Lara Bardi

Eliminating mirror responses by instructions

The observation of an action leads to the activation of the corresponding motor plan in the observer. This phenomenon of motor resonance has an important role in social interaction, promoting imitation, learning and action understanding. However, mirror responses not always have a positive impact on our behavior. An automatic tendency to imitate others can introduce interference in action execution and non-imitative or opposite responses have an advantage in some contexts. Previous studies suggest that mirror tendencies can be suppressed after extensive practice or in complementary joint action situations revealing that mirror responses are more flexible than previously thought. The aim of the present study was to gain insight into the mechanisms that allow response flexibility of motor mirroring. Here we show that the mere instruction of a counter-imitative mapping changes mirror responses as indexed by motor evoked potentials (MEPs) enhancement induced by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). Importantly, mirror activation was measured while participants were passively watching finger movements, without having the opportunity to execute the task. This result suggests that the implementation of task instructions activates stimulus-response association that can overwrite the mirror representations. Our outcome reveals one of the crucial mechanisms that might allow flexible adjustments of mirror responses in different contexts. The implications of this outcome are discussed.

Behavioral measures of implicit theory of mind in adults with high functioning autism

Theory of mind (ToM) research has shown that adults with high functioning autism (HFA) demonstrate typical performance on tasks that require explicit belief reasoning, despite clear social difficulties in everyday life situations. In the current study, we used implicit belief manipulations that are task-irrelevant and therefore less susceptible to strategies. In a ball-detection task, it was shown that neurotypical individuals detect a ball faster if an agent believed the ball was present. We predicted that adults with high functioning autism (HFA) would not show this effect. While we found a numerical difference in the hypothesized direction, we did not find a reliable group effect. Interestingly, the implicit ToM-index showed a strong negative correlation with both self-reported and observational measures of social difficulties in the HFA group. This suggests that the relationship between implicit ToM reasoning and the symptomatology of HFA might be subtler than assumed.

Brain activation for spontaneous and explicit false belief tasks overlaps: new fMRI evidence on belief processing and violation of expectation

Abstract There is extensive discussion on whether spontaneous and explicit forms of ToM are based on the same cognitive/neural mechanisms or rather reflect qualitatively different processes. For the first time, we analyzed the BOLD signal for false belief processing by directly comparing spontaneous and explicit ToM task versions. In both versions, participants watched videos of a scene including an agent who acquires a true or false belief about the location of an object (belief formation phase). At the end of the movies (outcome phase), participants had to react to the presence of the object. During the belief formation phase, greater activity was found for false vs true belief trials in the right posterior parietal cortex. The ROI analysis of the right temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), confirmed this observation. Moreover, the anterior medial prefrontal cortex (aMPFC) was active during the outcome phase, being sensitive to violation of both the participant’s and agent’s expectations about the location of the object. Activity in the TPJ and aMPFC was not modulated by the spontaneous/explicit task. Overall, these data show that neural mechanisms for spontaneous and explicit ToM overlap. Interestingly, a dissociation between TPJ and aMPFC for belief tracking and outcome evaluation, respectively, was also found.

Automatic imitation: A meta-analysis.

Automatic imitation is the finding that movement execution is facilitated by compatible and impeded by incompatible observed movements. In the past 15 years, automatic imitation has been studied to understand the relation between perception and action in social interaction. Although research on this topic started in cognitive science, interest quickly spread to related disciplines such as social psychology, clinical psychology, and neuroscience. However, important theoretical questions have remained unanswered. Therefore, in the present meta-analysis, we evaluated seven key questions on automatic imitation. The results, based on 161 studies containing 226 experiments, revealed an overall effect size of gz = 0.95, 95% CI [0.88, 1.02]. Moderator analyses identified automatic imitation as a flexible, largely automatic process that is driven by movement and effector compatibility, but is also influenced by spatial compatibility. Automatic imitation was found to be stronger for forced choice tasks than for simple response tasks, for human agents than for nonhuman agents, and for goalless actions than for goal-directed actions. However, it was not modulated by more subtle factors such as animacy beliefs, motion profiles, or visual perspective. Finally, there was no evidence for a relation between automatic imitation and either empathy or autism. Among other things, these findings point toward actor–imitator similarity as a crucial modulator of automatic imitation and challenge the view that imitative tendencies are an indicator of social functioning. The current meta-analysis has important theoretical implications and sheds light on longstanding controversies in the literature on automatic imitation and related domains.

TPJ-M1 interaction in the control of shared representations : new insights from tDCS and TMS combined

Abstract There is extensive evidence that perceived and internally planned actions have a common representational basis: action observation can induce an automatic tendency to imitate others. If perceived and executed action, however, are based on shared representations, the question arises how we can distinguish self‐related and other‐related representations. It has been suggested that the control of shared representations involves a neural network centered on the temporo‐parietal junction (TPJ). However, the specific role of the TPJ in controlling shared representations is still not clear. In a conflict situation where participants have to execute action A while observing action B, the TPJ might either facilitate the relevant action A or inhibit the irrelevant action B (mirror response). In the present study, we used transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS) to condition neural activity in the right temporo‐parietal junction (TPJ). We then analyzed the corticospinal output as indexed by motor‐evoked potentials (MEPs) induced by single‐pulse TMS (spTMS) of the left primary motor cortex (M1) during action observation in the context of a conflict task. Results showed that tDCS‐mediated increased control did not entail the attenuation of the task‐irrelevant response activation: the effect of motor mirroring was not suppressed or reduced. Rather, facilitating TPJ activity via anodal tDCS selectively enhanced the instructed motor plan (self‐related representation). This outcome supports the idea that TPJ plays a critical role in detecting the mismatch between self‐related and other‐related representations and is at work to enhance task‐relevant representations. HighlightsWe investigated the functional interaction between TPJ and M1 in the control of shared representations.TPJ stimulation enhances task‐relevant motor representations as indexed by MEPs analysis.

Mimicry and automatic imitation are not correlated

It is widely known that individuals have a tendency to imitate each other. However, different psychological disciplines assess imitation in different manners. While social psychologists assess mimicry by means of action observation, cognitive psychologists assess automatic imitation with reaction time based measures on a trial-by-trial basis. Although these methods differ in crucial methodological aspects, both phenomena are assumed to rely on similar underlying mechanisms. This raises the fundamental question whether mimicry and automatic imitation are actually correlated. In the present research we assessed both phenomena and did not find a meaningful correlation. Moreover, personality traits such as empathy, autism traits, and traits related to self- versus other-focus did not correlate with mimicry or automatic imitation either. Theoretical implications are discussed.

Repetitive TMS of the temporo-parietal junction disrupts participant’s expectations in a spontaneous Theory of Mind task

Abstract A recent debate about Theory of Mind (ToM) concerns whether spontaneous and explicit mentalizing are based on the same mechanisms. However, only a few neuroimaging studies have investigated the neural bases of spontaneous ToM, with inconsistent results. The present study had two goals: first, to investigate whether the right Temporo-Parietal Junction (rTPJ) is crucially involved in spontaneous ToM and second, to gain insight into the role of the rTPJ in ToM. For the first time, we applied rTMS to the rTPJ while participants were engaged in a spontaneous false belief task. Participants watched videos of a scene including an agent who acquires a true or false belief about the location of an object. At the end of the movie, participants reacted to the presence of the object. Results show that, during stimulation of the control site, RTs were affected by both the participant’s expectations and the belief of the agent. Stimulation of the rTPJ significantly modulated task performance, supporting the idea that spontaneous ToM, as well as explicit ToM, relies on TPJ activity. However, we did not observe a disruption of the representation of the agent’s belief. Rather, the stimulation interfered with participant’s predictions, supporting the idea that rTPJ is crucially involved in self-other distinction.

Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) reveals a dissociation between SNARC and MARC effects : implication for the polarity correspondence account

The concept of stimulus response compatibility (SRC) refers to the existence of a privileged association between a specific stimulus feature and a specific response feature. Two examples of SRC are the Spatial Numerical Association of Response Codes (SNARC) and the Markedness Association of Response Codes (MARC) effects. According to the polarity correspondence principle, these two SRC effects occur because of a match between the most salient dimensions of stimulus and response. Specifically, the SNARC effect would be caused by a match between right-sided responses and large numbers, while a match between right-sided responses and even numbers would give rise to the MARC effect. The aim of the present study was to test the validity of the polarity correspondence principle in explaining these two SRC effects. To this end, we applied transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) over left and right posterior parietal cortex (PPC), which is thought to be the neural basis of salience processing, during a parity judgement task. Results showed that cathodal tDCS over the PPC significantly reduced the MARC effect but did not affect the SNARC effect, suggesting a dissociation between the two effects. That is, the MARC would rely on a salience processing mechanism, whereas the SNARC would not. Despite this interpretation is in need of further experimental confirmations (i.e., testing different tasks or using different tDCS montages), our results suggest that the polarity correspondence principle can be a plausible explanation only for the MARC effect but not for the SNARC effect.

Measuring Mentalizing Ability: A Within-Subject Comparison between an Explicit and Implicit Version of a Ball Detection Task

The concept of mentalizing has been widely studied, but almost exclusively through tasks with explicit instructions. Recent studies suggest that people also mentalize on a more implicit level. However, to our knowledge, no study to date has directly contrasted the effects of implicit and explicit mentalizing processes on an implicit dependent measure within-subjects. We implemented this by using two versions of an object detection task, differing only on secondary catch questions. We hypothesized that if explicit mentalizing relies on complementary processes beyond those underlying implicit mentalizing, this would be reflected in enhanced belief effects in the explicit version. Twenty-eight healthy adults watched movies in which, during the first phase, both they themselves and another agent formed a belief about the location of a ball, and although irrelevant, these beliefs could influence their ball detection reaction times in the second phase. After this response phase, there were occasional catch questions that were different for the explicit and implicit task version. Finally, self-report measures of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) symptomatology were included, as the literature suggests that ASD is related to a specific deficit in implicit mentalizing. Both in the explicit and implicit version, belief conditions had a significant effect on reaction times, with responses being slower when neither the participant nor the other agent expected the ball to be present compared to all other conditions. Importantly, after the implicit version, participants reported no explicit mentalizing awareness. In our neurotypical sample, ASD symptoms were not found to correlate with either explicit or implicit mentalizing. In conclusion, the reaction time patterns in the explicit and implicit version of the task show strikingly similar effects of mentalizing, indicating that participants processed beliefs to the same extent regardless of whether they mentalized explicitly or implicitly, with no additional effects for explicit processing.

It wasn't me! Motor activation from irrelevant spatial information in the absence of a response.

Embodied cognition postulates that perceptual and motor processes serve higher-order cognitive faculties like language. A major challenge for embodied cognition concerns the grounding of abstract concepts. Here we zoom in on abstract spatial concepts and ask the question to what extent the sensorimotor system is involved in processing these. Most of the empirical support in favor of an embodied perspective on (abstract) spatial information has derived from so-called compatibility effects in which a task-irrelevant feature either facilitates (for compatible trials) or hinders (in incompatible trials) responding to the task-relevant feature. This type of effect has been interpreted in terms of (task-irrelevant) feature-induced response activation. The problem with such approach is that incompatible features generate an array of task-relevant and –irrelevant activations [e.g., in primary motor cortex (M1)], and lateral hemispheric interactions render it difficult to assign credit to the task-irrelevant feature per se in driving these activations. Here, we aim to obtain a cleaner indication of response activation on the basis of abstract spatial information. We employed transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to probe response activation of effectors in response to semantic, task-irrelevant stimuli (i.e., the words left and right) that did not require an overt response. Results revealed larger motor evoked potentials (MEPs) for the right (left) index finger when the word right (left) was presented. Our findings provide support for the grounding of abstract spatial concepts in the sensorimotor system.