Kourken Michaelian

Is external memory memory? Biological memory and extended mind

Clark and Chalmers (1998) claim that an external resource satisfying the following criteria counts as a memory: (1) the agent has constant access to the resource; (2) the information in the resource is directly available; (3) retrieved information is automatically endorsed; (4) information is stored as a consequence of past endorsement. Research on forgetting and metamemory shows that most of these criteria are not satisfied by biological memory, so they are inadequate. More psychologically realistic criteria generate a similar classification of standard putative external memories, but the criteria still do not capture the function of memory. An adequate account of memory function, compatible with its evolution and its roles in prospection and imagination, suggests that external memory performs a function not performed by biological memory systems. External memory is thus not memory. This has implications for: extended mind theorizing, ecological validity of memory research, the causal theory of memory.

Is memory a natural kind

Though researchers often refer to memory as if it were a unitary phenomenon, a natural kind, the apparent heterogeneity of the various ‘kinds’ of memory casts doubt on this default view. This article argues, first, that kinds of memory are individuated by memory systems. It argues, second, for a view of the nature of kinds of memory informed by the tri-level hypothesis. If this approach to kinds of memory is right, then memory is not in fact a natural kind.

The information effect: Constructive memory, testimony, and epistemic luck

The incorporation of post-event testimonial information into an agent’s memory representation of the event via constructive memory processes gives rise to the misinformation effect, in which the incorporation of inaccurate testimonial information results in the formation of a false memory belief. While psychological research has focussed primarily on the incorporation of inaccurate information, the incorporation of accurate information raises a particularly interesting epistemological question: do the resulting memory beliefs qualify as knowledge? It is intuitively plausible that they do not, for they appear to be only luckily true. I argue, however, that, despite its intuitive plausibility, this view is mistaken: once we adopt an adequate (modal) conception of epistemic luck and an adequate (adaptive) general approach to memory, it becomes clear that memory beliefs resulting from the incorporation of accurate testimonial information are not in general luckily true. I conclude by sketching some implications of this argument for the psychology of memory, suggesting that the misinformation effect would better be investigated in the context of a broader “information effect”.

In defence of gullibility: The epistemology of testimony and the psychology of deception detection

Research in the psychology of deception detection implies that Fricker, in making her case for reductionism in the epistemology of testimony, overestimates both the epistemic demerits of the antireductionist policy of trusting speakers blindly and the epistemic merits of the reductionist policy of monitoring speakers for trustworthiness: folk psychological prejudices to the contrary notwithstanding, it turns out that monitoring is on a par (in terms both of the reliability of the process and of the sensitivity of the beliefs that it produces) with blind trust. The consequence is that while (a version of) Fricker’s argument for the necessity of a reduction succeeds, her argument for the availability of reductions fails. This does not, however, condemn us to endorse standard pessimistic reductionism, according to which there is no testimonial knowledge, for recent research concerning the methods used by subjects to discover deception in non-laboratory settings suggests that only a more moderate form of pessimism is in order.

MARGARET CAVENDISH'S EPISTEMOLOGY

This paper provides a systematic reconstruction of Cavendishs general epistemology and a characterization of the fundamental role of that theory in her natural philosophy. After reviewing the outlines of her natural philosophy, I describe her treatment of ‘exterior knowledge’, i.e. of perception in general and of sense perception in particular. I then describe her treatment of ‘interior knowledge’, i.e. of self-knowledge and ‘conception’. I conclude by drawing out some implications of this reconstruction for our developing understanding of Cavendishs natural philosophy.This paper provides a systematic reconstruction of Cavendishs general epistemology and a characterization of the fundamental role of that theory in her natural philosophy. After reviewing the outlines of her natural philosophy, I describe her treatment of ‘exterior knowledge’, i.e. of perception in general and of sense perception in particular. I then describe her treatment of ‘interior knowledge’, i.e. of self-knowledge and ‘conception’. I conclude by drawing out some implications of this reconstruction for our developing understanding of Cavendishs natural philosophy.

Testimony as a Natural Kind

I argue, first, that testimony is likely a natural kind (where natural kinds are accurately described by the homoeostatic property cluster theory) and that if it is indeed a natural kind, it is likely necessarily reliable. I argue, second, that the view of testimony as a natural kind and as necessarily reliable grounds a novel, naturalist global reductionism about testimonial justification and that this new reductionism is immune to a powerful objection to orthodox Humean global reductionism, the objection from the too-narrow induction base.

Confabulating, Misremembering, Relearning: The Simulation Theory of Memory and Unsuccessful Remembering

This article develops a taxonomy of memory errors in terms of three conditions: the accuracy of the memory representation, the reliability of the memory process, and the internality (with respect to the remembering subject) of that process. Unlike previous taxonomies, which appeal to retention of information rather than reliability or internality, this taxonomy can accommodate not only misremembering (e.g., the DRM effect), falsidical confabulation, and veridical relearning but also veridical confabulation and falsidical relearning. Moreover, because it does not assume that successful remembering presupposes retention of information, the taxonomy is compatible with recent simulation theories of remembering.

Collective mental time travel: remembering the past and imagining the future together

Bringing research on collective memory together with research on episodic future thought, Szpunar and Szpunar (Mem Stud 9(4):376–389, 2016) have recently developed the concept of collective future thought. Individual memory and individual future thought are increasingly seen as two forms of individual mental time travel, and it is natural to see collective memory and collective future thought as forms of collective mental time travel. But how seriously should the notion of collective mental time travel be taken? This article argues that, while collective mental time travel is disanalogous in important respects to individual mental time travel, the concept of collective mental time travel nevertheless provides a useful means of organizing existing findings, while also suggesting promising directions for future research.

New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory

Dorothea Debus (University of York). Handle with care: On the fragility of recollective memories, and some ethical implications. Sometimes we remember past events in a vivid, experiential way. These experiential, or ‘recollective’ memories play an important role in our everyday lives. They provide us with knowledge about the past, they help us to form a healthy sense of self, and they arguably also play an important role in grounding a person’s identity over time. Thus, recollective memories are rather important and valuable elements of our ordinary, everyday mental lives. However, while recollective memories seem very important, recollective memories also are rather ‘fragile’: Sometimes we find ourselves unable to prompt ourselves to recollectively remember particular past events which we would like to remember, and at other times we find ourselves with recollective memories which we would much rather not have; sometimes we find that certain recollective memories have ‘reconstructive’ elements which are imagined into the scene but do not represent things as they were in the past, at other times we have whole experiences of which we are not sure whether they are memories or imaginings; the empirical literature on so-called ‘false memories’ also provides evidence which suggests that it is sometimes possible to manipulate subjects so that they become convinced that some of their experiences are memories, while these experiences present subjects with events which never occurred in their lives at all (and therefore most certainly should not count as memories). Thus, it is plausible to hold that while recollective memories are very important in our everyday lives, they are also very ‘fragile’. But then, given their importance, we should try to protect our recollective memories from ‘breaking’. The present paper will explore ways in which we might be actively involved with our own recollective memories in this respect, and it will ask whether, why, and in which contexts subjects might be responsible for handling their own recollective memories, as well as the recollective memories of others, with care. Jordi Fernández (University of Adelaide). Functionalism and the nature of episodic memory. The goal of this chapter is to determine what is to remember something, as opposed to imagining it, perceiving it, or introspecting it. What does it take for a mental state to qualify as remembering? I will consider the two main existing conceptions of the conditions that a mental state must satisfy for us to accept it as the state of remembering something. The first of these approaches, the causal theory of memory, is backwardlooking. It puts forward conditions that strictly concern the aetiology of the mental state at issue. I will argue that the conditions offered by this backward-looking approach are both too strong and too weak: They rule out mental states that, intuitively, count as memories while including mental states that, intuitively, do not qualify as memories. The second approach, the narrativity conception of memory, is forward-looking. It puts forward conditions that only concern the impact that the mental state has on the subjects overall cognitive economy. I will argue that the conditions proposed by this forward-looking approach are both too weak and too strong as well. However, the discussion of the two approaches will allow us to draw some helpful lessons on the constraints that any proposal about the nature of memory should respect. An alternative approach that aims to incorporate those lessons will be offered by drawing on the literature on functionalism. I will argue that this approach can, on the one hand, accommodate as memories those mental states which indicate that the backward-looking approach and the forward-looking approach are too strict and, one the other hand, rule out those mental states which suggest that the two alternative approaches are too permissive. Accordingly, I will conclude that construing memory along functionalist lines allows us to preserve the virtues of the two main conceptions of the nature of memory while, at the same time, avoiding their difficulties. Philip Gerrans (University of Adelaide). Subjective presence in mental time travel. One of the defining features of the default mode network (DMN) is its specialization for“self referential” processing. This specialization is produced by its links with circuitry involved in affective processing. In particular the contribution of the DMN is to allow us to “feel the future”, to produce feelings of being personally involved in an episode of imagination. Many theorists have argued that without the ability to integrate such feelings, which are produced by higher order affective processes, self referential processing in a variety of contexts (moral and social cognition, personal planning and reflection) would be severely compromised. Indeed I have argued that it is the affective aspect which makes DMN processing self-referential. Unless self representation is imbued with affect it lacks an essential subjective perspective. These ideas are challenged by patients such as Roger, whose limbic and DMN systems are lesioned and who has severe anterograde amnesia. Yet according to experimenters his self-awareness is not compromised. Other cases of aphantasia (absence of the episodic representations) also challenge the view that the DMN is necessary for self-awareness and diachronic self representation. In particular they challenge the interpretation of Anterior Insula functioning advanced by Craig and others which treats the AIC as a substrate of self awareness. Roger for example has damaged insula and limbic systems. These challenges can be met by reflecting on the computational nature of processes that generate self awareness. In short it is not affective processing per se which generates self awareness but predicted affective processing in the AIC. I discuss the contribution of predictive coding in the AIC to cognition and self representation and self awareness in general and in cases of aphantasia in particular. The conclusion that aphantasics have intact self awareness may depend on an overly intellectual characterization of representation. Kourken Michaelian (University of Otago). Confabulating, misremembering, relearning: The simulation theory of memory and unsuccessful remembering. This talk develops a taxonomy of memory errors in terms of three conditions: the accuracy of the memory representation, the reliability of the memory process, and the internality (with respect to the remembering subject) of that process. Unlike previous taxonomies, which appeal to retention of information rather than reliability or internality, this taxonomy can accommodate not only misremembering (e.g., the DRM effect), falsidical confabulation, and veridical relearning but also veridical confabulation and falsidical relearning. Moreover, because it does not assume that successful remembering presupposes retention of information, the taxonomy is compatible with recent simulation theories of remembering. Denis Perrin (Université Grenoble Alpes). The procedural nature of episodic memory. It is common to draw a sharp distinction between declarative memory and procedural memory regarding their respective natures and functions. The former are thought to be world-highlighting in virtue of providing representations of facts and experiences, while the latter are thought to be representationally blind and to merely provide practical skills. Drawing on attributionalism in psychology (Jacoby & al., 1989; Whittlesea, 1997; Leboe-McGowan and Whittlesea, 2013 — but see also Tulving’s GAPS model, 1985), this chapter argues that this common view is misguided. In contrast to the common view, it argues for a view of procedural memory as an essential ground of declarative memory, especially episodic memory. The core argument of the chapter is as follows: representation (including perceptual and recollective representation) always depends on constructive processes; constructive processes involve skills, whose possession depends on procedural memory; thus representational memory (including episodic memory) is grounded in procedural memory. I build up this argument in two steps. First, I critically discuss direct realism, which endorses a sharp declarative-procedural distinction. On this view, episodic reliving is a matter of being about the relevant past episode itself in a specific manner, namely, through a direct cognitive link to it. I argue that this claim can be understood in either of two ways: in a strong, internalist way (Debus, 2008) or in a weak, externalist way (Bernecker, 2008). Bearing this distinction in mind, I claim that the first version is empirically implausible and that the second fails to account for the phenomenology of reliving. On either way of understanding the claim, direct realism is doomed to failure because it assumes a static view of the objects of memory. Second, once we acknowledge that the objects of perception and memory are the products of essentially constructive cognitive processes, as suggested by current constructivism in psychology (Schacter et Addis, 2007), a different, dynamic approach is available, one that bases their phenomenological properties on these processes. I then argue that attributionalism provides a way of fleshing out such an approach that provides an adequate understanding of episodic phenomenology. In a nutshell, episodic reliving results from the automatic attribution to past experience of the detected procedural features of the construction of a mental scene. In support of this claim, I then show that key features of episodic recollection — causality, subjectivity, the sense of pastness, and particularity — can be accounted for along attributionalist lines. André Sant’Anna (University of Otago). Thinking about events: A pragmatic account of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought. This paper motivates and defend

Identifying and individuating cognitive systems: A task-based distributed cognition alternative to agent-based extended cognition

This article argues for a task-based approach to identifying and individuating cognitive systems. The agent-based extended cognition approach faces a problem of cognitive bloat and has difficulty accommodating both sub-individual cognitive systems (“scaling down”) and some supra-individual cognitive systems (“scaling up”). The standard distributed cognition approach can accommodate a wider variety of supra-individual systems but likewise has difficulties with sub-individual systems and faces the problem of cognitive bloat. We develop a task-based variant of distributed cognition designed to scale up and down smoothly while providing a principled means of avoiding cognitive bloat. The advantages of the task-based approach are illustrated by means of two parallel case studies: re-representation in the human visual system and in a biomedical engineering laboratory.