Johanna Peetz

When Does Feeling Moral Actually Make You a Better Person? Conceptual Abstraction Moderates Whether Past Moral Deeds Motivate Consistency or Compensatory Behavior:

According to the moral licensing literature, moral self-perceptions induce compensatory behavior: People who feel moral act less prosocially than those who feel immoral. Conversely, work on moral identity indicates that moral self-perceptions motivate behavioral consistency: People who feel moral act more prosocially than those who feel less so. In three studies, the authors reconcile these propositions by demonstrating the moderating role of conceptual abstraction. In Study 1, participants who recalled performing recent (concrete) moral or immoral behavior demonstrated compensatory behavior, whereas participants who considered temporally distant (abstract) moral behavior demonstrated behavioral consistency. Study 2 confirmed that this effect was unique to moral self-perceptions. Study 3 manipulated whether participants recalled moral or immoral actions concretely or abstractly, and replicated the moderation pattern with willingness to donate real money to charity. Together, these findings suggest that concrete moral self-perceptions activate self-regulatory behavior, and abstract moral self-perceptions activate identity concerns.

Crimes of the Past: Defensive Temporal Distancing in the Face of Past In-Group Wrongdoing

Relegating past in-group transgressions to ancient history might deflect threat to collective identity. Germans (but not Canadians) judged the Holocaust to be more subjectively remote in time when they read only about German-perpetrated atrocities than when this threat was mitigated. Greater subjective distance predicted lower collective guilt, which, in turn, predicted less willingness to make amends (Study 1). Distancing under threat was more pronounced among defensive Germans who felt unjustly blamed by other nations (Study 2). In Study 3, the authors examined the causal role of subjective time. Nondefensive Germans induced to view the Holocaust as closer reported more collective guilt and willingness to compensate. In contrast, defensive Germans reported less collective guilt after the closeness induction. Taken together, the studies demonstrate that how past wrongs are psychologically situated in time can play a powerful role in people’s present-day reactions to them.

The Planning Fallacy: Cognitive, Motivational, and Social Origins

Abstract The planning fallacy refers to a prediction phenomenon, all too familiar to many, wherein people underestimate the time it will take to complete a future task, despite knowledge that previous tasks have generally taken longer than planned. In this chapter, we review theory and research on the planning fallacy, with an emphasis on a programmatic series of investigations that we have conducted on this topic. We first outline a definition of the planning fallacy, explicate controversies and complexities surrounding its definition, and summarize empirical research documenting the scope and generality of the phenomenon. We then explore the origins of the planning fallacy, beginning with the classic inside–outside cognitive model developed by Kahneman and Tversky [Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Intuitive prediction: biases and corrective procedures. TIMS Studies in Management Science, 12 , 313–327]. Finally, we develop an extended inside–outside model that integrates empirical research examining cognitive, motivational, social, and behavioral processes underlying the planning fallacy.The planning fallacy refers to a prediction phenomenon, all too familiar to many, wherein people underestimate the time it will take to complete a future task, despite knowledge that previous tasks have generally taken longer than planned. In this chapter, we review theory and research on the planning fallacy, with an emphasis on a programmatic series of investigations that we have conducted on this topic. We first outline a definition of the planning fallacy, explicate controversies and complexities surrounding its definition, and summarize empirical research documenting the scope and generality of the phenomenon. We then explore the origins of the planning fallacy, beginning with the classic inside–outside cognitive model developed by Kahneman and Tversky [Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Intuitive prediction: biases and corrective procedures. TIMS Studies in Management Science, 12, 313–327]. Finally, we develop an extended inside–outside model that integrates empirical research examining cognitive, motivational, social, and behavioral processes underlying the planning fallacy.

Is There a Budget Fallacy? The Role of Savings Goals in the Prediction of Personal Spending

The authors extend research and theory on self prediction into the realm of personal financial behavior. Four studies examined people’s ability to predict their future personal spending and the findings supported the two main hypotheses. First, participants tended to underestimate their future spending. They predicted spending substantially less money in the coming week than they actually spent or than they remembered spending in the previous week. Second, the prediction bias stemmed from people’s savings goals—defined as the general desire to save money or minimize future spending—at the time of prediction. Participants who reported (Studies 2 and 3) or were induced to experience (Study 4) a stronger savings goal predicted they would spend less money. However, savings goals were not related to actual spending and thus contributed to the bias in prediction.

Chapter One – The Planning Fallacy: Cognitive, Motivational, and Social Origins

Abstract The planning fallacy refers to a prediction phenomenon, all too familiar to many, wherein people underestimate the time it will take to complete a future task, despite knowledge that previous tasks have generally taken longer than planned. In this chapter, we review theory and research on the planning fallacy, with an emphasis on a programmatic series of investigations that we have conducted on this topic. We first outline a definition of the planning fallacy, explicate controversies and complexities surrounding its definition, and summarize empirical research documenting the scope and generality of the phenomenon. We then explore the origins of the planning fallacy, beginning with the classic inside–outside cognitive model developed by Kahneman and Tversky [Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Intuitive prediction: biases and corrective procedures. TIMS Studies in Management Science, 12 , 313–327]. Finally, we develop an extended inside–outside model that integrates empirical research examining cognitive, motivational, social, and behavioral processes underlying the planning fallacy.The planning fallacy refers to a prediction phenomenon, all too familiar to many, wherein people underestimate the time it will take to complete a future task, despite knowledge that previous tasks have generally taken longer than planned. In this chapter, we review theory and research on the planning fallacy, with an emphasis on a programmatic series of investigations that we have conducted on this topic. We first outline a definition of the planning fallacy, explicate controversies and complexities surrounding its definition, and summarize empirical research documenting the scope and generality of the phenomenon. We then explore the origins of the planning fallacy, beginning with the classic inside–outside cognitive model developed by Kahneman and Tversky [Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Intuitive prediction: biases and corrective procedures. TIMS Studies in Management Science, 12, 313–327]. Finally, we develop an extended inside–outside model that integrates empirical research examining cognitive, motivational, social, and behavioral processes underlying the planning fallacy.

Marking Time Selective Use of Temporal Landmarks as Barriers Between Current and Future Selves

Temporal landmarks such as birthdays and significant calendar dates structure our perception of time. People might highlight temporal landmarks spontaneously in an effort to regulate connections between temporal selves. Five studies demonstrated that landmarks are used spontaneously to induce psychological separation from undesirable temporal selves. Participants were more likely to think of events that fell in between the current and the future self if an imagined future self was negative than if it was positive (Studies 1a, 1b, and 2). Furthermore, when a self-enhancement mindset was activated, participants were more likely to call to mind intervening temporal landmarks to protect themselves from a negative future self than when this mindset was not activated (Study 3). Finally, when psychological separations between the current self and a negative future self were introduced through alternate means, participants no longer selectively used landmarks to separate themselves from this future self (Study 4).

Only Minutes a Day: Reframing Exercise Duration Affects Exercise Intentions and Behavior

Two studies demonstrated that leading individuals to mentally reframe the time required for an exercise program (e.g., 2 hr per week) in terms of the equivalent daily amount (e.g., 17 min per day) reduced the perceived time commitment and increased peoples willingness to try the program. Study 2 also identified a cognitive mechanism that mediated the effect of temporal framing on exercise intentions. Consistent with findings in other domains (Gourville, 1998), reframing exercise duration in daily units led participants to retrieve comparison activities that were relatively short and manageable, which in turn increased their willingness to try the target exercise.

Big Money: The Effect of Money Size on Value Perceptions and Saving Motivation

Motivated perception has been shown to affect people’s estimates of money (e.g., perceiving coins as larger than real size). In the present research, we examine whether simply varying the size of a picture of money can affect its perceived value and subsequent decisions. Participants presented with a picture of money enlarged by 15% perceived the depicted money as more valuable compared with those seeing a real-size picture (Study 1). When told to imagine their own cash and banked money in the depicted form, participants presented with a picture enlarged by 15% felt more subjectively wealthy and reported fewer intentions to conserve their money compared with those seeing a real-size picture of the same money (Study 2). Together, these studies suggest that judgments about money and even attitudes toward personal spending can be influenced by manipulating the size of a picture of money.

Relationships’ Best Friend: Links between Pet Ownership, Empathy, and Romantic Relationship Outcomes

ABSTRACT The benefits of pets on individual wellbeing is well established. But can pets also have benefits for romantic relationships? Using mixed methods, three studies explored the link between pet ownership and romantic relationship quality. First, using a grounded theory approach, we qualitatively investigated participants’ personal beliefs of how their pets influence their romantic relationships by coding open-ended responses. Results suggested that pets are seen as having predominantly positive (86.5%) effects, followed by few neutral (8%) and negative (4.5%) effects (study 1). We next compared a community sample of pet owners’ reports of relationship quality with those of non-pet owners. Results suggested that pet ownership was associated with several relationship benefits (greater overall relationship quality, partner responsiveness, adjustment, and relational investment) compared with couples without pets (study 2). Finally, we examined one possible reason for why pets may benefit relationships: A pet might provide the opportunity to practice empathic abilities, which is a crucial ability in the maintenance of positive relationships. Results showed that the number of years an individual owned a pet was positively correlated with empathic concern, which in turn was linked to several relationship benefits (commitment, couple identity, and relationship maintenance behaviors; study 3). In sum, three studies provided initial evidence that there is indeed a positive association between two important relationships in peoples’ lives: their partners and their pets.

It's a matter of time: The effect of depletion on communal action in romantic relationships is moderated by relationship length.

Researchers have only begun to turn their attention to the role of self-control in communal action (rather than communal restraint) in relationships. Conflicting results from early studies indicate that the association between self-control and communal action may be quite complex, and potentially moderated by many variables. Here we investigate how relationship length may moderate the extent to which communal actions require self-control resources. In 5 studies, we investigated the role of self-control resources in implementing (Studies 1 and 2) and in choosing (Studies 3-5) communal actions for a romantic partner, as a function of the length of time partners had been together. The data supported the hypothesis that as relationships mature over time, communal actions may require less self-control to implement and may become a decisional default. These findings suggest that communal actions may be a more deliberative response in newer romantic relationships but a more reflexive response in more established relationships.