Jordi Grau-Moya

Bounded Rationality, Abstraction, and Hierarchical Decision-Making: An Information-Theoretic Optimality Principle

Abstraction and hierarchical information-processing are hallmarks of human and animal intelligence underlying the unrivaled flexibility of behavior in biological systems. Achieving such a flexibility in artificial systems is challenging, even with more and more computational power. Here we investigate the hypothesis that abstraction and hierarchical information-processing might in fact be the consequence of limitations in information-processing power. In particular, we study an information-theoretic framework of bounded rational decision-making that trades off utility maximization against information-processing costs. We apply the basic principle of this framework to perception-action systems with multiple information-processing nodes and derive bounded optimal solutions. We show how the formation of abstractions and decision-making hierarchies depends on information-processing costs. We illustrate the theoretical ideas with example simulations and conclude by formalizing a mathematically unifying optimization principle that could potentially be extended to more complex systems.

Planning with Information-Processing Constraints and Model Uncertainty in Markov Decision Processes

Information-theoretic principles for learning and acting have been proposed to solve particular classes of Markov Decision Problems. Mathematically, such approaches are governed by a variational free energy principle and allow solving MDP planning problems with information-processing constraints expressed in terms of a Kullback-Leibler divergence with respect to a reference distribution. Here we consider a generalization of such MDP planners by taking model uncertainty into account. As model uncertainty can also be formalized as an information-processing constraint, we can derive a unified solution from a single generalized variational principle. We provide a generalized value iteration scheme together with a convergence proof. As limit cases, this generalized scheme includes standard value iteration with a known model, Bayesian MDP planning, and robust planning. We demonstrate the benefits of this approach in a grid world simulation.

Decision-Making under Ambiguity Is Modulated by Visual Framing, but Not by Motor vs. Non-Motor Context: Experiments and an Information-Theoretic Ambiguity Model

A number of recent studies have investigated differences in human choice behavior depending on task framing, especially comparing economic decision-making to choice behavior in equivalent sensorimotor tasks. Here we test whether decision-making under ambiguity exhibits effects of task framing in motor vs. non-motor context. In a first experiment, we designed an experience-based urn task with varying degrees of ambiguity and an equivalent motor task where subjects chose between hitting partially occluded targets. In a second experiment, we controlled for the different stimulus design in the two tasks by introducing an urn task with bar stimuli matching those in the motor task. We found ambiguity attitudes to be mainly influenced by stimulus design. In particular, we found that the same subjects tended to be ambiguity-preferring when choosing between ambiguous bar stimuli, but ambiguity-avoiding when choosing between ambiguous urn sample stimuli. In contrast, subjects’ choice pattern was not affected by changing from a target hitting task to a non-motor context when keeping the stimulus design unchanged. In both tasks subjects’ choice behavior was continuously modulated by the degree of ambiguity. We show that this modulation of behavior can be explained by an information-theoretic model of ambiguity that generalizes Bayes-optimal decision-making by combining Bayesian inference with robust decision-making under model uncertainty. Our results demonstrate the benefits of information-theoretic models of decision-making under varying degrees of ambiguity for a given context, but also demonstrate the sensitivity of ambiguity attitudes across contexts that theoretical models struggle to explain.

Non-Equilibrium Relations for Bounded Rational Decision-Making in Changing Environments

Living organisms from single cells to humans need to adapt continuously to respond to changes in their environment. The process of behavioural adaptation can be thought of as improving decision-making performance according to some utility function. Here, we consider an abstract model of organisms as decision-makers with limited information-processing resources that trade off between maximization of utility and computational costs measured by a relative entropy, in a similar fashion to thermodynamic systems undergoing isothermal transformations. Such systems minimize the free energy to reach equilibrium states that balance internal energy and entropic cost. When there is a fast change in the environment, these systems evolve in a non-equilibrium fashion because they are unable to follow the path of equilibrium distributions. Here, we apply concepts from non-equilibrium thermodynamics to characterize decision-makers that adapt to changing environments under the assumption that the temporal evolution of the utility function is externally driven and does not depend on the decision-maker’s action. This allows one to quantify performance loss due to imperfect adaptation in a general manner and, additionally, to find relations for decision-making similar to Crooks’ fluctuation theorem and Jarzynski’s equality. We provide simulations of several exemplary decision and inference problems in the discrete and continuous domains to illustrate the new relations.