Kyungkook Kang

In Search of Structure: The Nonlinear Dynamics of Power Transitions

Power Transitions (PT) anticipates interstate conflict or cooperation by examining dynamic changes in the distribution of power across the international system, as well as each nations (or politically “relevant” nations) satisfaction with the current international status quo. Using a system of symmetric, coupled nonlinear differential equations, we formalize and test a dynamic PT model to identify to what extent and degree policy makers can maintain stability in rival dyads, such as the US-China case currently. Our formalized dynamic PT model explores some of the structural conditions of how conflict or cooperation affects growth and transition from the PT literature. These formal results are consistent both with theoretical expectations and empirical results. Our results not only suggest specific, strategic policy prescriptions for dyads in hopes of avoiding war, but more importantly highlight the nonlinear and non-monotonic effects of foreign policy actions.

Assessment of deterrence and missile defense in East Asia: A power transition perspective

This paper explores the stability of deterrence in East Asia and the effects of missile defense on regional security. In particular, we evaluate the policy implications derived from the power transition perspective for the development of the US missile defense system in the Asia-Pacific region. Over the short term, we anticipate that the stability of deterrence in East Asia will be increased by the deployment of ballistic missile defenses that creates a power preponderance of satisfied challengers against potential regional challengers. The long-term horizon is, however, tenuous because the rapid expansion of US-led missile defense systems may significantly alter the trajectory of China’s missile strategy by increasing its dissatisfaction with the status quo. One fundamental implication is that, without further restrictions, long-term deployment stability in East Asia will become increasingly fragile.

International Political Economy and Political Demography: An Interdisciplinary Exploration

The authors of this chapter seek to further our knowledge of economic growth, change and conflict. They build a general model that offers a new perspective on politics. It shows that economic development is a complex socioeconomic process involving multiple factors within a dynamic, nonlinear relationship. Their model synthesizes diverse ideas from politics, economics and demography and helps us understand problems such as income inequality and major conflict.

An Agent-Based Approach on Conditional Deterrence

This paper provides an integrated structure that defines conditions for the success and failure of deterrence. The conditional deterrence model presented can be applied to global and regional interactions that drive nuclear proliferation. The objective is to further extend the dyadic logic established to anticipate challenges generated by the proliferation of nuclear capabilities and their acquisitions by non-state dissatisfied agents. Key elements included in this assessment are relative capabilities, risk propensity associated with the status quo, and physical exposure to preemptive-attack or retaliation. This work uses ABM to generalize insights to deterrence environments with multiple competing actors. We show that deterrence is stable when the capabilities of a dissatisfied challenger are inferior to that of a dominant and satisfied defender. Deterrence is tenuous when a dissatisfied challenger approaches parity in capability with the dominant and satisfied defender, or when a violent non-state actor obtains nuclear weapon or other WMDs.