Jennifer Crocker

Social stigma and self-esteem: The self-protective properties of stigma.

Although several psychological theories predict that members of stigmatized groups should have low global self-esteem, empirical research typically does not support this prediction. It is proposed here that this discrepancy may be explained by considering the ways in which membership in a stigmatized group may protect the self-concept It is proposed that members of stigmatized groups may (a) attribute negative feedback to prejudice against their group, (b) compare their outcomes with those of the ingroup, rather than with the relatively advantaged outgroup, and (c) selectively devalue those dimensions on which their group fares poorly and value those dimensions on which their group excels. Evidence for each of these processes and their consequences for self-esteem and motivation is reviewed. Factors that moderate the use of these strategies and implications of this analysis for treatment of stigmas are also discussed. For more than three decades, social psychological research on prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination has examined both the content of stereotypes about a variety of social groups

The costly pursuit of self-esteem.

Researchers have recently questioned the benefits associated with having high self-esteem. The authors propose that the importance of self-esteem lies more in how people strive for it rather than whether it is high or low. They argue that in domains in which their self-worth is invested, people adopt the goal to validate their abilities and qualities, and hence their self-worth. When people have self-validation goals, they react to threats in these domains in ways that undermine learning; relatedness; autonomy and self-regulation; and over time, mental and physical health. The short-term emotional benefits of pursuing self-esteem are often outweighed by long-term costs. Previous research on self-esteem is reinterpreted in terms of self-esteem striving. Cultural roots of the pursuit of self-esteem are considered. Finally, the alternatives to pursuing self-esteem, and ways of avoiding its costs, are discussed.

Cognitive Processes in the Revision of Stereotypic Beliefs

Northwestern University Stereotypes have often been assumed to be resistant to change, although some evidence indicates that they are responsive to new information. The present studies examine stereotype change using three models: the bookkeeping model, in which each instance of stereotype-relevant information is used to modify the stereotype gradually; the conversion model, in which stereotypes change radically in response to dramatic or salient instances; and the subtyping model, in which new Stereotypic structures are developed to accommodate instances not easily assimilated by existing stereotypes. The models predict different response patterns as a function of variations in the pattern of stereotype-in consistent evidence and the number of instances encountered. In Experiment 1, subjects were given information about either a small or a large sample of group members in which stereotype-inconsistent evidence was dispersed across many members or concentrated within a few members. Results generally supported the subtyping model when evidence was concentrated and the bookkeeping model when evidence was dispersed. Experiment 3 suggested that the development of subtypes occurs because dramatically inconsistent individuals are seen as unrepresentat ive of the group as a whole. Although the present studies generally favored the subtyping and bookkeeping models, conditions under which the conversion model may operate are considered.

Collective self-esteem and ingroup bias.

In addition to personal self-esteem, we propose that there is a second type of self-esteem, collective self-esteem. People who are high in trait collective self-esteem should be more likely to react to threats to collective self-esteem by derogating outgroups and enhanging the ingroup. In a study using the minimal intergroup paradigm, trait personal and collective self-esteem were measured, and subjects received information about the average performance of their group. We conclude that collective self-esteem is an individual difference variable that may moderate the attempt to maintain a positive social identity. The relation between collective and personal self-esteem is discussed

Collective Self-Esteem and Psychological Well-Being among White, Black, and Asian College Students

A total of 91 Black, 96 White, and 35 Asian college students completed the Collective Self-Esteem Scale (CSES), as well as measures of psychological well-being (personal self-esteem, life satisfaction, depression, and hopelessness). Correlations between the Public and Private subscales of the CSES were near zero for Blacks, moderate for Whites, and strong for Asians. The membership and private subscales of the general CSES were related to psychological well-being, even when the effects of personal self-esteem on well-being were partialed out. However, when the three groups were examined separately, the relation of CSE to well-being with personal self-esteem partialed out was nonsignificant for Whites, small for Blacks, and moderate to strong for Asians. General and race-specific CSE were correlated for all three groups, although the correlations were strongest for Asians. Implications for symbolic interactionist views of the self-concept, for formulations of mental health, and for methodological issues concerning the CSES are discussed.

Social stigma: The affective consequences of attributional ambiguity

Two experiments investigated the hypothesis that the stigmatized can protect their self-esteem by attributing negative feedback to prejudice. Fifty-nine women participated in the 1st experiment. Women who received negative feedback from a prejudiced evaluator attributed the feedback to his prejudice and reported less depressed affect than women who received negative feedback from a nonprejudiced evaluator. In the 2nd experiment, 38 Black and 45 White students received interpersonal feedback from a White evaluator, who cither could see them or could not. Compared with Whites, Blacks were more likely to attribute negative feedback to prejudice than positive feedback and were more likely to attribute both types of feedback to prejudice when they could be seen by the other student. Being seen by the evaluator buffered the self-esteem of Blacks from negative feedback but hurt the self-esteem of Blacks who received positive feedback.

Contingencies of self-worth in college students: theory and measurement.

The Contingencies of Self-Worth Scale assesses 7 sources of self-esteem in college students: academics, appearance, approval from others, competition, family support, Gods love, and virtue. In confirmatory factor analyses on data from 1,418 college students, a 7-factor model fit to the data acceptably well and significantly better than several plausible alternative models. The subscales all have high internal consistency, test-retest reliability, are distinct from other personality measures, and have a simplex structure arrayed on a continuum from external to internal sources of self-esteem. Contingencies of self-worth assessed prior to college predicted how students spent their time during their 1st year of college.

Coping with Negative Stereotypes about Intellectual Performance: The Role of Psychological Disengagement:

Two experiments tested the hypothesis that members of negatively stereotyped groups psychologically disengage their self-esteem from feedback received in stereotype-relevant domains. In both experiments, African American and European American college students received performance feedback on a bogus intelligence test and completed measures of self-esteem. In Experiment 1, European American students had higher self-esteem after success than after failure, whereas African American students had similar levels of self-esteem regardless of feedback. Whether the test had been described as racially biased or culturally fair had no effect. Experiment 2 examined the extent to which lesser responsivity among African Americans is the result of chronic disengagement from intelligence tests or situational disengagement initiated by priming racial stereotypes. Results indicate that both chronic disengagement and racial priming engender less responsivity to negative performance feedback among African American, but not European American, students. Performance expectancies, self-evaluations, and beliefs about test bias are discussed as possible mediators of this relationship.

Downward comparison, prejudice, and evaluations of others: effects of self-esteem and threat

In two studies, we explored the effects of trait self-esteem and threats to the self-concept on evaluations of others. In Study 1, subjects high, moderate, and low in self-esteem received either success, failure, or no feedback on a test and later evaluated three pairs of targets: in-groups and out-groups based on a minimal intergroup manipulation, those who scored above average and those who scored below average on the test, and themselves and the average college student. Study 2 explored the effects of self-esteem and threat on in-group favoritism in a real-world setting, campus sororities. Together, the results of these studies indicate that individuals high in self-esteem, but not those low in self-esteem, respond to threats to the self-concept by derogating out-groups relative to the in-group when the group boundaries have evaluative implications.

Self-Esteem and Self-Serving Biases in Reactions to Positive and Negative Events: An Integrative Review

The self-serving bias refers to the tendency of people to interpret and explain outcomes in ways that have favorable implications for the self. The term bias often implies distorted or inaccurate perception that can be shown to be erroneous according to some objective standard. But according to the Random House College Dictionary (1975), a bias is also “a tendency or inclination of outlook; a subjective point of view” (p. 131). Similarly, the Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (1976) defines a bias as “an inclination of temperament or outlook; esp. a highly personal and unreasoned distortion of judgment” (p. 106). In this chapter, we regard self-serving biases as judgments or interpretations of oneself, one’s behavior, and the behavior of others in ways that are favorable to the self, without requiring that such judgments be accurate according to some objective standard. We also begin with no assumptions that biases necessarily reflect motivated distortions in reasoning, rather than normal cognitive processes.