Tora Skodvin

METRICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: ASSESSING RADIATIVE FORCING AND EMISSION INDICES

In this paper, we review existing and alternative metrics of climate change, with particular emphasis on radiative forcing and global warming potentials (GWPs), in terms of their scientific performance. Radiative forcing is assessed in terms of questions such as the utility of the concept, uncertainties and sensitivity to key assumptions. The assessment of emission indices focuses on the climate and other resulting impacts (end points) against which emissions are weighted; the extent to which (and how) time dependence is included, with regard to both emission control and impact; how cost issues are dealt with; and the sensitivity of the metrics to various assumptions. It is concluded that the radiative forcing concept is a robust and useful metric of the potential climatic impact of various agents and that there are prospects for improvement by weighing different forcings according to their effectiveness. We also find that although the GWP concept is associated with serious shortcomings, it retains advantages over any of the proposed alternatives in terms of political feasibility. Alternative metrics, however, make a significant contribution to addressing important issues, and this contribution should be taken into account in the further development of refined metrics of climate change.

The Persistence of the Kyoto Protocol: Why Other Annex I Countries Move on Without the United States

The United States, the worlds largest emitter of greenhouse gases, is not going to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in the foreseeable future. Yet, a number of countries have decided to stay on the Kyoto track. Four main explanations for this apparent puzzle are considered. The first is that remaining Annex I countries still expect the Kyoto Protocol to reduce global warming sufficiently to outweigh the economic costs of implementation. The second is that the parties, by implementing the treaty, hope to induce non-parties to follow suit at some later stage. A third hypothesis is that EU climate institutions have generated a momentum that has made a change of course difficult. Finally, Kyotos persistence may be linked to the European Unions desire to stand forth as an international leader in the field of climate politics. We conclude that the first two explanations have little explanatory power, but find the latter two more promising.

Climate implications of GWP-based reductions in greenhouse gas emissions

Possible implications of a GWP-based implementation of GHG reductions on future man-made climate change are explored. Abatement scenarios are established in terms of “CO2 equivalents” using GWP100; one scenario reducing CO2 only, and one reducing short-lived gases, mainly CH4. Future temperature changes are calculated by using a simple climate model. Equal emission scenarios in terms of CO2 equivalents do not imply equivalent climate responses and large differences in the magnitude and rate of temperature change are calculated.

Target-group influence and political feasibility: the case of climate policy design in Europe

Political feasibility (or infeasibility) is often associated with target-group support (or opposition) of specific policy alternatives. We argue that target-groups’ capacity to influence the spectrum of politically feasible policy options tends to be higher when (1) target groups control resources needed by decision-makers, that (2) are agenda-setters and/or veto players in the decision-making process. In the 2008 revision of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) exemptions from the basic principle of full auctioning of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions allowances can all be traced to target-group interest representation by single veto players or blocking minorities in the European Council and the Council of Ministers. Our analysis indicates that target groups succeeded in constraining the spectrum of politically feasible policy options to the extent that their positions were unified and threats to shut down or relocate activity were perceived to be relevant, severe and credible. Our findings confirm both the significance and the limits of portfolio assignment in the Commission. Even with Directorate General (DG) Environment in an agenda-setting role, target groups acquired exemptions through their relations with veto players in the Council.

Nonstate Influence in the International Whaling Commission, 1970-1990

The role of nonstate actors in international environmental politics has been given increased scholarly attention during the last decade. While most analyses are focused on direct nonstate influence at the international level, one main objective of this article is to develop a multi-level approach that allows analysis of nonstate influence channeled via the domestic decision making level. The point of departure for the analysis is the International Whaling Commission (IWC) during the period from 1970 to 1990, with a particular focus on the competition for influence characterizing the relationship between the scientific community and the environmental and animal rights movement. The analysis shows that domestic channels of influence may be equally, or even more important than channels of influence linked to the international decision making level. In the case of the IWC, for instance, the environmental and animal rights movement succeeded in mobilizing domestic public support, particularly in the United States, and had a key ally in the US government, Congress and Administration. The domestic role of this nonstate actor was of key importance to its success in influencing the development of the international whaling regime. The analysis shows, therefore, that examining the role of the domestic channel is integral to understanding nonstate influence on international policy-making, and particularly how some nonstate actors acquire influence at the expense of others.

Structure and Agent in the Scientific Diplomacy of Climate Change

Acronyms. Acknowledgements. 1. Introduction. 2. Effectiveness in Processes of Science-Policy Interaction. 3. The Science-Policy Nexus. 4. Designing Institutions for Science-Policy. 5. The Development of an International Regime on a Human-Induced Climate Change. 6. Structure: The Institutional Design of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 7. Agent: Leadership Performance in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 8. Causal Relationship: Real or Spurious? 9. Structure and Agent in the Scientific Diplomacy of Climate Change. References. Appendix. Index.

IPCC gazing and the interpretative social sciences: A comment on Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen's: ‘Global climate protection policy: the limits of scientific advice’

This comment is a response to the 2-part paper ‘Global climate protection policy: the limits of scientific advice’ by Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen recently published in Global Environmental Change. We present some problems with Boehmer-Christiansens core argument that the involvement of the research community in the IPCC has primarily been motivated by the desire to acquire more research funds. We stress the role of negotiation (between different groups and at different levels) at the IPCC and discuss some of its learning processes. We also use this case to comment on the role of the interpretative social sciences in global environmental change research.

Can conditional commitments break the climate change negotiations deadlock

Can a conditional commitment by a major actor (for example, the European Union) induce other major actors (such as the USA, China, India, or Japan) to do more to mitigate global climate change? We analyse this question by first estimating the impact of emission reductions by one of these actors on the mitigation costs of the others and, second, by exploring how domestic politics influence the willingness of the European Union and the USA to contribute. We find that an emission cut by any actor will reduce mitigation costs for all the others and thereby expand the settlement range. These cost reductions seem, however, insufficient to induce significant unilateral policy change. Emissions trading can cut aggregate costs further, but also redistribute wealth. Domestic politics tend to add weight to the concerns of powerful actors that stand to lose from more ambitious mitigation policies.

Revised Rules of Procedure for the IPCC Process

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)held its fifteenth Plenary session in San Jose, CostaRica in April, 1999. One major item on the agenda wasthe adoption of a revised set of rules of procedurefor the Panels work with its Third Assessment Report(TAR). The IPCC process is already a time-consumingand cumbersome process, and the new rules of procedureadopted at the fifteenth Plenary session adds furthercomplexity and bureaucracy to the process.

The Development of an International Regime on a Human-Induced Climate Change

In this chapter, the problem of a human-induced climate change and the scientific and historical background for the development of an international regime addressing this problem is presented (sections 5.2 and 5.3). In section 5.4 the effectiveness of the associated science-policy dialogue is assessed according to the conceptualisation of effectiveness developed in chapter 2. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is organised so that all IPCC reports must be accepted and/or approved by both scientists and policymakers. Thus, in this assessment effectiveness is judged in relation to what is agreed upon within the IPCC as well as in relation to what is agreed upon in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.