Lasana T. Harris

Dehumanizing the Lowest of the Low Neuroimaging Responses to Extreme Out-Groups

Traditionally, prejudice has been conceptualized as simple animosity. The stereotype content model (SCM) shows that some prejudice is worse. The SCM previously demonstrated separate stereotype dimensions of warmth (low-high) and competence (low-high), identifying four distinct out-group clusters. The SCM predicts that only extreme out-groups, groups that are both stereotypically hostile and stereotypically incompetent (low warmth, low competence), such as addicts and the homeless, will be dehumanized. Prior studies show that the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) is necessary for social cognition. Functional magnetic resonance imaging provided data for examining brain activations in 10 participants viewing 48 photographs of social groups and 12 participants viewing objects; each picture dependably represented one SCM quadrant. Analyses revealed mPFC activation to all social groups except extreme (low-low) out-groups, who especially activated insula and amygdala, a pattern consistent with disgust, the emotion predicted by the SCM. No objects, though rated with the same emotions, activated the mPFC. This neural evidence supports the prediction that extreme out-groups may be perceived as less than human, or dehumanized.

Attributions on the brain: neuro-imaging dispositional inferences, beyond theory of mind.

People need to predict what other people will do, and the other persons perceived disposition is the preferred mode of prediction. People less often use, for example, shared social norms to explain another persons behavior. Social psychologys last half-century of research on attribution theory offers precise, validated paradigms for testing how people think about other peoples minds. Neuro-imaging data from one classic attribution paradigm shows the unique priority given to inferring chronic, idiosyncratic dispositions (unique attitudes, individual personality, idiosyncratic intent), compared to other kinds of mental contents. Specifically, sentences describing behavior that is low in consensus across actors, low in distinctiveness across entities, and high in consistency over time (compared with the other 7 low-high combinations) uniquely elicits (a) person attributions and (b) activation in the superior temporal sulcus. Ignoring consensus, both low-distinctiveness, high-consistency combinations (compared to 6 remaining combinations) also activate the MPFC, consistent with decades of behavioral data showing that general social cognition neglects consensus information. Thus, activated areas converge with prior neuro-imaging data on theory of mind and social cognition, but more precisely isolate the exact nature of the inferences that activate these areas.

Social groups that elicit disgust are differentially processed in mPFC

Social neuroscience suggests medial pre-frontal cortex (mPFC) as necessary for social cognition. However, the mPFC activates less to members of extreme outgroups that elicit disgust, an emotion directed toward both people and objects. This study aimed to counteract that effect. Participants made either superficial categorical age estimations or individuating food-preference judgments about people, while fMRI recorded neural activity. Besides replicating the reduced mPFC activity to extreme outgroups that elicit disgust, this study demonstrates that the same type of judgment for these individuals is processed in a region anatomically distinct from social groups that elicit exclusively social emotions (pity, envy, pride). Finally, inferring individuating information (food preferences) increases mPFC activation above superficial categorical judgments. This evidence fits differentiated mPFC processing of extreme outgroups, which activate mPFC less than other groups, but suggests that individuation increases activation.

Regions of the MPFC differentially tuned to social and nonsocial affective evaluation

The medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) reliably activates in social cognition and reward tasks. This study locates distinct areas for each. Participants made evaluative (positive/negative) or social (person/not a person) judgments of pictured positive or negative people and objects in a slow event-related design. Activity in an anterior rostral region (arMPFC) was significantly greater for positive than for negative persons but did not show a valence effect for objects, and this was true regardless of the judgment task. This suggests that the arMPFC is tuned to social valence. Interestingly, however, no regions of the MPFC were found to be responsive to social information independently of valence. A region-of-interest analysis of the paraanterior cingulate cortex (pACC), previously implicated in reward processing, demonstrated sensitivity to the valence of all stimuli, whether persons or objects, across tasks. Affective evaluation may be a general function of the MPFC, with some regions being tuned to more specific domains of information (e.g., social) than are others.

Toward socially inspired social neuroscience

Social neuroscience, often viewed as studying the neural foundations of social cognition, has roots in multiple disciplines. This paper argues that it needs a firmer base in social psychology. First, we outline some major opportunities from social psychology--the power of social context and social motives in shaping human behavior. Second, as the social cognition field moves away from studying only deliberate, explicit processes to studying also automatic, implicit processes, adopting a dual-process perspective, social neuroscience also lends itself to both automatic and controlled processes. Finally, social neuroscience is especially suited to study the efficiency and spontaneity of social judgments. All this brings social behavioral grounding to cognitive neuroscience. Among the implications for social neuroscience: Social cognition intrinsically evokes affect, so social cognitive affective neuroscience glues together a variety of fields in psychological and neurosciences.

Durable effects of cognitive restructuring on conditioned fear.

Studies of cognitive reappraisal have demonstrated that reinterpreting a stimulus can alter emotional responding, yet few studies have examined the durable effects associated with reinterpretation-based emotion regulation strategies. Evidence for the enduring effects of emotion regulation may be found in clinical studies that use cognitive restructuring (CR) techniques in cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) to alleviate anxiety. These techniques are based on cognitive theories of anxiety that suggest these disorders arise from biased cognitions; therefore, changing a persons thoughts will elicit durable changes in an individuals emotional responses. Despite the considerable success of CBT for anxiety disorders, durable effects associated with emotion regulation have not been thoroughly examined in the context of a laboratory paradigm. The goal of this study was to determine whether CR, a technique used in CBT and similar to cognitive reappraisal, could attenuate conditioned fear responses, and whether the effect would persist over time (24 hr). We conditioned participants using images of snakes or spiders that were occasionally paired with a mild shock to the wrist while we obtained subjective fear reports and electrodermal activity (EDA). After conditioning, half of the participants were randomly assigned to CR training aimed at decreasing their emotional response to the shock and the conditioned stimuli, while the other half received no such training. All participants returned 24 hr later to repeat the conditioning session. Compared with control participants, CR participants demonstrated a reduction in fear and EDA across sessions. These findings suggest that CR has durable effects on fear responding.

The Emotional Cost of Humanity Anticipated Exhaustion Motivates Dehumanization of Stigmatized Targets

Although mind perception is a basic part of social interaction, people often dehumanize others by denying them mental states. Many theories suggest that dehumanization happens in order to facilitate aggression or account for past immorality. We suggest a novel motivation for dehumanization: to avoid affective costs. We show that dehumanization of stigmatized targets (e.g., drug addicts) relative to nonstigmatized targets is strongest for those who are motivated to avoid emotional exhaustion. In Experiment 1, participants anticipated more exhaustion from helping, and attributed less mind to, a stigmatized target and anticipated exhaustion partially mediated the influence of stigma on mind attribution. Experiment 2 manipulated anticipated exhaustion prior to an empathy plea and revealed that the influence of stigma on mind attribution was only present when people anticipated high levels of emotional exhaustion.

Disgust and biological descriptions bias logical reasoning during legal decision-making

Legal decisions often require logical reasoning about the mental states of people who perform gruesome behaviors. We use functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine how brain regions implicated in logical reasoning are modulated by emotion and social cognition during legal decision-making. Participants read vignettes describing crimes that elicit strong or weak disgust matched on punishment severity using the US Federal Sentencing Guidelines. An extraneous sentence at the end of each vignette described the perpetrator’s personality using traits or biological language, mimicking the increased use of scientific evidence presented in courts. Behavioral results indicate that crimes weak in disgust receive significantly less punishment than the guidelines recommend. Neuroimaging results indicate that brain regions active during logical reasoning respond less to crimes weak in disgust and biological descriptions of personality, demonstrating the impact of emotion and social cognition on logical reasoning mechanisms necessary for legal decision-making.

Sticking with the nice guy: Trait warmth information impairs learning and modulates person perception brain network activity

Social learning requires inferring social information about another person, as well as evaluating outcomes. Previous research shows that prior social information biases decision making and reduces reliance on striatal activity during learning (Delgado, Frank, & Phelps, Nature Neuroscience 8 (11): 1611-1618, 2005). A rich literature in social psychology on person perception demonstrates that people spontaneously infer social information when viewing another person (Fiske & Taylor, 2013) and engage a network of brain regions, including the medial prefrontal cortex, temporal parietal junction, superior temporal sulcus, and precuneus (Amodio & Frith, Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 7(4), 268-277, 2006; Haxby, Gobbini, & Montgomery, 2004; van Overwalle Human Brain Mapping, 30, 829–858, 2009). We investigate the role of these brain regions during social learning about well-established dimensions of person perception—trait warmth and trait competence. We test the hypothesis that activity in person perception brain regions interacts with learning structures during social learning. Participants play an investment game where they must choose an agent to invest on their behalf. This choice is guided by cues signaling trait warmth or trait competence based on framing of monetary returns. Trait warmth information impairs learning about human but not computer agents, while trait competence information produces similar learning rates for human and computer agents. We see increased activation to warmth information about human agents in person perception brain regions. Interestingly, activity in person perception brain regions during the decision phase negatively predicts activity in the striatum during feedback for trait competence inferences about humans. These results suggest that social learning may engage additional processing within person perception brain regions that hampers learning in economic contexts.

Perceiving Humanity or Not

© 2011 by Oxford University Press, Inc. All rights reserved. Social neuroscience can be used to understand dehumanized perception, a failure to think about another persons mind (mentalizing). This extreme form of prejudice entails perceiving a person as less than, not quite, or not at all human. It is argued that dehumanized perception may be a psychological response to social targets who elicit the negative basic emotion disgust. The chapter reviews social neuroscience data showing that the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC)-an area implicated in mentalizing and social cognition-is not as active for these dehumanized targets as for other social targets. It then reviews subsequent social psychological predictions generated by the neural data; these data show that participants fail to think about the minds of these dehumanized targets to the same extent as other social targets. Participants also describe these dehumanized targets as ill-intentioned, inept, unfamiliar, dissimilar, strange, and not uniquely human or quite typically human. The chapter concludes with a discussion of some factors that may moderate dehumanized perception, perhaps relevant to the hope of reducing some of the thought processes and emotions that underlie human atrocities.