Phillip C. Saunders

Bridge over Troubled Water?: Envisioning a China-Taiwan Peace Agreement

In Taiwans 2008 presidential election, both candidates advocated signing a peace agreement with China, and Chinese leaders have also expressed interest in reaching such an agreement. Although substantial obstacles remain in the way of a cross-strait peace agreement, this increased interest on both sides of the Taiwan Strait suggests that a closer examination of an agreements possible dimensions and consequences is warranted. This analysis considers what an agreement might look like, whether and how it might be effective in reducing the possibility of cross-strait military conflict, the relevant barriers to an agreement, and whether an agreementif reachedwould be likely to endure.

Debating China's Naval Nationalism

In “China’s Naval Nationalism: Sources, Prospects, and the U.S. Response,” Robert Ross seeks to explain why “China will soon embark on a more ambitious maritime policy, beginning with the construction of a power-projection navy centered on an aircraft carrier.”1 Ross argues that geopolitical constraints should lead China, a continental power, to pursue access denial as its optimal maritime strategy. He relies on “naval nationalism” to explain China’s development of naval power-projection capabilities, which he describes as a suboptimal choice given China’s geopolitical position. We argue that “naval nationalism” is an underdeveloped and unconvincing explanation for China’s pursuit of expanded naval capabilities. Instead, China’s development of a limited naval power-projection capability reoects changes in China’s threat environment and expanded Chinese national interests created by deeper integration into the world economy. In our critique, we arst identify oaws in Ross’s geopolitical analysis. Second, we discuss shortcomings in his causal argument. Lastly, we brieoy present Chinese rationales for the development of limited power-projection capabilities, which are consistent with a proper understanding of Chinese interests.

US–China military relations: competition and cooperation

ABSTRACT China’s efforts to build a ‘new type of great power relations’ and a ‘new type of military-to-military relations’ do not constitute a major turning point in relations with the United States. Political relations set limits on military cooperation, and the two sides have been unable to construct a sustainable strategic basis for relations. This has contributed to an ‘on-again, off-again’ pattern in military ties. Trends show a pattern of frequent disruptions in military-to-military relations from 2000 to 2010, followed by an increase in interactions beginning in 2012. Nevertheless, obstacles on both sides are likely to limit mutual trust and constrain future development of military-to-military relations.