Jeffrey Church

Nietzsche's Culture of Humanity: Beyond Aristocracy and Democracy in the Early Period

Nietzsche scholars have long been divided over whether Nietzsche is an aristocratic or a democratic thinker. Nietzche’s Culture of Humanity overcomes this debate by proving both sides wrong. Jeffrey Church argues that in his early period writings, Nietzsche envisioned a cultural meritocracy that drew on the classical German tradition of Kant and Herder. The young Nietzsche’s “culture of humanity” synthesized the high and the low, the genius and the people, the nation and humanity. Nietzsche’s early ideal of culture can shed light on his mature period thought because, Church argues, Nietzsche does not abandon this fundamental commitment to a cultural meritocracy. Nietzche’s Culture of Humanity argues that Nietzsche’s novel defense of culture can overcome persisting problems in contemporary liberal theories of culture. As such, this book should interest Nietzsche scholars, political theorists, and philosophers interested in modern thought, as well as contemporary thinkers concerned with the politics of culture.

Culture beyond identity: J. G. Herder on the purpose and justification of culture

Liberal approaches to multiculturalism and cultural nationalism have met with severe criticism in recent years. This article makes the case for an alternative, Aristotelian approach developed in the work of the ‘founding father’ of culture, J. G. Herder. According to Herder, culture is worthy of political recognition because it contributes to the realization of our common but contradictory human telos. Only a plurality of cultures, each realizing a unique balance of our contradictory needs, can bring wholeness to our common nature. In conclusion, I argue for the merits of this Aristotelian approach in resolving some recurring problems of multiculturalism.

Two concepts of culture in the early Nietzsche

Culture remains a divisive issue in liberal democracies, and this article argues Nietzsche offers a principled middle ground between the conservative and progressive camps of recent and ongoing ‘culture wars’. Hence, this article challenges the ‘aristocratic’ versus ‘democratic’ Nietzsche debate by making the case that Nietzsche defended two opposed notions of culture in his early period work: a national or group culture and a cosmopolitan culture. This opposition is salutary, however, in that each form of culture moderates the excesses of the other so that both jointly can aim to perfect what Nietzsche claims is our bifurcated human nature.

Selfish and Moral Politics: David Hume on Stability and Cohesion in the Modern State

In Humes dialogue with the Hobbesian-Mandevillian “selfish system” of morals, Hume seems to reject its conclusions in morals, but accept them in politics. No skeptic of moral claims like Mandeville, Hume sought to ground objective moral standards in his moral sentiment philosophy, yet, like Mandeville, Hume argued that in political life human beings act based largely on self-interest and a limited generosity. I argue that Hume, however, is ultimately ambivalent about the selfish systems conclusions in politics. He puts forth both a nonmoral and a moral solution to the problem of cohesion in modern liberal states. First, he agrees with the selfish systems nonmoral tactic of channeling the self-interest of citizens through well-constructed institutions toward salutary ends. Second, arguing that the first solution is insufficient for the health of a political regime, Hume seeks to expand the limited moral sense of citizens through moral and aesthetic education and through an empowerment of local politics. Humes second solution is a means within liberalism to combat its own tendencies toward the dissolution of communal ties and the creation of conditions ripe for the emergence of “sensible knaves.”

The veil of philanthropy: Kant on the political benefits of dissimulation and simulation

Kant has traditionally been read as an excessively moralistic critic of lying in his ethics and politics. In response, recent scholars have noted that for Kant we have an ethical duty not to be completely candid, but rather we should practice reticence and simulate virtues even when we do not have them. This article argues that Kant extends the value of dissimulation and simulation beyond the interpersonal to society and politics. By examining three examples—politeness and decorum in society, and the veiled relationships between the rich and the poor and between government and the people in politics—this article further challenges the received reading of Kant as a defender of truth at all costs and reveals him to be much more attentive to the need for pretense, reserve, and appearance than is commonly understood.

Friedrich Schiller on republican virtue and the tragic exemplar

Scholars have recently argued that Friedrich Schiller makes a signal contribution to republican political theory in his view of “aesthetic education,” which offers a means of elevating self-interest to virtue. However, though this education is lauded in theory, it has been denigrated as implausible, irresponsible, or dangerous in practice. This paper argues that the criticisms rest on a faulty assumption that artistic objects constitute the sole substance of this “aesthetic education.” Through a reading of Schiller’s work throughout the 1790s, I make the case that this “education” occurs also through an encounter with the “moral beauty” of individual exemplars. This interpretation fits with Schiller’s republican allegiances, saves Schiller’s project from political irrelevance, and enriches Schiller’s contribution to contemporary republican political theory. However, I argue that Schiller was attentive to the dangers of this “aesthetic education” in his play Wallenstein, in which Schiller dramatizes the tragic relationship between individual exemplar and political order.

The Political Cultivation of Moral Character: Kant on Public Moral Feeling as a Precondition for Right

Does the liberal state have the legitimate power to shape the moral character of its citizenry? One common liberal answer, which draws on a traditional reading of Kants distinction between morality and right, is “no”: the scope of state authority extends only to the external actions of individuals, not to their inner, moral lives. This article explores an alternative reading of Kant in which the liberal state defends individual rights yet also has the duty to supply the preconditions for enjoying those rights. One precondition is the moral character of the citizenry, even though the governments provision of this precondition would seem to undermine the “external freedom” of citizens. The article thus both challenges a traditional interpretation of Kants view of the state, and develops a liberal line of reasoning about moral character within a secular, pluralistic regime.