Jon Birger Skjærseth

EU Emissions Trading : Initiation, Decision-making and Implementation

Contents: Preface Introduction Analytical framework Development of EU ETS Initiating EU emissions trading Deciding on EU emissions trading Implementing EU emissions trading Conclusions References Annex Index.

Soft Law, Hard Law, and Effective Implementation of International Environmental Norms

The article compares the interplay between soft law institutions and those based on hard law in international efforts to protect the North Sea, reduce transboundary air pollution, and discipline fisheries subsidies. Our cases confirm that ambitious norms are more easily achieved in soft law institutions than in legally binding ones, but not primarily because they bypass domestic ratification or fail to raise concerns for compliance costs. More important is the greater flexibility offered by soft law instruments with respect to participation and sectoral emphasis. Second, ambitious soft law regimes put political pressure on laggards in negotiations over binding rules, but this effect is contingent on factors such as political saliency and reasonably consensual risk and option assessment. Third, hard-law instruments are subject to more thorough negotiation and preparation which, unless substantive targets have been watered down, makes behavioral change and problem solving more likely. Finally, although most of the evidence presented here confirms the implementation edge conventionally ascribed to hard law institutions, the structures for intrusive verification and review that provide part of the explanation can also be created within soft law institutions.

The Origin, Evolution and Consequences of the EU Emissions Trading System

The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is the cornerstone of EU climate policy, a grand policy experiment, as the first and largest international emissions trading system in the world. In this article, we seek to provide a broad overview of the initiation, decision-making and implementation of the EU ETS so far. We explore why the EU changed from a laggard to a leader in emissions trading, how it managed to establish the system rapidly, and the consequences to date, leading up to the 2008 proposal for a revised ET Directive for the post-2012 period. We apply three explanatory approaches, focusing on the roles of the EU member states, the EU institutions and the international climate regime, and conclude that all three approaches are needed to understand what happened, how and why. This also reveals that what happened in the early days of developing the system had significant consequences for the problems experienced in practice and the prospects ahead.

Fixing the EU Emissions Trading System? Understanding the Post-2012 Changes

This article explains why the significant changes in the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) for the 20132020 phase were adopted in 2008. The combination of a more stringent EU-wide cap, allocation of emission allowances for payment, and limits on imports of credits from third countries have strengthened the system for the post-2012 period. This will promote reduction in greenhouse gases compared to the old system. The main reasons for these changes are, first, changes in the positions of the member states due to unsatisfactory experience with performance of the EU ETS so far. Second, a package approach where the EU ETS reform was integrated into wider energy and climate policy facilitated agreement on the changes. Third, changes in the position of nonstate actors and a desire to affect the international climate negotiations contributed to the reform.

Oil Companies and Climate Change: Inconsistencies between Strategy Formulation and Implementation?

This article examines major oil companies in terms of climate strategies and their implementation. More specifcally, it takes a critical look at Shell, BP, and ExxonMobil, and the relationship between rhetoric and action regarding investments in climate-friendly activities. Empirical evidence indicates a generally high degree of consistency between what these companies say and what they do, but interesting differences are also found: ExxonMobil has done somewhat more than its climate strategy formulations would suggest; Shell has done somewhat less; whereas BPs activities are mainly in line with its statements. Factors at three levels contribute to explaining these differences: (1) the company level, 2) the political framework conditions in the various regions where the companies operate, 3) international climate cooperation. The fndings and explanations, although restricted to the three oil companies with regard to climate change, provide insight into the relationship between corporate strategies and implementation more generally. They offer understanding and analytical categories for assessing how well and why such multinational entities put into practice stated objectives.

Does adequate financing exist for adaptation in developing countries

Irrespective of mitigation efforts, adaptation measures will be needed in most parts of the world. The greatest challenge will be for developing countries. The estimated needs for adaptation funding in developing countries are considered in the context of the status and ‘delivery’ of the current financing efforts made under the UN regime and the anticipated Adaptation Fund. A considerable gap exists between the actual (as well as projected) supply of funding and estimated adaptation needs. A number of alternative financial mechanisms are suggested to close the gap between estimated needs and actual delivery.

Why negotiate a legally binding mercury convention

The purpose of this paper is to explain how and why consensus was reached on a legally binding approach given the opposition of powerful actors. Why did the United States and key emerging economies change their positions? We apply tools from the regime formation literature—classical perspectives on power, interests and knowledge—and the use of different leadership tools to shed light on the issue. Knowledge-based intellectual leadership was exercised by the UNEP Secretariat, providing new information on the seriousness and scope of the problem. Power-based leadership through unilateral action was provided by the United States. When the United States changed position after change in domestic leadership, political costs increased for other opponents. Finally, interest-based instrumental leadership was provided by many proponents, with UNEP and among others the EU in the lead. Still, conflicts remain on control measures and the form of financial mechanism.

Linking EU climate and energy policies: policy-making, implementation and reform

Abstract This contribution examines the EU’s innovative climate and energy package: how this package of binding policies has been initiated, decided, implemented and reformed. The key argument is that linking climate and energy concerns can help to explain how the EU managed to adopt an ambitious package of policies aimed at achieving 2020 goals. The combination of differently valued issues, side payments to overcome distributional obstacles and the creation of synergies contributed to a successfully negotiated outcome. The consequences for implementation and further policy development towards 2030 are explained by challenges in reproducing these joint EU-level gains at national level and by new circumstances. This may weaken the EU’s chances of realizing a low-carbon economy and ‘leadership by example’ in international climate policy.

Explaining Growing Climate Policy Differences Between the European Union and the United States

Strong rhetorical differences between the European Union and the United States on climate matters have been evident for almost two decades. Since the mid-2000s, such differences are becoming visible in their respective climate policies as well. We propose three explanations for differences in climate policy outcomes in the EU and the US. First, the agenda-setting privileges of their policy-makers are significantly different, influencing how agenda setters shape policies and link issues, such as energy and climate policy. Second, while issue linkage has helped overcome distributional obstacles in the EU, it has led to more complexity and greater policy obstacles in the US. Finally, legislative rules, procedures, and norms have constrained the coalition-building efforts of lawmakers in the two systems in different ways, affecting negotiation processes and outcomes. Such differences in agenda-setting privileges, potential for issue linkages, and legislative procedures in the EU and the US have left them wide apart in international climate negotiations.

The ‘successful’ ozone-layer negotiations: Are there any lessons to be learned?☆

Abstract It is important to distinguish between a problem and the problem-solving capacity invested in its solution. Applying this perspective to the global ozone cooperation process it is shown that evolving knowledge about ecological, technological and economic aspects of the ozone problem revealed that actors faced a quite ‘benign’ political problem. While the ozone-layer negotiations constitute a valuable example of international cooperation, ignoring problem characteristics may result in misleading conclusions about the applicability of any lessons learned.