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PS Political Science & Politics | 2002

Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews

Joel D. Aberbach; Bert A. Rockman

In real estate the maxim for picking a piece of property is “location, location, location.” In elite interviewing, as in social science generally, the maxim for the best way to design and conduct a study is “purpose, purpose, purpose.” Its elementary that the primary question one must ask before designing a study is, “What do I want to learn?” Appropriate methods flow from the answer. Interviewing is often important if one needs to know what a set of people think, or how they interpret an event or series of events, or what they have done or are planning to do. (Interviews are not always necessary. Written records, for example, may be more than adequate.) In a case study, respondents are selected on the basis of what they might know to help the investigator fill in pieces of a puzzle or confirm the proper alignment of pieces already in place. If one aims to make inferences about a larger population, then one must draw a systematic sample. For some kinds of information, highly structured interviews using mainly or exclusively close-ended questions may be an excellent way to proceed. If one needs to probe for information and to give respondents maximum flexibility in structuring their responses, then open-ended questions are the way to go.


American Political Science Review | 1991

Keeping a watchful eye : the politics of congressional oversight

Diana Evans; Joel D. Aberbach

Congressional oversight activity has increased dramatically since the early 1970s. Congressional committees now spend more of their time holding hearings to review the activities of federal agencies, and committee staff members are busy collecting information about what goes on during program implementation. This book examines the reasons behind the surprising growth of congressional oversight. Using original data collected for this project, Joel D. Aberbach documents the increase in oversight activity and links it to changes in the political environment. He explores the political purposes served by oversight, the techniques Congress uses to uncover information about the activities of the federal bureaucracy, and the reasons why topics get on the oversight agenda. He concludes that even though the U.S. government system was not designed with a large administrative sector in mind, its ability to expose bureaucratic behavior to public scrutiny is impressive, and the Congress plays a vital role in this endeavor.


American Political Science Review | 1970

Political Trust and Racial Ideology

Joel D. Aberbach; Jack L. Walker

No government yet established has had the loyalty and trust of all its citizens. Regardless of the popularity of its leaders or how careful they are in soliciting opinions and encouraging participation in the process of policy-making, there are always those who see inequalities and injustices in the society and harbor suspicions of the governments motives and intentions. Resentment and distrust are elements of disaffection and the first step toward resistance. Therefore, even the most dictatorial governments have usually striven to increase their credibility and popularity. For democratic governments, however, the problem of combating distrust and encouraging voluntary acceptance of its institutions and decisions is a paramount concern. One of democratic theorys distinctive characteristics is its strong emphasis on voluntary consent, both as a basis of political obligation and as a central attribute of citizenship. The concern expressed by democratic thinkers about the elements of due process and the protection of opportunities for widespread participation is directed toward the creation of citizens who voluntarily accept the societys goals; “the demand for consent is the demand that the government must be more than self-appointed and must, in some significant way, be the chosen instrument through which the body politic and community acts ….” Democracys guiding ideal is the substitution of mutual understanding and agreement for coerciveness and arbitrary authority in all phases of social and political life. The existence of distrustful citizens who are convinced that the government serves the interests of a few rather than the interests of all is a barrier to the realization of the democratic ideal.


American Political Science Review | 1976

Clashing Beliefs Within the Executive Branch: The Nixon Administration Bureaucracy.

Joel D. Aberbach; Bert A. Rockman

This article examines two key political beliefs of high level American federal executives: their views on the role of government in providing social services and their views regarding inequities in political representation. Data were collected in 1970 through open-ended interviews with a sample of 126 political appointees and supergrade career civil servants in the domestic agencies. Both of the beliefs analyzed were pertinent to the efforts of the Nixon administration to reorder national priorities and policies. The evidence in the paper establishes differences in the outlooks of administrators depending on agency, job status, and party affiliation. Agency and party affiliation are particularly important variables, and their joint effects on the beliefs examined are substantial. Democratic administrators in the social service agenoies were the most liberal and Republicans in the non-social service agencies the most conservative. Our data document a career bureaucracy with very little Republican representation and a social service bureaucracy dominated by administrators ideologically hostile to many of the directions pursued by the Nixon administration in the realm of social policy. The article closes with a discussion of the implications of our findings for future conflicts between the elected executive and the bureaucracy.


Public Administration | 2001

Radical Reform in New Zealand: Crisis, Windows of Opportunity, and Rational Actors

Joel D. Aberbach; Tom Christensen

This article uses three perspectives to explain the radical economic and state sector reforms undertaken in New Zealand starting in 1984. We interpret the reforms using a rational-comprehensive perspective, a garbage can perspective and a modified garbage can perspective identified in the work of John Kingdon. With New Zealand as an illustrative case, we explore the conditions under which radical reform is possible, the factors governing the adoption of reforms, and the impact on the reform process of a countrys historical and cultural traditions. Our analysis emphasizes the import of a package of ready-made solutions, strong advocates (particularly a well-placed policy entrepreneur) who attach the solutions to a problem, and the existence of a ‘window of opportunity’ for adoption of the reforms. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of adopting reforms that run counter to a nations long-established traditions.


International Journal of Public Administration | 2006

The Past and Future of Political-Administrative Relations: Research from Bureaucrats and Politicians to In the Web of Politics—and Beyond

Joel D. Aberbach; Bert A. Rockman

Abstract This article examines the changing nature of the relations between bureaucrats and politicians. Drawing on our earlier work with Robert D. Putnam (Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies, 1981) and our book published in 2000 (In the Web of Politics), plus additional works by others in this area, we consider the findings in these studies with particular emphasis on their implications for further research. One notable phenomenon is a retreat from what looked originally like a steady progression of bureaucratic influence in policymaking from Image I (politicians making decisions and bureaucrats implementing them) to Image IV (a deepening overlap of roles) back to Image II (with civil servants bringing facts and knowledge to the policy process and politicians defining values and representing interests). In a dynamic world, one should be cautious in suggesting a future research agenda. Despite this caution, however, we conclude the article with suggestions for work that we think will be important in the near future.


Administration & Society | 2003

Translating Theoretical Ideas into Modern State Reform: Economics-Inspired Reforms and Competing Models of Governance

Joel D. Aberbach; Tom Christensen

Reform ideas inspired by the new institutional economics have swept the world. This article examines three perspectives on organizing government and civil service. The individual-economic model draws on market theories. It emphasizes institutional arrangements designed to harness individual self-interest to achieve overall efficiency. The collectivist model stresses a centralized state, collective goals, and cultural integration. The pluralist model celebrates a vital group life and sees heterogeneous interests as properly reflected in a public sector characterized by institutional variety. We analyze the three as guides to reform, with emphasis on the individual-economic model, and argue that each applies best under certain conditions.


Congress & the Presidency: A Journal of Capital Studies | 2002

What's Happened to the Watchful Eye?

Joel D. Aberbach

This article reports results of a follow-up study to my book Keeping a Watchful Eye (1990), updating it with data from the 1990s. It examines whether congressional oversight has increased or decreased relative to earlier periods, how the variables that predicted oversight behavior in the period from 1961 to 1983 worked in later years, why changes have occurred, and what they mean. It also examines whether there was something distinctive about oversight in the 1990s when Republicans dominated both chambers. Results indicate that the amount of primary-purpose oversight continues to be quite high and that the model developed in the book to explain committee oversight behavior remains remarkably effective. What has changed is a large drop in legislative hearings and meetings (where oversight behavior often occurs), something that the data show actually predates the Republican 104th Congress. However, the Republican takeover did lead to a more oppositional oversight context–to more oversight hostile to the basic goals of programs and agencies.


Public Policy and Administration | 2007

The Challenges of Modernizing Tax Administration Putting Customers First in Coercive Public Organizations

Joel D. Aberbach; Tom Christensen

Customer friendliness in tax systems typically characterized by control and enforcement appears to be a contradiction in terms. But many tax agencies, like other types of public organizations, have become more customer-oriented in the last few decades. This article, comparing the administration of tax systems in Norway and the USA, describes and analyzes the driving forces behind the consumer orientation movement in tax administration in the two nations and the dilemmas and effects of trying to balance control and service. Using a broad transformative perspective, we analyze structural and cultural changes in tax administration that are related to the increase in customer orientation and also consider the symbolic aspects of catering more to taxpayers. Norway and the USA have experienced similar structural reforms, but the two countries deviate rather sharply in other respects, particularly in the much larger impact of consumer-oriented reforms in the USA.


Administration & Society | 1987

Comparative Administration Methods, Muddles, and Models

Joel D. Aberbach; Bert A. Rockman

This article explores three theoretical and methodological problems in the comparative study of public administration: (1) the relations of parts of the administrative system, usually the focus of inquiry, to the administrative system as a whole, usually the object of theoretical inference; (2) the connection between universals of organization theory and variabilities in the environment of organizations and administrative systems; and (3) the link between distinctive levels of analytic focus-structures, actions, and actors. These broad theoretical and methodological problems anchor a more specific analysis of (1) links between bureaucracies, bureaucrats, and politics; (2) the ideas of centralization, planning, and coordination; and (3) the notions of bargaining, mediation, and sub governments.

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Charles V. Willie

State University of New York System

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