Jan Delhey

Who trusts?: The origins of social trust in seven societies

This article identifies six main theories of the determinants of social trust, and tests them against survey data from seven societies, 1999-2001. Three of the six theories of trust fare rather poorly and three do better. First and foremost, social trust tends to be high among citizens who believe that there are few severe social conflicts and where the sense of public safety is high. Second, informal social networks are associated with trust. And third, those who are successful in life trust more, or are more inclined by their personal experience to do so. Individual theories seem to work best in societies with higher levels of trust, and societal ones in societies with lower levels of trust. This may have something to do with the fact that our two low trust societies, Hungary and Slovenia, happen to have experienced revolutionary change in the very recent past, so that societal events have overwhelmed individual circumstances.

How General Is Trust in “Most People”? Solving the Radius of Trust Problem

Generalized trust has become a paramount topic throughout the social sciences, in its own right and as the key civic component of social capital. To date, cross-national research relies on the standard question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” Yet the radius problem—that is, how wide a circle of others respondents imagine as “most people”—makes comparisons between individuals and countries problematic. Until now, much about the radius problem has been speculation, but data for 51 countries from the latest World Values Survey make it possible to estimate how wide the trust radius actually is. We do this by relating responses to the standard trust question to a new battery of items that measures in-group and out-group trust. In 41 out of 51 countries, “most people” in the standard question predominantly connotes out-groups. To this extent, it is a valid measure of general trust in others. Nevertheless, the radius of “most people” varies considerably across countries; it is substantially narrower in Confucian countries and wider in wealthy countries. Some country rankings on trust thus change dramatically when the standard question is replaced by a radius-adjusted trust score. In cross-country regressions, the radius of trust matters for civic attitudes and behaviors because the assumed civic nature of trust depends on a wide radius.

Do Enlargements Make the European Union Less Cohesive? An Analysis of Trust between EU Nationalities

This article analyses the impact enlargements have had on the social cohesion of the European Union (EU), measured as generalized interpersonal trust between EU nationalities. Based on a quantitative-dyadic approach, Eurobarometer surveys from 1976 to 1997 are utilized. The key result is that enlargements do not necessarily weaken cohesion, but southern enlargement and the recent eastern enlargement did. The integrative effect of enlargement depends on the extent to which acceding nations differ from existing club members in three main dimensions: the level of modernization (mechanisms: prestige), cultural characteristics (mechanisms: similarity) and their power in the international system (mechanisms: perceived threat).

Quality of life in a European Perspective: The EUROMODULE as a New Instrument for Comparative Welfare Research

In this article, a new survey instrument for comparative welfare research and social reporting is described, the EUROMODULE. It has been set up in intensive discussions among experts from several nations engaged in quality of life research and social reporting. By combining indicators of objective living conditions, subjective well-being, and quality of society, with this new survey central aspects of the quality of life of European citizens can be investigated. The EUROMODULE initiative aims at strengthening efforts to monitor and systematically analyze the current state and the changes in living conditions and quality of life in Europe in a comparative perspective. So far, data for eight European countries are available.

Measuring the Europeanization of Everyday Life: Three New Indices and an Empirical Application

ABSTRACT This article seeks to conceptually clarify the measurement of Europeanization from a transactional perspective. Following Karl Deutsch, we regard cross-border practices and sense of community as constitutive for an emerging European society. But we critically reassess how this approach has been put into empirical practice by contemporary scholars. Typically, too much attention is paid to absolute Europeanization, and too little to relative Europeanization. In order to properly investigate the European society as situated between the nation-state and the world society, we argue that Europeanization involves both national openness (the salience of Europe compared to the nation-state) and external closure (the salience of Europe compared to the world). Three indices are suggested to capture relative Europeanization and its major components. Recent Eurobarometer and European Values Study data on practices and attitudes of EU citizens is used to illustrate our approach empirically. The results demonstrate that external closure adds a new layer of information for understanding everyday life Europeanization. We also find a bifurcation between practices for which Europe is the more relevant reference frame (as compared to the world) and attitudes for which it is not.

Between ‘class project’ and individualization: The stratification of Europeans’ transnational activities

In sociological transnationalization research, it is conventional wisdom that the upper strata are more involved in cross-border activities than the lower ones. However, proponents of the individualization/death-of-class thesis have argued that the significance of class (and of inequalities in general) for people’s actions is declining in affluent societies. Using these theories as a point of departure, this article investigates the influence of class and inequalities, more generally, on transnational activity. Using Eurobarometer 73.3 data from 27 European countries, this article examines (a) the extent to which class determines, by itself, in conjunction with other inequalities, and relative to heterogeneities, transnational practices within countries; and (b) how much the social gradient of transnational activity produced by class and inequalities varies across countries, and whether socioeconomic development tends to decrease or increase this gradient. The findings show that, in most countries, heterogeneities explain more variance in transnational activity than class, but not more variance than inequalities as more generally conceived. Further, social gradients in transnational activity are systematically larger in more affluent European countries.

Generalizing Trust The Benign Force of Emancipation

Trust in people is general insofar as it extends to out-groups, that is, unfamiliar and dissimilar others. But whether trust in out-groups can emerge independently from in-group trust is controversial, and conclusive evidence has been unavailable. This article fills this gap, analyzing which conditions create out-group trust independent from in-group trust. Using data from 76 countries around the world, we establish three insights. First, while a high level of in-group trust is the rule, out-group trust varies greatly across countries. Second, out-group trust emerges independent from in-group trust when human empowerment emancipates people from in-group control. Third, other conditions championed as trust-crediting forces do not confound the effect of human empowerment. In conclusion, trust generalizes to out-groups as a result of human empowerment’s emancipatory impulse.

Europäische Integration, Modernisierung und Konvergenz : Zum Einfluss der EU auf die Konvergenz der Mitgliedsländer ()

Modernisierung und Konvergenz ihrer Mitgliedsländer ist das sozioőkonomische Zwillingsziel der Europäischen Union. Doch inwieweit kann die EU diese Prozesse überhaupt steuern? Dies wird in diesem Artikel für den Zeitraum 1970 bis 2000 empirisch untersucht und mit der Frage nach Mechanismen und Grenzen einer EU-induzierten Angleichung verbunden. Die EU-Gesellschaften sind durch einen Großtrend der Modernisierung aller Mitgliedsländer und einen Subtrend der nachholenden Modernisierung der leistungsschwächeren Länder gekennzeichnet. Es überwiegt die Konvergenz, bei vereinzelten Divergenzen und „neuen Unterschieden“ im Zuge neuartiger Anpassungsprobleme. In weiten Teilen folgen Modernisierung und Konvergenz einer eigenen, integrationsunabhängigen Logik, doch werden beide durch die europäische Integration unterstützt. Die EU-Mitgliedschaft wirkt über die Mechanismen Ressourcendistribution, Konkurrenz, Regulation und Imitation vor allem für die Nachzügler modernisierungsfördernd und verstärkt dadurch die Konvergenz. Zugleich gibt es Grenzen einer EU-induzierten Angleichung.SummaryThe European Union aims at steady modernisation of the EU member countries as well as covergence between them. But to what degree can the EU manage processes of modernisation and convergence? This article deals with the mechanisms and limitations of convergence initiated by the EU. Starting with a description of the main trends of modernisation in the 15 member countries for the time period 1970 to 2000, we can observe both a general trend of modernisation in all of them and a process of catch-up modernisation for the laggards. Hence the EU 15 countries are converging, although there have also occured some “new differences”, caused by differing adaptabilities to new challenges of ongoing modernisation. I argue that modernisation and convergence widely follow their own logic, independent from European political integration that nevertheless supports convergence. Through the four mechanisms, redistribution of resources, competition, regulation and imitation, EU membership makes catch-up modernisation easier for countries lagging behind. There are, however, clear limitations for the EU to induce convergence.RésuméLa modernisation et la convergence des pays membres forment le double objectif de l’Union Européenne. Mais dans quelle mesure l’UE est-elle apte à diriger ce processus? Dans l’article suivant, cette question fait l’objet d’une analyse empirique s’étendant sur la période de 1970 à l’an 2000 et soulevant la question des mécanismes et des limites d’une procédure d’harmonisation induite par l’Union Européenne. La société européenne est marquée par une tendance générale à la modernisation dans tous les pays membres et une tendance implicite à la modernisation „de rattrapage“ dans les pays les moins performants. La convergence domine malgré quelques phénomènes de divergence et des différences naissant des problèmes d’adaptation. Dans l’ensemble, la modernisation et la convergence suivent leur propre logique, indépendante de celle de l’intégration, même si toutes deux sont soutenues et renforcées par le phénomène d’intégration européenne. L’affiliation à l’UE agit par l’intermédiaire de mécanismes comme la redistribution de ressources, la concurrence, la régulation et l’imitation de façon à promouvoir la modernisation — surtout pour les retardataires — et renforce, par là même, la convergence. Cependant, il existe aussi des limites à l’harmonisation européenne.

The Radius of Trust Problem Remains Resolved

We welcome van Hoorn’s comment on our ASR article about trust (Delhey, Newton, and Welzel 2011). We appreciate that the author considers our work “an enormous step forward [in] the development of a method for quantifying trust radius” and that our approach fills “an essential gap in the trust literature” (van Hoorn 2014:1259). And we note with contentment that van Hoorn is able to use our method to replicate the most important results. Finally, we are grateful that he has detected a mistake in the later part of our analysis where we apply the trust radius to civicness: van Hoorn helps clarify even more how much the radius of trust matters in shaping a society’s civicness. As much as we acknowledge van Hoorn’s contribution, we wish to stress that the author overstates the importance of his correction. Furthermore, his comment is partly misleading because it blurs the distinction between the major and minor contribution of our research. In the end, van Hoorn’s replication provides striking confirmation of our key contribution, which is that the radius of trust is distinct from the level of trust and that including the radius in measures of generalized trust leads to significantly different—and better—results. These findings are reinforced by van Hoorn’s re-analysis, yet he omits this important conclusion from his presentation. Our 2011 article is concerned with a crucial problem inherent in the standard measure of trust in survey research: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” Obviously, who “most people” are remains unspecified in the question. The radius problem thus concerns the circle of “others” whom respondents imagine as “most people.” Is this a small circle of close and familiar others (i.e., ingroups)? Or does it include a rather wide circle of unfamiliar and dissimilar others (i.e., out-groups)? Because the survey question is meant to measure generalized interpersonal trust, a wider understanding of “most people” is assumed. But this is merely an assumption that must be established empirically before researchers can take it for granted. The resulting problems in interpreting trust figures are serious. When conceptions of “most people” vary systematically between nations, the standard trust scores are simply not comparable cross-nationally. This is exactly what our article demonstrates using the fifth wave of data from the World Values Survey (WVS 5 [2009]). More specifically, we made the following claims:

A "Happiness Test" for the New Measures of National Well-Being: How Much Better than GDP are they?

Across the globe there is growing skepticism about the usefulness of GDP as a measure of national well-being. Consequently, several alternative quality-of-life (QOL) measures were developed which either aim at healing the GDP, complementing it, or replacing it. This chapter portrays some of these new measures and puts them to a happiness test: compared to the GDP, are the new QOL measures better able to capture what makes people happy and satisfied with their lives? Using data for 34 OECD societies, we can show that from a happiness perspective, there is-surprisingly-little wrong with the GDP, and most alternative QOL measures do not outperform GDP. Yet, one measure actually does a better job: the OECDs Better Life Index which is particularly effective when it comes to predicting subjective well-being in the richest OECD countries. In sum, the chapter demonstrates that a happiness perspective can add important insights along the way to facilitate the search for a new, widely accepted, internationally comparable measure of well-being.