Joseph B. Tamney

Social Traditionalism and Economic Conservatism: Two Conservative Political Ideologies in the United States

Abstract The authors surveyed by telephone a random sample of voters in the 1996 presidential election from the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area of Muncie, IN (“Middletown”; R. Lynd & H. Lynd, 1929) to test a model describing the nature of 2 conservative political ideologies–social traditionalism and economic conservatism. The model, based on functions of attitudes theory, predicted (a) that the 2 political ideologies would appeal to 2 rather distinct constituency groups–the former, to conservative Protestants; the latter, to people of higher incomes–and (b) that social traditionalists would be more dogmatic and economic conservatives would be more open-minded in their respective views. The findings were consistent with those predictions.

The popularity of strict churches

After briefly reviewing Kelleys ideal-church model, and relevant aspects of modernization theory, we set forth hypotheses about who favors church strictness, an essential aspect of Kelleys model. Data came from a sample of Middletown residents (N = 567). It was necessary to distinguish strictness and authoritativeness. While respondents did not believe church strictness is important, authoritative preachers were highly favored. Regression analyses showed that strictness was somewhat more important to the less educated. Authoritativeness was mainly valued by fundamentalists, and to a lesser extent by authoritarians and political conservatives. We conclude with a discussion of how the relative appeal of strictness and authoritativeness can be understood in terms of the current stage of modernity.

Education and Fundamentalism

The paper explores the relationship between education and Fundamentalism. It was hypothesized that these two variables would be negatively related. It was also expected that this negative relationship would be stronger among converts to Fundamentalism than among those raised as Fundamentalists. In addition, it was expected that Fundamentalism would relate differently to conservative social attitudes for people in different educational groups. The data came from a survey of Middletown residents [N=379]. For the present study only the information from white, Protestant respondents was used [N=281]. There was a weak, negative relationship between education and Fundamentalism. However, contrary to our expectations, converts to Fundamentalism were not less educated people. Finally, it was found that the Fundamentalist perspective differs by educational group.

The Religious Challenge to the State

Preface Part I: Introduction 1. Challenge and Accommodation in Religion and Politics Lowell S. Gustafson and Matthew C. Moen Part II: South America and the Caribbean 2. Church and State in Argentina Lowell S. Gustafson 3. Revolution and Political Religion in Cuba Damian J. Fernandez Part III: North America 4. The Christian Right in the United States Matthew C. Moen 5. Church-State Relations in Contemporary Mexico, 1968-1988 Allan Metz Part IV: Europe 6. Miter Against Missiles: The Papal Challenge to Soviet Regimes in Eastern Europe Donald E. Bain 7. The Church, the Peace Movement, and the Social Democratic Party of German Mark Bartholomew Part V: The Middle East and Islamic Africa 8. Challenge and Conciliation: Religion and State in Israel Allan Metz 9. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: Reform or Revolution? Ann M. Lesch 10. Religion and Politics in Islamic Africa John O. Voll Part VI: Asia 11. Islam and the State: The Case of Pakistan Mumtaz Ahmad 12. Religion and Modernization in Gorbachevs Soviet Union: An Indirect Challenge to Secular Authority James W. Warhola Contributors

Christianity and public book banning

Modernization theory is used to understand why conservative Protestants tend to be intolerant. We explain this tendency as a consequence of religious worldview that privileges a sacred group and that exhibits a mistrust of the individual. Using a random sample of Middletown residents (N = 500), we tested the proposition that conservative Protestants are willing to ban controversial books from public libraries because they are more likely to be theologically fundamentalist and morally traditionalist. Control variables were generation, gender, education, and political conservatism. The results support the importance of fundamentalism in explaining the association between conservative Protestantism and intolerance. In addition, it was found that among mainline Protestants, moral traditionalism was related to intolerance. Conservative Protestants can believe in civil intolerance because of their anti-modern, fundamentalist theology. Among mainline Protestants, because specific moral issues are more salient than theological matters, support for book banning results from a fear of moral decay.

The Resilience of Conservative Religion: The Case of Popular, Conservative Protestant Congregations

1. Explanations for the success of conservative religions 2. The appeal of conservative protestantism in the early-modern United States 3. Spirited church 4. Truth church 5. Caring church 6. Open church 7. Conclusion Tables Appendix 1 Appendix 2.

Factors Related to Inconsistent Life-Views

The study reported here explores how certain segments of the anti-abortion population of America can hold inconsistent life-views. Specifically, it examines what social psychological factors might enable some anti-abortion advocates to be against abortion, but for capital punishment. Anti-abortion subsamples from the 1983 and 1984 nationwide NORC surveys were analyzed and explanations of the results are proposed.

Does Strictness Explain the Appeal of Working-Class Conservative Protestant Congregations?

For different reasons, Kelley (1977) and Iannaccone (1994) have argued that ascetic strictness causes congregational growth. The relevant published case studies of congregations do not support strictness theory, however this research concerned mainly middle-class congregations. A recently published quantitative study found that church growth was positively associated with strictness, but only among working-class congregations. Thus the research reported in this paper focused on working-class congregations and was meant to determine if there is a causal connection, and not just a statistical association, between strictness and church growth. Open-ended interviews were done with new participants in two working-class Protestant congregations about what drew them to their new congregations. The most important factors were feeling the presence of the Holy Spirit, the family-like nature of congregational life, and qualities of the pastor. No evidence supporting strictness theory was found. The popularity of a congregation, at the micro level, or of a brand of religion,

Personal Experience, Ideology and Support for Feminism

Abstract Previous research has come to conflicting conclusions about the relative importance of personal experience versus ideology, and within the latter about the relative significance of secular and religious beliefs and values, in creating support for feminism. This paper reports a test of the relative significance of these variables for women and for men. The study used data collected in 1988 from a random sample of the “Middletown” population (N = 400). Feminist support was related to social class, race, three indicators of personal dissatisfaction, economic liberalism, and moral-religious variables. As suggested by Klein (1984), personal experience variables were more important for women. This was also true for moral-religious factors. In comparison with women, the feminist attitudes of men were more strongly influenced by class factors.

A Research Note on the Free-Rider Issue

Iannaccone (1994) proposed that church success results from controlling the free-rider problem and that churches with few free-riders are more likely to provide collective rewards. Using a sample of Middletown residents (N = 567), we tested hypotheses derived from Iannaccones theory. Our critical variable was respondents estimates of the number of free-riders in their churches We found some evidence consistent with the idea that church success is negatively related to the number of free-riders, but the results were not statistically significant; moreover Catholicism seems to have more free-riders than would be predicted by Iannaccones theory. The number of free-riders was not related to two collective rewards measured in this study: the absence of noninvolved people at church services and participation in supportive church groups.