Jonathan S. A. Carriere

Absent-mindedness: Lapses of conscious awareness and everyday cognitive failures

A brief self-report scale was developed to assess everyday performance failures arising directly or primarily from brief failures of sustained attention (attention-related cognitive errors-ARCES). The ARCES was found to be associated with a more direct measure of propensity to attention lapses (Mindful Attention Awareness Scale--MAAS) and to errors on an existing behavioral measure of sustained attention (Sustained Attention to Response Task--SART). Although the ARCES and MAAS were highly correlated, structural modelling revealed the ARCES was more directly related to SART errors and the MAAS to SART RTs, which have been hypothesized to directly reflect the lapses of attention that lead to SART errors. Thus, the MAAS and SART RTs appear to directly reflect attention lapses, whereas the ARCES and SART errors reflect the mistakes these lapses are thought to cause. Boredom proneness was also assessed by the BPS, as a separate consequence of a propensity to attention lapses. Although the ARCES was significantly associated with the BPS, this association was entirely accounted for by the MAAS, suggesting that performance errors and boredom are separate consequences of lapses in attention. A tendency to even extraordinarily brief attention lapses on the order of milliseconds may have far-reaching consequences not only for safe and efficient task performance but also for sustaining the motivation to persist in and enjoy these tasks.

Anatomy of an error: A bidirectional state model of task engagement/disengagement and attention-related errors

We present arguments and evidence for a three-state attentional model of task engagement/disengagement. The model postulates three states of mind-wandering: occurrent task inattention, generic task inattention, and response disengagement. We hypothesize that all three states are both causes and consequences of task performance outcomes and apply across a variety of experimental and real-world tasks. We apply this model to the analysis of a widely used GO/NOGO task, the Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART). We identify three performance characteristics of the SART that map onto the three states of the model: RT variability, anticipations, and omissions. Predictions based on the model are tested, and largely corroborated, via regression and lag-sequential analyses of both successful and unsuccessful withholding on NOGO trials as well as self-reported mind-wandering and everyday cognitive errors. The results revealed theoretically consistent temporal associations among the state indicators and between these and SART errors as well as with self-report measures. Lag analysis was consistent with the hypotheses that temporal transitions among states are often extremely abrupt and that the association between mind-wandering and performance is bidirectional. The bidirectional effects suggest that errors constitute important occasions for reactive mind-wandering. The model also enables concrete phenomenological, behavioral, and physiological predictions for future research.

Everyday attention lapses and memory failures: The affective consequences of mindlessness

We examined the affective consequences of everyday attention lapses and memory failures. Significant associations were found between self-report measures of attention lapses (MAAS-LO), attention-related cognitive errors (ARCES), and memory failures (MFS), on the one hand, and boredom (BPS) and depression (BDI-II), on the other. Regression analyses confirmed previous findings that the ARCES partially mediates the relation between the MAAS-LO and MFS. Further regression analyses also indicated that the association between the ARCES and BPS was entirely accounted for by the MAAS-LO and MFS, as was that between the ARCES and BDI-II. Structural modeling revealed the associations to be optimally explained by the MAAS-LO and MFS influencing the BPS and BDI-II, contrary to current conceptions of attention and memory problems as consequences of affective dysfunction. A lack of conscious awareness of ones actions, signaled by the propensity to experience brief lapses of attention and related memory failures, is thus seen as having significant consequences in terms of long-term affective well-being.

Out of Mind, Out of Sight Eye Blinking as Indicator and Embodiment of Mind Wandering

Mind wandering, in which cognitive processing of the external environment decreases in favor of internal processing (Small-wood & Schooler, 2006), has been consistently associated with errors on tasks requiring sustained attention and continu-ous stimulus monitoring (e.g., Cheyne, Carriere, & Smilek, 2006; Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997; Smallwood et al., 2004). Consistent with this finding, recent neuroimaging studies suggest that mind wandering engages the default neural network (Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 2009; Mason et al., 2007; Smallwood, Beach, Schooler, & Handy, 2008; Weissman, Roberts, Viss-cher, & Woldorff, 2006) and is associated with decreased neu-ral analysis of incoming information (Christoff et al., 2009; Smallwood, Beach, et al., 2008; Weissman et al., 2006). Here, we propose that mind wandering also involves overt embodied components whereby external input is blocked at the sensory endings. We demonstrate that during an extended period of reading, episodes of mind wandering, compared with on-task periods, contain more eye closures (blinks) and fewer fixa-tions on the text―even as subjects continue to scan the text.The present investigation is based on the idea that blink rate might serve to modulate trade-offs between attention to mind-wandering thoughts and to external task-related stimuli. Blinks reduce processing of external stimuli in two ways―by physi-cally closing the eyelid and by generating cortical suppression of visual processing both before and after the time of actual lid closure (Bristow, Frith, & Rees, 2005; Bristow, Haynes, Syl-vester, Frith, & Rees, 2005; Ridder & Tomlinson, 1997; Volk-mann, 1986). Increasing the rate of such visual interruptions may facilitate a shift in the balance of processing from exter-nal stimuli to internal thoughts. Consistent with these consid-erations, evidence suggests that an increase in eye blinks is associated with errors in vigilance to external stimuli (Papadelis et al., 2007; Poulton & Gregory, 1952; Van Orden, Jung, & Makeig, 2000) and with conflict between internal and external workload (Recarte, Perez, Conchillo, & Nunes, 2008).To assess the relation between eye blinks and mind wandering, we compared blink rates during probe-caught epi-sodes of mind wandering and on-task periods of reading. Mind-wandering episodes during reading are relatively fre-quent; everyone has experienced interfering thoughts that compromise reading (Reichle, Reineberg, & Schooler, in press; Schooler, Reichle, & Halpern, 2004; Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2008), and it is possible to even find oneself at the end of a page with no recollection of having processed the material just “read.” Such

Failures of sustained attention in life, lab, and brain: Ecological validity of the SART

The Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART) is a widely used tool in cognitive neuroscience increasingly employed to identify brain regions associated with failures of sustained attention. An important claim of the SART is that it is significantly related to real-world problems of sustained attention such as those experienced by TBI and ADHD patients. This claim is largely based on its association with the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ), but recently concerns have been expressed about the reliability of the SART-CFQ association. Based on a review of the literature, meta-analysis of prior research, and analysis of original data, we conclude that, across studies sampling diverse populations and contexts, the SART is reliably associated with the CFQ. The CFQ-SART relation also holds for patients with TBI. We note, however, conceptual limitations of using the CFQ, which was designed as a measure of general cognitive failures, to validate the SART, which was specifically designed to assess sustained attention. To remedy this limitation, we report on associations between the SART and a specific Attention-Related Cognitive Errors Scale (ARCES) and a Mindful Awareness of Attention Scale-Lapses Only (MAAS-LO).

Wandering in both mind and body: individual differences in mind wandering and inattention predict fidgeting.

Anecdotal reports suggest that during periods of inattention or mind wandering, people tend to experience increased fidgeting. In four studies, we examined whether individual differences in the tendency to be inattentive and to mind wander in everyday life are related to the tendency to make spontaneous and involuntary movements (i.e., to fidget). To do so, we developed self-report measures of spontaneous and deliberate mind wandering, as well as a self-report scale to index fidgeting. In addition, we used several existing self-report measures of inattentiveness, attentional control, and memory failures. Across our studies, a series of multiple regression analyses indicated that fidgeting was uniquely predicted by inattentiveness and spontaneous mind wandering but not by other related factors, including deliberate mind wandering, attentional control, and memory failures. As a result, we suggest that only spontaneously wandering thoughts are related to a wandering body.

Age trends for failures of sustained attention.

Recent research has revealed an age-related reduction in errors in a sustained attention task, suggesting that sustained attention abilities improve with age. Such results seem paradoxical in light of the well-documented age-related declines in cognitive performance. In the present study, performance on the sustained attention to response task (SART) was assessed in a supplemented archival sample of 638 individuals between 14 and 77 years old. SART errors and response speed appeared to decline in a linear fashion as a function of age throughout the age span studied. In contrast, other measures of sustained attention (reaction time coefficient of variation), anticipation, and omissions) showed a decrease early in life and then remained unchanged for the rest of the life span. Thus, sustained attention shows improvements with maturation in early adulthood but then does not change with aging in older adults. On the other hand, aging across the entire life span leads to a more strategic (i.e., slower) response style that reduces the overt and critical consequences (i.e., SART errors) of momentary task disengagement.

Not all mind wandering is created equal: dissociating deliberate from spontaneous mind wandering

In two large samples we show a dissociation between trait-level tendencies to mind-wander spontaneously (unintentionally) and deliberately (intentionally). Participants completed online versions of the Mind Wandering Spontaneous (MW-S) and the Mind Wandering Deliberate (MW-D) self-report scales and the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ). The results revealed that deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering were uniquely associated with some factors of the FFMQ. Notably, while the MW-D and the MW-S were positively associated with each other, the MW-D was uniquely positively associated with the ‘Non-Reactivity to Inner Experience’ factor of the FFMQ, whereas the MW-S was uniquely negatively associated with this factor. We also showed that conflating deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering can result in a misunderstanding of how mind wandering is related to other traits. We recommend that studies assessing individual differences in mind wandering should distinguish between deliberate and spontaneous subtypes of mind wandering to avoid possibly erroneous conclusions.

Grapheme Frequency and Color Luminance in Grapheme-Color Synaesthesia:

Individuals with grapheme-color synaesthesia experience vivid colors whenever they see, hear, or just think of ordinary letters and digits (Dixon, Smilek, Cudahy, & Merikle, 2000; Mattingley, Rich, Yelland, & Bradshaw, 2001). Currently, little is known about how specific colors become associated with specific letters and digits in synaesthesia. Beeli, Esslen, and Jancke (2007, this issue) report an interesting relation between grapheme frequency and the luminance and saturation of synaesthetic color experiences. They had 19 synaesthetes choose colors for spoken digits and letters from a digital color palette. The colors were quantified in terms of their hue, saturation, and luminance (the HSL color system). The results showed (a) that the luminance of synaesthetic colors increased with the frequency of digits in everyday language and (b) that the saturation of synaesthetic colors increased with increased letter and digit frequency. These findings indicate that there is a relation between how graphemes are encountered (and perhaps learned) in language and the basic qualities of synaesthetic color experiences. To assess the replicability of the findings reported by Beeli et al., we analyzed the grapheme-color pairings we have collected on-line over the past 5 years for large groups of synaesthetes and nonsynaesthetes.

How few and far between? Examining the effects of probe rate on self-reported mind wandering

We examined whether the temporal rate at which thought probes are presented affects the likelihood that people will report periods of mind wandering. To evaluate this possibility, we had participants complete a sustained-attention task (the Metronome Response Task; MRT) during which we intermittently presented thought probes. Critically, we varied the average time between probes (i.e., probe rate) across participants, allowing us to examine the relation between probe rate and mind-wandering rate. We observed a positive relation between these variables, indicating that people are more likely to report mind wandering as the time between probes increases. We discuss the methodological implications of this finding in the context of the mind-wandering literature, and suggest that researchers include a range of probe rates in future work to provide more insight into this methodological issue.