Jochen Hundsdoerfer

Net Wage Illusion in a Real-Effort Experiment*

In a controlled laboratory experiment, subjects had to fold letters in order to earn money. While the net income per letter was the same in the three treatments, the gross income varied and the tax rate was 0, 25, and 50 percent. Although work incentives should be the same in all treatments, subjects worked harder and longer when they were taxed. We conclude that this is because of a net wage illusion effect. The existence of this effect demonstrates that not only are the tax rate and the tax base of importance for work incentives, but the perception of a tax is also important.

It's All About Tax Rates: An Empirical Study of Tax Perception

In this paper we apply conjoint analysis to study the influence of changes in the tax rate and the tax base on the perceived tax burden. Our results show that the majority of individuals do not make rational tax decisions based on the actual tax burden, but rather use simple decision heuristics. This leads to the importance of the tax rate being significantly overestimated and the importance of the tax base being significantly underestimated. Furthermore we determine framing effects and show that under specific assumptions, a rise in the actual tax burden can lead to a electoral success.

Tax Perception - An Empirical Survey

This paper gives a survey of the experimental literature on the perception (bias) of individuals with respect to their own tax burden and its effect on economic decisions. Six strands of literature are discussed: (1) perception of marginal tax rates, (2) influence of tax complexity on tax perception, (3) taxation and incentives to work, (4) tax salience, (5) tax morale and fairness and (6) money illusion, perceived inflation and fiscal drag. The literature discussed contains more evidence for than against a perception bias.

The Influence of Tax Labeling and Tax Earmarking on the Willingness to Contribute – A Conjoint Analysis

We apply conjoint analysis to study the influence of tax labeling and tax earmarking on German taxpayers’ willingness to contribute. We show that labeling and earmarking effects can substantially increase participants’ willingness to contribute, and we analyze how these effects interact. These results add to the explanation of the variety in tax labels and provide implications for tax policy on further reforms of the tax and contribution system. Labeling and earmarking contributions are important instruments in selling policies and increasing tax revenue.

Progressionseffekte und Varianten zur optimalen Steuerplanung bei der Thesaurierungsbegünstigung–Eine Abweichungsanalyse

ZusammenfassungBei progressiven Steuertarifen kann Steuerplanung P rogressionseffekte bewirken. Da aber die Berücksichtigung progressiver Tarife häufig nicht unerhebliche Planungskosten mit sich bringt, werden Progressionseffekte in Steuerplanungskalkülen häufig vereinfachend vernachlässigt. Wir wollen an einem praktisch relevanten Beispiel zeigen, wie groß der Fehler aus dieser Vereinfachung ist und wovon er abhängt. Mit Hilfe eines mathematischen Optimierungsmodells zeigen wir am Beispiel der Thesaurierungsbegünstigung des § 34a EStG, für welche Steuerpflichtigen sich die Berücksichtigung von P rogressionseffekten und somit eine detaillierte Steuerplanung lohnt und für wen ein vereinfachtes lineares Modell bereits zu akzeptablen Ergebnissen führt.AbstractIf tax rates are progressive, tax planning may cause progression effects. The inclusion of progression effects is costly. Therefore, the simplifying assumption that tax rates are linear is widespread in tax planning. We analyse the potential loss caused by this simplifying assumption and its determinants. Using a mathematical optimization model, we show for the example of the German conduit tax privilege for retained earnings in which case and for which types of taxpayers the inclusion of progression effects in tax planning is appropriate. Furthermore, we analyse for which taxpayers they may safely be neglected.

Income Tax Compliance Costs of Working Individuals

We analyze the compliance costs of individual taxpayers resulting from the German income tax (tax year 2007). Using survey data that have been raised between December 2008 and April 2009, we find evidence for a considerably higher cost burden of self-employed taxpayers. Taxable income and a higher education (university degree) are positively correlated with compliance costs, while the time effort of female taxpayers is significantly lower. By contrast, joint filing of married couples reduces the burden of tax compliance. The aggregate cost estimate of German income taxpayers amounts to €6 to €9 billion, respectively, 3.1 to 4.7 percent of the income tax revenue in 2007. This estimate is higher than latest projections in a number of other European countries like Spain and Sweden, but lower than estimates for the United States and Australia.

The Hidden Burden of the Income Tax: Compliance Costs of German Individuals

We analyze the compliance costs of individual taxpyers resulting from the German income tax. using survey data that has been raised between December 2008 and April 2009, we find evidence for a considerably higher cost burden of self-employed taxpaxers. Taxable income and the demand for external support are positively correlated with compliance costs, while the time effort of female taxpayers is significantly lower. We also find evidence for a positive correlation of education and tax knowledge with the compliance burden. By contrast, a joint assessment of a married couple seems to reduce the monetized time effort. The aggregated cost burden of German income taxpayers amounts to 6.1-7.2 billion €, respectively 3.2-3.7 % of the income tax revenue in 2007. This estimate is higher than latest projections in a number of other European countries like Spain and Sweden, but significantly lower than results for the United States and Australia.

Investment Valuation with Tax-optimized Financing Decisions and a Tax-optimized Default Alternative

In this paper we evaluate an indivisible investment project that is carried out in a corporation under very simple premises. In particular, we discuss a one-period model with certainty, the pure domestic case and proportional tax rates. Surprisingly, the decision problem turns out to be rather complex if one has to make allowance for different taxation of the corporation and its owner. Altogether there are more than 10 cases that have to be distinguished if the firm’s managers want to make a correct decision, depending on the relation of personal and corporate tax rates.

Does legality matter? The case of tax avoidance and evasion

Previous research argues that the law expresses social values and could, therefore, influence individual behavior independently of enforcement and penalization. Using three laboratory experiments on tax avoidance and evasion, we study how legality affects individuals’ decisions. We find that, without any risk of negative financial consequences, the qualification of tax minimization as illegal versus legal reduces tax minimization considerably. Legislators can thus, in principle, affect subjects’ decisions by defining the line between legality and illegality. However, once we introduce potential negative financial consequences, we observe no difference between legal and illegal tax minimization behavior. Only if we use moral priming to increase subjects’ moral cost do we again find a legality effect on tax minimization. Overall, this demonstrates the limitations of the expressive function of the law. Legality might be an important determinant of behavior only if we consider activities with little or no risk of negative financial consequences or if subjects are morally primed.

The Name Game for Contributions – Influence of Labeling and Earmarking on the Perceived Tax Burden

In this paper we apply conjoint analysis as an empirical method to study the influence of tax labeling and tax earmarking on the perceived tax burden. As reference for the individual behavior we use the model of a rational utility maximizer described by the economic theory. We determine a significant influence of the labeling and the earmarking of taxes. We can show that the labeling and earmarking effect can decrease the perceived tax burden for the test persons which results in a deviation from a (rational) consumption maximizing behavior. These results give important implications for tax policy regarding further reforms of the tax and contribution system.