Steinar Andresen

Navigating the Anthropocene: Improving Earth System Governance

The United Nations conference in Rio de Janeiro in June is an important opportunity to improve the institutional framework for sustainable development. Science assessments indicate that human activities are moving several of Earths sub-systems outside the range of natural variability typical for the previous 500,000 years (1, 2). Human societies must now change course and steer away from critical tipping points in the Earth system that might lead to rapid and irreversible change (3). This requires fundamental reorientation and restructuring of national and international institutions toward more effective Earth system governance and planetary stewardship.

Leaders, pushers and laggards in the making of the climate regime

Abstract The primary motivation for this paper is to illuminate the role of leadership exerted by individuals, institutions and nation-states at various stages of the global climate change regime. Four forms of leadership: intellectual, instrumental, power-based, and directional, are identified. Next, theoretical claims about the dominance of particular forms of leadership at particular stages of regime formation are empirically tested by examining the agenda setting and negotiation phases of the climate regime. This analysis tends to support theoretical claims that intellectual leadership is particularly prominent during agenda setting, but evidence to support the influence of entrepreneurial leaders during negotiations is mixed at best for the climate regime. Structural or power based leadership meanwhile was largely absent during agenda setting of the climate regime but has been in clear evidence through the negotiations of the Climate Convention and the Kyoto Protocol.

NGO Influence in the Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol: Compliance, Flexibility Mechanisms, and Sinks

While most scholars agree that NGOs make a difference in global environmental politics, there has been little systematic work that looks at the actual influence NGOs have on policy outcomes. This paper looks to shed some new light on the question of NGO effectiveness through an evaluation of the role played by NGOs in climate negotiations. We begin with a brief sketch of different kinds of green NGOs, along with a review of the sorts of strategies and resources they employ. Next, we look to gauge the influence that NGOs have had on recent rounds of negotiations to do with compliance, flexibility mechanisms, and appropriate crediting rules for sinks. Our analysis is based on detailed interviews with members of some of the most prominent environmental NGOs involved in climate work. Finally, we suggest, based on our findings, some means by which NGOs may look to extend their influence in the development of the climate regime. Our analysis points to the crucial need for further insider capacitythat is, NGOs are likely to have the most far-reaching influence on future climate negotiations if they foster ways to work closely and collaboratively with key negotiators and governments.

The Persistence of the Kyoto Protocol: Why Other Annex I Countries Move on Without the United States

The United States, the worlds largest emitter of greenhouse gases, is not going to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in the foreseeable future. Yet, a number of countries have decided to stay on the Kyoto track. Four main explanations for this apparent puzzle are considered. The first is that remaining Annex I countries still expect the Kyoto Protocol to reduce global warming sufficiently to outweigh the economic costs of implementation. The second is that the parties, by implementing the treaty, hope to induce non-parties to follow suit at some later stage. A third hypothesis is that EU climate institutions have generated a momentum that has made a change of course difficult. Finally, Kyotos persistence may be linked to the European Unions desire to stand forth as an international leader in the field of climate politics. We conclude that the first two explanations have little explanatory power, but find the latter two more promising.

Science and politics in the international management of whales

to answer is whether scientific knowledge has any affect on the decisions of the international Whaling Commission. Generally it seems that policy variables are dominant, especially when political polarization or the interests at stake are high. Where this has not been the case, the influence of science has appeared to be more significant. Two other questions are also addressed; the extent to which organization matters in terms of its effect on outcome, and whether the IWC is just as ‘inefficient as the international organizations dealing with marine resources are often believed to be.

Nonstate Influence in the International Whaling Commission, 1970-1990

The role of nonstate actors in international environmental politics has been given increased scholarly attention during the last decade. While most analyses are focused on direct nonstate influence at the international level, one main objective of this article is to develop a multi-level approach that allows analysis of nonstate influence channeled via the domestic decision making level. The point of departure for the analysis is the International Whaling Commission (IWC) during the period from 1970 to 1990, with a particular focus on the competition for influence characterizing the relationship between the scientific community and the environmental and animal rights movement. The analysis shows that domestic channels of influence may be equally, or even more important than channels of influence linked to the international decision making level. In the case of the IWC, for instance, the environmental and animal rights movement succeeded in mobilizing domestic public support, particularly in the United States, and had a key ally in the US government, Congress and Administration. The domestic role of this nonstate actor was of key importance to its success in influencing the development of the international whaling regime. The analysis shows, therefore, that examining the role of the domestic channel is integral to understanding nonstate influence on international policy-making, and particularly how some nonstate actors acquire influence at the expense of others.

Norwegian Climate Policy: From Pusher to Laggard?

Initially Norwegian climate policy was very ambitious and Norway stood forth as a pusher on the international scene. Over time Norwegian policy has become more ‘sober’, stressing the need for differentiated commitments and flexible implementation. In contrast to the initial ‘enthusiastic’ phase, climate change policy has been increasingly seen in pragmatic economic terms. Still, Norway is no laggard, as it has shown more willingness to pay for abatement measures than many other countries.

Why negotiate a legally binding mercury convention

The purpose of this paper is to explain how and why consensus was reached on a legally binding approach given the opposition of powerful actors. Why did the United States and key emerging economies change their positions? We apply tools from the regime formation literature—classical perspectives on power, interests and knowledge—and the use of different leadership tools to shed light on the issue. Knowledge-based intellectual leadership was exercised by the UNEP Secretariat, providing new information on the seriousness and scope of the problem. Power-based leadership through unilateral action was provided by the United States. When the United States changed position after change in domestic leadership, political costs increased for other opponents. Finally, interest-based instrumental leadership was provided by many proponents, with UNEP and among others the EU in the lead. Still, conflicts remain on control measures and the form of financial mechanism.

US Climate Policy: Evolution and Future Prospects

Climate change is a problem which US science has significantly helped to bring to the worlds attention. It now requires initiatives in US domestic policy for even the first steps towards any realistic global resolution of this problem. This paper addresses three questions: (1) How has US climate policy evolved since climate change became an international political concern in the late–1980s?; (2) what is the relative significance of various factors, both domestic and international, in shaping this evolution?; and (3) what are some likely future scenarios for the climate regime and the role of the US under the new Bush (Jr.) administration? This analysis suggests that the US has generally played a cautious, even blocking role on the international arena, although the period between 1992 and 1997 witnessed a rather uneven march towards progressivism, culminating in the US agreeing to a 7% cut in its greenhouse emissions by 2008–2012 under the Kyoto Protocol. US policy during the Bush (Sr.) and Clinton administrations was primarily shaped by powerful ideologues, while a second critical determinant was the constitutional separation of powers between the executive and legislature. Scientific assessments and international negotiations meanwhile have given climate change unusual stamina on the domestic agenda, while the preferred set of policy responses has been constrained by a national culture that gives primacy to the market over the state. Looking into the future, the recent one-two punch delivered by President George W. Bush in reversing his pledge to regulate carbon dioxide followed by a rejection of US commitments under the Kyoto Protocol renders any expectation of measures to reduce domestic emissions unrealistic, and is likely to cripple the treaty in its present form. The possibility of an alternate to the Kyoto Protocol also appears very remote at this time. However, while official action is unlikely, it is possible that the growth of US greenhouse emissions might be reduced in the near future due to offsetting factors such as a widely expected economic slowdown.

International resource cooperation and the greenhouse problem

Abstract This article summarizes some Important lessons from experience of international environmental cooperation. The main focus in the first part Is on institutional and procedural factors: participation; scope of the agenda; political leadership; incorporation of scientific knowledge; and design of the agreement. The second part focuses on global climate negotiations: to what extent have they been conducted according to lessons learned? Bearing in mind that the greenhouse context is comparatively very complex, our impression is that the ‘match’ is quite good, although uneven. But, the prospects for an ecologically ‘strong’ climate convention seem grim. Procedural and institutional factors have limited significance when stakes are high.