John Considine

Online Assignments in Economics: A Test of Their Effectiveness

This article compares the effectiveness of online and paper-based assignments and tutorials using summative assessment results. All of the students in a large managerial economics course at National University of Ireland, Galway were asked to do six assignments online using Aplia and to do two on paper. The authors examined whether a students performance on a particular section of the exam is affected (1) by how he or she performed on the corresponding assignment and (2) by whether the student completed the corresponding assignment on paper or online. Our results provide little evidence that a students performance on an assignment helps him or her perform better on the corresponding section of the exam. We also found little evidence that the way in which one completes an assignment—on paper or online—has an effect on how one performs on a particular section of the exam.

UK Debt Sustainability: Some Nonlinear Evidence and Theoretical Implications

In this paper we assess whether the UK public finances were sustainable for the period 1919-2001. A robust test of sustainability is presented using a nonlinear representation of the debt-GDP ratio. Empirical evidence supports debt sustainability. Moreover, the exponential smooth transition autoregressive representation is evidence that sustainability is the result of active debt management rather than tax smoothing. The results strongly support the active debt management hypothesis for the UK. Copyright

Irish National Lottery Sports Capital Grant Allocations, 1999-2007: Natural Experiments on Political Influence

Irish National Lottery Sports Capital Grant Allocations show a clear bias towards the geographical areas represented by the Minister for Arts, Sports and Tourism and the Minister for Finance. This bias is the result of the procedures by which the funds are allocated.

Yes Minister: Invaluable Material for Teaching the Public Choice of Bureaucracy

Conveying the logical consequences of modelling the individual as self-interested in the public sector bureaucracy is not an easy task. One has to avoid, without dismissing, normative judgments and issues of empirical validity in order to focus on the logical consequence. Illustrating the theory in a memorable way is also difficult. This paper argues that Yes Minister provides ideal material for the task.

Irish sports capital funding: a public choice perspective.

In the last five years, the public funding of large scale sports facilities in Ireland has been the subject of investigations by the Attorney General, the Comptroller and Auditor General and government appointed independent consultants. During the same period there has been a growing scent of sports pork from the allocation of National Lottery funded sports capital grants for smaller sports facilities around the country. Public choice economists, with their assumption of self‐interested political actors pursuing their preferences through the political process, would not be surprised by these events. This paper explains how the public choice perspective offers, the best explanation of sports capital funding in Ireland. “I am lucky enough to be the first Minister for Finance in over fifty years to bring in an overall Budget surplus. I suppose it is not surprising that the very mention of budget surplus has disturbed the discipline and restraint, which underpin the conditions that led to the budget surplus in the first place.” (Charlie McCreevy in his budget speech of December 2nd 1998)

Competitive balance in a quasi-double knockout tournament

ABSTRACT In 2001, the All-Ireland Gaelic Football competition changed from being a singleknockout tournament to a quasi-double knockout competition. Similar natural experiments in economics and operational research theory suggest such a change should reduce the competitive balance in the competition. Using a Hirschmann–Herfindahl Index measure of concentration and a bootstrapping approach, we confirm that the new structure leads to a less competitive outcome and, importantly, this outcome is less uncertain. Our bootstrapped results show that in the long run, with larger samples, there is less competitive balance in the new competition structure than in the older structure competition structure. Finally, we also consider a stochastic dominance approach to evaluating the change in tournament structure, but the low power due to the presence of ties in our small sample leads to an inconclusive outcome.

Of Mice and Pens: A Discrete Choice Experiment on Assignment Systems in Economics

Technological advances have led to a rise in the variety of ways of delivering assignments, most notably, the use of online assignment systems. The main contribution of this paper is to use a Discrete Choice Experiment to elicit students’ preferences for various possible attributes of assignment systems. Our results indicate that students have the strongest preference for assignment systems containing questions that have a high relevance for exam preparation. They also have a strong preference for assignment systems that provide a high level of feedback. Our results indicate that there is a high degree of heterogeneity within the student cohort in their preferences towards various attributes of assignment systems with some students willing to pay over €180 for assignment systems that have a high level of exam relevance while others are only willing to pay €30.

Dr Olson's Antidote for Institutional Sclerosis

An important part in the evolution of Mancur Olsons economic thinking was delivered to an Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) symposium in June 1989. The economist who had identified, what he labelled, the disease of institutional sclerosis was now identifying an improved version of the antidote and the circumstances under which the antidote might work. While Olson had previously identified economic understanding as a possible antidote, he acknowledged that he did not know how, and if, it might work. Olsons IEA paper represents the next step. Dr Olson returned to examine the ‘patient’ (Olsons term) that he previously held up as an exemplar case of institutional sclerosis – Great Britain. His examination revealed that it was a particular type of understanding that was important and that it was only likely to work under particular circumstances.

James M. Buchanan and Edmund Burke: Opposite Sides of the Same Fiscal Constitution Coin

Constitutional economics examines the individuals choice-between-rules rather than their choice-within-rules. It is, according to James M. Buchanan, a restatement of the classical political economy of Adam Smith. One of its primary normative implications is the need for a fiscal constitution. Given the late eighteenth century intellectual basis for such fiscal constitutions it appears, at first glance, a little strange that the research program does not consider Edmund Burkes 1780 economic constitution worthy of consideration. The most obvious reason for Burkes exclusion from constitutional political economy is that the methodological basis of Buchanans twentieth century constitutional economics seems almost the polar opposite of Burkes eighteenth century legislators attempt to introduce a fiscal constitution. However, both methodologies suffer from internal inconsistency in their cases for a fiscal constitution. One of the primary reasons for this inconsistency is that each needs to appeal to ideas more at home in the methodology of the other. Buchanan adapts a quasi-Burke approach by the introduction of ethical norms not consistent with the self-interest postulate, while Burke adopts a quasi-Buchanan approach by appealing to the principle of consent to justify his reform of institutions that have been formed by custom and tradition. Ultimately, the methodological difference is not as great as it appears at first. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Burkes work deserves recognition in the broader constitutional economics research program because to exclude him on the grounds of methodology is to fail to understand the logical implications of Buchanans work.