Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen

When the Claim Hits: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bounded Rational Learning

Using the international investment regime as its point of departure, the article applies notions of bounded rationality to the study of economic diplomacy. Through a multimethod approach, it shows that developing countries often ignored the risks of bilateral investment treaties (bit s) until they themselves became subject to an investment treaty claim. Thus the behavior of developing country governments with regard to the international investment regime is consistent with that routinely observed for individuals in experiments and field studies: they tend to ignore high-impact, low-probability risks if they cannot bring specific “vivid” instances to mind.

Investment Protection in TTIP: Three Feasible Proposals

Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) through international arbitration has become a major stumbling block in negotiations of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).

The Politics of South-South Bilateral Investment Treaties

The paper analyzes systematic patterns of investment treaty rule-making using a large sample of bilateral investment treaties (BITs). Focusing on national treatment and transfer provisions, it finds that BITs signed between two developing countries are typically less wide-ranging than North-South BITs. Yet restrictions in South-South BITs are ‘levelled out’ by the treaties’ most-favoured-nation provisions leading to a de‐facto coherence in developing countries’ BIT‐networks. The paper concludes by speculating whether this paradoxical pattern might have been unintended on the part of developing country negotiators.