Lauren A. M. Lebois

Are Automatic Conceptual Cores the Gold Standard of Semantic Processing? The Context-Dependence of Spatial Meaning in Grounded Congruency Effects

According to grounded cognition, words whose semantics contain sensory-motor features activate sensory-motor simulations, which, in turn, interact with spatial responses to produce grounded congruency effects (e.g., processing the spatial feature of up for sky should be faster for up vs. down responses). Growing evidence shows these congruency effects do not always occur, suggesting instead that the grounded features in a words meaning do not become active automatically across contexts. Researchers sometimes use this as evidence that concepts are not grounded, further concluding that grounded information is peripheral to the amodal cores of concepts. We first review broad evidence that words do not have conceptual cores, and that even the most salient features in a words meaning are not activated automatically. Then, in three experiments, we provide further evidence that grounded congruency effects rely dynamically on context, with the central grounded features in a concept becoming active only when the current context makes them salient. Even when grounded features are central to a words meaning, their activation depends on task conditions.

Neuroimaging genetic approaches to Posttraumatic Stress Disorder.

Neuroimaging genetic studies that associate genetic and epigenetic variation with neural activity or structure provide an opportunity to link genes to psychiatric disorders, often before psychopathology is discernable in behavior. Here we review neuroimaging genetics studies with participants who have Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Results show that genes related to the physiological stress response (e.g., glucocorticoid receptor and activity, neuroendocrine release), learning and memory (e.g., plasticity), mood, and pain perception are tied to neural intermediate phenotypes associated with PTSD. These genes are associated with and sometimes predict neural structure and function in areas involved in attention, executive function, memory, decision-making, emotion regulation, salience of potential threats, and pain perception. Evidence suggests these risk polymorphisms and neural intermediate phenotypes are vulnerabilities toward developing PTSD in the aftermath of trauma, or vulnerabilities toward particular symptoms once PTSD has developed. Work distinguishing between the re-experiencing and dissociative sub-types of PTSD, and examining other PTSD symptom clusters in addition to the re-experiencing and hyperarousal symptoms, will further clarify neurobiological mechanisms and inconsistent findings. Furthermore, an exciting possibility is that genetic associations with PTSD may eventually be understood through differential intermediate phenotypes of neural circuit structure and function, possibly underlying the different symptom clusters seen within PTSD.

A shift in perspective: Decentering through mindful attention to imagined stressful events

Ruminative thoughts about a stressful event can seem subjectively real, as if the imagined event were happening in the moment. One possibility is that this subjective realism results from simulating the self as engaged in the stressful event (immersion). If so, then the process of decentering--disengaging the self from the event--should reduce the subjective realism associated with immersion, and therefore perceived stressfulness. To assess this account of decentering, we taught non-meditators a strategy for disengaging from imagined events, simply viewing these events as transient mental states (mindful attention). In a subsequent neuroimaging session, participants imagined stressful and non-stressful events, while either immersing themselves or adopting mindful attention. In conjunction analyses, mindful attention down-regulated the processing of stressful events relative to baseline, whereas immersion up-regulated their processing. In direct contrasts between mindful attention and immersion, mindful attention showed greater activity in brain areas associated with perspective shifting and effortful attention, whereas immersion showed greater activity in areas associated with self-processing and visceral states. These results suggest that mindful attention produces decentering by disengaging embodied senses of self from imagined situations so that affect does not develop.

Establishing the situated features associated with perceived stress

We propose that the domain general process of categorization contributes to the perception of stress. When a situation contains features associated with stressful experiences, it is categorized as stressful. From the perspective of situated cognition, the features used to categorize experiences as stressful are the features typically true of stressful situations. To test this hypothesis, we asked participants to evaluate the perceived stress of 572 imagined situations, and to also evaluate each situation for how much it possessed 19 features potentially associated with stressful situations and their processing (e.g., self-threat, familiarity, visual imagery, outcome certainty). Following variable reduction through factor analysis, a core set of 8 features associated with stressful situations-expectation violation, self-threat, coping efficacy, bodily experience, arousal, negative valence, positive valence, and perseveration-all loaded on a single Core Stress Features factor. In a multilevel model, this factor and an Imagery factor explained 88% of the variance in judgments of perceived stress, with significant random effects reflecting differences in how individual participants categorized stress. These results support the hypothesis that people categorize situations as stressful to the extent that typical features of stressful situations are present. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to establish a comprehensive set of features that predicts perceived stress.

Learning situated emotions

From the perspective of constructivist theories, emotion results from learning assemblies of relevant perceptual, cognitive, interoceptive, and motor processes in specific situations. Across emotional experiences over time, learned assemblies of processes accumulate in memory that later underlie emotional experiences in similar situations. A neuroimaging experiment guided participants to experience (and thus learn) situated forms of emotion, and then assessed whether participants tended to experience situated forms of the emotion later. During the initial learning phase, some participants immersed themselves in vividly imagined fear and anger experiences involving physical harm, whereas other participants immersed themselves in vividly imagined fear and anger experiences involving negative social evaluation. In the subsequent testing phase, both learning groups experienced fear and anger while their neural activity was assessed with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). A variety of results indicated that the physical and social learning groups incidentally learned different situated forms of a given emotion. Consistent with constructivist theories, these findings suggest that learning plays a central role in emotion, with emotion adapted to the situations in which it is experienced.

Brain circuit dysfunction in post-traumatic stress disorder: from mouse to man

Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a prevalent, debilitating and sometimes deadly consequence of exposure to severe psychological trauma. Although effective treatments exist for some individuals, they are limited. New approaches to intervention, treatment and prevention are therefore much needed. In the past few years, the field has rapidly developed a greater understanding of the dysfunctional brain circuits underlying PTSD, a shift in understanding that has been made possible by technological revolutions that have allowed the observation and perturbation of the macrocircuits and microcircuits thought to underlie PTSD-related symptoms. These advances have allowed us to gain a more translational knowledge of PTSD, have provided further insights into the mechanisms of risk and resilience and offer promising avenues for therapeutic discovery.Advanced techniques for the imaging and manipulation of neural circuits are increasingly being used to advance our understanding of psychiatric disorders. Ressler and colleagues describe our current understanding of the circuit dysfunction that underlies the symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder.

Mechanisms of PACAP in PTSD and Stress-Related Disorders in Humans

Pituitary adenylate cyclase-activating polypeptide (PACAP) is a pleiotropic neuropeptide, a neuronal signaling molecule that affects many distinct phenotypic traits. Despite the diversity in PACAP’s functioning, by examining PACAP in the typical stress response, we can identify when PACAP levels and signaling become dysregulated. These findings can serve as clues to help identify the mechanisms of psychiatric and clinical disorders. Furthermore, accumulating evidence suggests that PACAP itself may represent a novel treatment target for a variety of disorders. In this chapter, we provide a brief overview of PACAP in the stress response, and review evidence that PACAP levels, signaling, genetic and epigenetic variations may be important mechanisms underlying human illnesses. Posttraumatic stress disorder and other stress-related medical conditions including migraines, Alzheimer’s disease, multiple sclerosis, sudden infant death syndrome, and asthma are discussed.