Joachim Weimann

Dissatisfied with Life, but Having a Good Day: Time-Use and Well-Being of the Unemployed

We apply the Day Reconstruction Method to compare unemployed and employed people with respect to their subjective assessment of emotional affects, differences in the composition and duration of activities during the course of a day, and their self-reported life satisfaction. Employed persons are more satisfied with their life than the unemployed and report more positive feelings when engaged in similar activities. Weighting these activities with their duration shows, however, that average experienced utility does not differ between the two groups. Although the unemployed feel sadder when engaged in similar activities, they can compensate this by using the time the employed are at work in more enjoyable ways. Our finding that unemployment affects life satisfaction and experienced utility differently may be explained by the fact that people do not adjust their aspirations when becoming unemployed but face hedonic adaptation to changing life circumstances, triggered by the opportunity to use the time in a way that yields higher levels of satisfaction than working.

Types and patterns: an experimental East-West-German comparison of cooperation and solidarity

Abstract In a study of public good and solidarity experiments conducted in eastern and western Germany, we found in both games that eastern subjects behave in a significantly more selfish manner than do western subjects. Besides that we found that many qualitative results of both data sets are similar. Since our experiments were conducted in two parts of one nation, we present an unusually well controlled cross-cultural study by avoiding difficulties that usually arise in multinational settings. We conclude that cooperation and solidarity behavior seem to depend strongly on different culture-specific norms resulting from opposing economic and social histories in the two parts of Germany.

The Hot Versus Cold Effect in a Simple Bargaining Experiment

In this paper, the strategy methods impact on behavior in sequential bargaining games is investigated. Besides the decision procedure (hot versus cold), we varied the second mover punishment costs (high versus low). Significant impacts of both treatment variables were observed. For example, second movers punished significantly more often in the hot version of the low cost game. Furthermore, first mover behavior was significantly different in the hot and cold versions of both games. In the hot games, first mover behavior suggests an expectation of decreased rewards and/or punishments from second movers. We observed, however, no decrease in reward and an increase in punishment. The hot cold variable only informs first movers that the decision procedure used by second movers has changed. Therefore, first mover behavior must be shaped by their perceived assessment concerning how second movers make decisions. We argue that first mover behavior can be explained by the interaction of two well-known psychological effects: the consensus and positive self-image effects.

Marginal Employment Subsidization: A New Concept and a Reappraisal

In this paper, we attempt to renew the interest in marginal employment subsidies. Such subsidies are paid only for a firms additional employment exceeding some reference level and create larger employment stimuli at lower fiscal costs than general wage subsidies for all workers. If the hiring of a new employee also entails subsidizing an incumbent worker (double marginal subsidization), the replacement of regular paid workers by outsourcing employment to newly established firms – a standard critique of marginal employment subsidies – can be avoided. This additional subsidy reduces the incentive to crowd out regular employment and results in even larger employment effects. Applying the subsidy scheme to the low-skill labor market in Germany, we show that employment can be substantially increased without imposing additional fiscal burden.

Experiments in Environmental Economics and Some Close Relatives

It is not only the great number of papers written on environment economics that make it worth dealing with this special branch of experimental research, but the environmental problem in all its facets seems to serve as a catalyst for identifying some methodological problems of the experimental method. For this reason, we will not only try to give an overview of recent experiments in environmental economics but also add some thoughts on the methodological implications of this work. We identify three direct connecting factors for the experimental method and environmental economics. First, social dilemmas are, in many cases, at the core of environmental problems. Experiments are able to test theoretical hypotheses for individual behavior in such social dilemma situations. The second connecting factor comes from the field of applied experimental work and can be characterized as the testbedding of institutional arrangements for the solution of environmental problems. The last direct application of experimental methods to environmental economics concerns the individual evaluation of environmental resources. Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2006.

An experiment on sequential rent-seeking

In an experiment on sequential rent seeking, we find that the theoretically predicted first-mover advantage does not exist empirically. Rather, a second-mover advantage can be observed. Though the subgame perfect equilibrium can not prevail in experiment, individual behavior is highly reasonable nevertheless, such that subjects appear to play a reduced form of the original game. We also observe that the efficient fair outcome can not be achieved because of the exploitation opportunity for the second mover. The observed behavior is quite different from that in ultimatum and trust game experiments. Keyword(s): Rent-seeking, Experiment, Reciprocity, Fairness, Exploitation

Against all Odds: Nash Equilibria in a Road Pricing Experiment

Congested roads during rush-hours create a common-pool problem in which individual rationality results in inefficienCcies. They are not a mere nuisance for commuters but impose social costs that can be reduced by implementing a system of user fees: road pricing. Road pricing promises substantial efficiency gains if used as an instrument to achieve an efficient allocation of fixed road capacity. The road-pricing model of Arnott, R., De Palma, A., and Lindsey (1993) is tested in an experiment. Although the Nash equilibrium of the model is not unique and Nash behavior is therefore unlikely, the road-pricing experiment supports the predictions of the model as long as each player plays with one vehicle only. Allowing players to play with more than one vehicle makes the outcome more efficient. Players appear to internalize part of the externality.

Efficient Rent-Seeking in Experiment

In a series of experiments we show that people learn to playthe efficient outcome in an open-ended rent-seeking game. Thisresult persists despite quite different experimentenvironments and designs, like different propensities ofcompetition, group sizes etc., and is interpretable as aresolution of the so-called Tullock paradox which states thatreal-world rent-seeking expenditures are much lower than whatthe standard rent-seeking model predicts.

Net Wage Illusion in a Real-Effort Experiment*

In a controlled laboratory experiment, subjects had to fold letters in order to earn money. While the net income per letter was the same in the three treatments, the gross income varied and the tax rate was 0, 25, and 50 percent. Although work incentives should be the same in all treatments, subjects worked harder and longer when they were taxed. We conclude that this is because of a net wage illusion effect. The existence of this effect demonstrates that not only are the tax rate and the tax base of importance for work incentives, but the perception of a tax is also important.

Competition of newspapers and the location of political parties

In this paper we suggest a model for an analysis of how newspapers and political parties determine their ideological orientation and how both decisions depend on each other. Quite naturally dissemination of information plays an important role. The model is set up as a two-stage game. Because elements of horizontal as well as vertical product differentiation are present in this model location patterns in ideology space exhibit in general neither maximal nor minimal differentiation, although we keep quite close to the Downs model, with information as the most important distinguishing feature. Furthermore, the model shows by way of example that economic theory can be a useful tool to investigate issues which are central to communication science.