Sven Bernecker

The metaphysics of memory

Memory Causation.- Setting the Stage.- The Motivation of the Causal Theory of Memory.- An Argument for Memory Traces.- From Traces to Recall.- Objects of Memory.- The Primary Objects of Memory.- Against Representative Realism.- Skepticism, Externalism, and Closure.- Truth in Memory.- The Factivity Constraint.- Diachronic Content Similarity.- The Pragmatic Dimension of Memory.

Remembering without knowing

This paper challenges the standard conception of memory as a form of knowledge. Unlike knowledge, memory implies neither belief nor justification.

A Causal Theory of Mnemonic Confabulation

This paper attempts to answer the question of what defines mnemonic confabulation vis-à-vis genuine memory. The two extant accounts of mnemonic confabulation as “false memory” and as ill-grounded memory are shown to be problematic, for they cannot account for the possibility of veridical confabulation, ill-grounded memory, and well-grounded confabulation. This paper argues that the defining characteristic of mnemonic confabulation is that it lacks the appropriate causal history. In the confabulation case, there is no proper counterfactual dependence of the state of seeming to remember on the corresponding past representation.

Davidson on first-person authority and externalism

Incompatibilism is the view that privileged knowledge of our own mental states cannot be reconciled with externalism regarding the content of mental states. Davidson has recently developed two arguments that are supposed to disprove incompatibilism and establish the consistency of privileged access and externalism. One argument criticizes incompatibilism for assuming that externalism conflicts with the mind‐body identity theory. Since mental states supervene on neurological events, Davidson argues, they are partly ‘in the head’ and are knowable just by reflection. Another argument rejects incompatibilism by repudiating the object perception model of introspection. Once extemalism is freed from the internalist idea that thoughts take objects which are inner epistemological intermediaries, Davidson maintains, it poses no threat to privileged self‐knowledge. It is argued that neither of these arguments is successful, since both disprove assumptions irrelevant to incompatibilism. Moreover, it is indicated how...

Medical knowledge in a social world: Introduction to the special issue

Abstract Philosophy of medicine has traditionally examined two issues: the scientific ontology for medicine and the epistemic significance of the types of evidence used in medical research. In answering each question, philosophers have typically brought to bear tools from traditional analytic philosophy. In contrast, this volume explores medical knowledge from the perspective offered by social epistemology. While many of the same issues are addressed, the approach to these issues generates both fresh questions and new insights into old debates. In addition, the broader purview offered by social epistemology opens up opportunities to address new topics such as the role of consensus conferences, epistemic injustice, the value of medical knowledge, continuing medical education, and industry funding. This article situates and summarizes the contributions to this special issue.

Reinhold’s Road to Fichte: The Elementary-Philosophy of 1795/96

This paper examines the revisions the Elementary Philosophy underwent when Reinhold studied Fichte’s Science of Knowledge. The goal is to reconstruct Reinhold’s argument for the primacy of facts of moral consciousness over facts of theoretical consciousness when it comes to establishing the first principle of philosophy, and also to relate this argument to his idea that moral enlightenment is a precondition of philosophical enlightenment. I argue that there is an intimate relation between Reinhold’s work as an Elementary Philosopher and his activity as champion of enlightenment. The doctrine according to which moral enlightenment has priority over philosophical enlightenment corresponds to the revaluation of facts of moral consciousness within the framework of the amended Elementary Philosophy.

Kant zur moralischen Selbsterkenntnis

Abstract Der intentionalistischen Ethik oder Gesinnungsethik zufolge ist das, was an einer Handlung moralisch beurteilt wird, die Handlungsabsicht oder Intention. Der bedeutendste Vertreter des ethischen Intentionalismus, Immanuel Kant, spricht freilich nicht von „Absichten“ sondern von „Maximen“. Dem hier zugrundegelegten Verständnis zufolge sind Maximen weder Handlungsmotive noch Handlungsstrukturen, sondern Handlungsabsichten. Jedoch ist nicht jede beliebige Absicht eine Maxime. Eine Maxime zu haben, heißt für Kant, sich bewußt entschlossen zu haben, so-und-so zu handeln. Handeln nach Maximen ist regelgeleitetes Verhalten. Der Begriff der Maxime bezieht sich nur auf okkurente (nicht auf dispositionale) Absichten. Und schließlich sind Maximen solche Absichten, die nicht auf eine singulare Verwirklichung abzielen, sondern für einen ganzen Lebensbereich das leitende Handlungsprinzip aufstellen.

Nachruf auf Gerhard Funke

Abstract Am 22. Januar 2006 ist Gerhard Funke, der Herausgeber der Kant-Studien und langjährige frühere Erste Vorsitzende der Kant-Gesellschaft in seinem 92sten Lebensjahr verstorben. Bis in sein neuntes Lebensjahrzehnt war Gerhard Funke auf dem Feld von Philosophie und Wissenschaften tätig. So konnte er noch 1994 zu seiner großen Freude an der 450-Jahrfeier der „Albertina“ in Königsberg als Festredner teilnehmen. Eine seiner späteren Publikationen ist die Abhandlung von 1998 über „Interpretation“ bei der Mainzer Akademie der Wissenschaften, deren tatkräftiges Mitglied er über Jahrzehnte war.