Walter Nicgorski

Cicero's Paradoxes and His Idea of Utility:

_ WO SALIENT PARADOXES in Ciceros writings pose significant obstacles to appreciating him as a moral and political philosopher. The primary paradox is the tension between Cicero the self-proclaimed Socratic, student of the texts of Plato and Aristotle, the ambassador and evangelist of philosophy in Rome on the one hand and, on the other, Cicero the pragmatic statesman and orator who seems to favor action over inquiry, success over truth. A secondary and second paradox is found in Ciceros dual allegiance to the philosophical schools of academic skepticism and stoicism, the school of doubt and uncertainty on the one hand, and, on the other, the school of rigorous moral absolutes and sweeping certainties about the nature of all things. These paradoxes provide a sufficient basis for understanding the strong tendency through the ages to question Ciceros integrity and importance as a philosopher, to regard him as opportunistically eclectic or, at best, as hopelessly muddled. This article argues that both paradoxes dissipate and that a coherence and consistency is found in Ciceros teaching when the foundation of his philosophy is in view. That foundation reveals the Socratic character of Ciceros approach to philosophy and his idea of utility as the principle of coherence and consistency. That idea of utility is shown to be more in the tradition of Aristotle than in that of modern utilitarianism.

Yves R. Simon : A Philosopher's Quest for Science and Prudence

This essay treats the inspiration and nature of Yves Simons philosophical life. His embrace of that life was importantly shaped by his engagement with the republican tradition in France, his passionate opposition to the fascist threat to France, and his later attachment to the aspirations of American democracy. However, his early philosophical interests took direction and inspiration from his encounter with Jacques Maritain who drew him to Thomism. His devotion to the truth was fierce, and he confronted honestly the threats to this defining quality of philosophical life from the pressures of social conformity and from the discouragement of seeing the inadequacies and disagreements in the history of philosophy. He came, as especially evident in his most influential book, Philosophy of Democratic Government, to esteem highly the virtue of prudence, seeking to protect it from both philosophy and social science.

Chapter 2 The Critical and Rhetorical Modes of Philosophy

The two modes stem from two distinct tasks for philosophy in Cicero: to search for the truth and to guide and comfort in life (consolatory mode). The tensions between these tasks are explored, and Cicero’s use of mixed modes is brought out. The reconciliation of those tasks is found in Cicero’s Socratic model, developed with attention to the Socratic method and irony. The reconciliation, perfecta philosophia, is more complex than simply seeing rhetoric as a servant of philosophy. Here, there is much use of Cicero’s De Oratore, De Finibus, and the Tusculans. Socratic realization of philosophy’s aspirations in a way of life marked by virtue is appropriated by Cicero for his Roman literary vocation.

Chapter 5 The Socratic Statesman

The requisites for developing this statesman, who can be called Socratic and prudent, lead to the examination of Cicero’s thinking on how such statesmen (historical exempla) have been and might be educated. This entails reflection on the role of friendship, including intergenerational friendship, in that education and the maintenance of true statesmanship. To aspire to such statesmanship entails a consideration of the use and abuse of the quest for glory by the greatly talented. The Dream of Scipio and the prospect of immortality are considered, and the path of virtue as that of true glory is explored.

Chapter 4 Political Philosophy and the Roman Republic

Here, Cicero’s De Re Publica and De Legibus are the central texts. The way Cicero has embraced skepticism and grounded the right and utility in nature shows his distinctive way of following yet differing from Plato. He appreciates Plato’s Republic as a clarifying philosophical achievement yet sees in Roman development a better tool for teaching his audience the principles of political life. Seemingly modern concepts emerge as mixed constitution, genuine progress, equality, republican liberty, consent and contract, collective leadership over time, and a limited defense of property rights. There is much evidence within these texts on how he transcends Rome so as to be able to judge her and to address audiences well beyond Rome and his time.

Chapter 1 Skepticism, Politics, and a Philosophical Foundation

Cicero’s skepticism is explored as well as the fact that it need not undermine the search for wisdom. It is the basis for a genuine and honest search for wisdom and thus consistent with the love of philosophy manifested by Cicero from his earliest years. Antiochus, Philo, Carneades, and the New Academy with its Socratic roots are introduced. The importance of the criterion of truth beneath probable judgments is presented, as well as what that criterion consists in for Cicero. The focus on the supreme good and the testing of various conceptions is pursued as the basis for assurance in living the good life. The Academica and the De Legibus are the primary texts of Cicero used in developing this chapter.

Chapter 3 Duties and Virtue

Cicero’s De Officiis comes to the fore as the present book moves to the moral issues in the horizon of ordinary life. The tension between the right and the useful is explored, and the sources for the right or truly honorable in the virtues and, in turn, in nature draw readers to nature as a standard and, thus, to ideas of natural law and natural rights. The expedient is seen to make moral claims on human beings, and the recognition of the necessity of political community entails the importance of the life of the statesman. For Cicero, it seems that the primary way of assessing the truth in claims of the contending philosophical schools, such as the Epicureans, is to test how they serve to stabilize and nourish political community and the leadership, and how they serve to foster public virtue and the private virtues that undergird it.

The New Federalism and Direct Popular Election

REFORMS usually spring from felt or threatened grievances, not from abstract considerations of institutional perfection. It is understandable then that Presidential election years regularly bring a renewal of more than ordinary interest in reforming the way the President is elected. Interest in reform of this kind was more widespread and intense than usual before and after the 1968 election.* Changes have already been made in certain phases of the nomination processes of the major political parties. Nevertheless, the constitutional provisions and the laws governing the Presidential election itself remain unchanged. In 1969 and 1970, these provisions and laws were almost swept aside by a proposed constitutional amendment providing for direct popular election of the President.