Jeannette Brosig

Identifying cooperative behavior: some experimental results in a prisoner's dilemma game

In recent years, experimental economists have discovered that people exhibit different patterns of cooperative behavior. This paper presents findings from a face-to-face experiment that analyzed whether individuals who possess a willingness to cooperate can credibly signal it and whether it is recognizable by the partner. Results revealed that both capabilities, signaling and recognizing, depend upon the individual’s propensity to cooperate.

The Hot Versus Cold Effect in a Simple Bargaining Experiment

In this paper, the strategy methods impact on behavior in sequential bargaining games is investigated. Besides the decision procedure (hot versus cold), we varied the second mover punishment costs (high versus low). Significant impacts of both treatment variables were observed. For example, second movers punished significantly more often in the hot version of the low cost game. Furthermore, first mover behavior was significantly different in the hot and cold versions of both games. In the hot games, first mover behavior suggests an expectation of decreased rewards and/or punishments from second movers. We observed, however, no decrease in reward and an increase in punishment. The hot cold variable only informs first movers that the decision procedure used by second movers has changed. Therefore, first mover behavior must be shaped by their perceived assessment concerning how second movers make decisions. We argue that first mover behavior can be explained by the interaction of two well-known psychological effects: the consensus and positive self-image effects.

The Monotonicity Puzzle: An Experimental Investigation of Incentive Structures

Non-monotone incentive structures, which — according to theory — are able to induce optimal behavior, are often regarded as empirically less relevant for labor relationships. We compare the performance of a theoretically optimal non-monotone contract with a monotone one under controlled laboratory conditions. Implementing some features relevant to real-world employment relationships, our paper demonstrates that, in fact, the frequency of income-maximizing decisions made by agents is higher under the monotone contract. Although this observed behavior does not change the superiority of the non-monotone contract for principals, they do not choose this contract type in a significant way. This is what we call the monotonicity puzzle. Detailed investigations of decisions provide a clue for solving the puzzle and a possible explanation for the popularity of monotone contracts.

Was macht Ökonomen „anders“? Wirkungen der Ökonomieausbildung in Magdeburg und Köln

Dass Okonomen ein wenig anders sind als die Vertreter anderer Fachdisziplinen, weis man seit langem. Im Economist war vor vielen Jahren einmal ein Cartoon abgedruckt, auf dem eine Dame einen Partygast einem anderen Gast mit den Worten vorstellt „Er ist Okonom — aber ansonsten ganz in Ordnung.“ Hintergrund dieser wenig schmeichelhaften Witzeleien ist die Beobachtung, dass sich Okonomiestudenten in Experimenten deutlich anders verhalten als die Studierenden anderer Facher. Als erstes haben bereits Marwell/Ames (1981) darauf aufmerksam gemacht, dass Studenten der Wirtschaftswissenschaft wesentlich haufiger die Freifahreroption in Offentliches-Gut-Spielen wahlen als Studenten anderer Fakultaten. Frank/Gilovich/Regan (1993) haben diesen Befund spater bestatigt und seitdem zieht er sich wie ein roter Faden durch die experimentelle Literatur. Ockenfels/Weimann (1999) konnten zwar zeigen, dass sich der Effekt auf die mannlichen Studenten reduzieren lasst, aber diese Einschrankung hat an dem Bild der eigennutzigen Okonomen nicht viel andern konnen.