Laurent Lehmann

Group selection and kin selection: Two concepts but one process

In a recent paper, Traulsen and Nowak use a multilevel selection model to show that cooperation can be favored by group selection in finite populations [Traulsen A, Nowak M (2006) Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 103:10952–10955]. The authors challenge the view that kin selection may be an appropriate interpretation of their results and state that group selection is a distinctive process “that permeates evolutionary processes from the emergence of the first cells to eusociality and the economics of nations.” In this paper, we start by addressing Traulsen and Nowaks challenge and demonstrate that all their results can be obtained by an application of kin selection theory. We then extend Traulsen and Nowaks model to life history conditions that have been previously studied. This allows us to highlight the differences and similarities between Traulsen and Nowaks model and typical kin selection models and also to broaden the scope of their results. Our retrospective analyses of Traulsen and Nowaks model illustrate that it is possible to convert group selection models to kin selection models without disturbing the mathematics describing the net effect of selection on cooperation.

Inbreeding Avoidance through Kin Recognition: Choosy Females Boost Male Dispersal

Inbreeding avoidance is predicted to induce sex biases in dispersal. But which sex should disperse? In polygynous species, females pay higher costs to inbreeding and thus might be expected to disperse more, but empirical evidence consistently reveals male biases. Here, we show that theoretical expectations change drastically if females are allowed to avoid inbreeding via kin recognition. At high inbreeding loads, females should prefer immigrants over residents, thereby boosting male dispersal. At lower inbreeding loads, by contrast, inclusive fitness benefits should induce females to prefer relatives, thereby promoting male philopatry. This result points to disruptive effects of sexual selection. The inbreeding load that females are ready to accept is surprisingly high. In absence of search costs, females should prefer related partners as long as \documentclass{aastex} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{bm} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{pifont} \usepackage{stmaryrd} \usepackage{textcomp} \usepackage{portland,xspace} \usepackage{amsmath,amsxtra} \usepackage[OT2,OT1]{fontenc} \newcommand\cyr{ \renewcommand\rmdefault{wncyr} \renewcommand\sfdefault{wncyss} \renewcommand\encodingdefault{OT2} \normalfont \selectfont} \DeclareTextFontCommand{\textcyr}{\cyr} \pagestyle{empty} \DeclareMathSizes{10}{9}{7}{6} \begin{document} \landscape

Is Sociality Driven by the Costs of Dispersal or the Benefits of Philopatry? A Role for Kin‐Discrimination Mechanisms

\delta < r/( 1+r)

On the number of independent cultural traits carried by individuals and populations

\end{document} , where r is relatedness and δ is the fecundity loss relative to an outbred mating. This amounts to fitness losses up to one‐fifth for a half‐sib mating and one‐third for a full‐sib mating, which lie in the upper range of inbreeding depression values currently reported in natural populations. The observation of active inbreeding avoidance in a polygynous species thus suggests that inbreeding depression exceeds this threshold in the species under scrutiny or that inbred matings at least partly forfeit other mating opportunities for males. Our model also shows that female choosiness should decline rapidly with search costs, stemming from, for example, reproductive delays. Species under strong time constraints on reproduction should thus be tolerant of inbreeding.

Natural Selection on Fecundity Variance in Subdivided Populations: Kin Selection Meets Bet Hedging

In natural populations, dispersal tends to be limited so that individuals are in local competition with their neighbours. As a consequence, most behaviours tend to have a social component, e.g. they can be selfish, spiteful, cooperative or altruistic as usually considered in social evolutionary theory. How social behaviours translate into fitness costs and benefits depends considerably on life-history features, as well as on local demographic and ecological conditions. Over the last four decades, evolutionists have been able to explore many of the consequences of these factors for the evolution of social behaviours. In this paper, we first recall the main theoretical concepts required to understand social evolution. We then discuss how life history, demography and ecology promote or inhibit the evolution of helping behaviours, but the arguments developed for helping can be extended to essentially any social trait. The analysis suggests that, on a theoretical level, it is possible to contrast three critical benefit-to-cost ratios beyond which costly helping is selected for (three quantitative rules for the evolution of altruism). But comparison between theoretical results and empirical data has always been difficult in the literature, partly because of the perennial question of the scale at which relatedness should be measured under localized dispersal. We then provide three answers to this question.

Effects of Brood Manipulation Costs on Optimal Sex Allocation in Social Hymenoptera

The role of ecological constraints in promoting sociality is currently much debated. Using a direct‐fitness approach, we show this role to depend on the kin‐discrimination mechanisms underlying social interactions. Altruism cannot evolve under spatially based discrimination, unless ecological constraints prevent complete dispersal. Increasing constraints enhances both the proportion of philopatric (and thereby altruistic) individuals and the level of altruistic investments conceded in pairwise interactions. Familiarity‐based discrimination, by contrast, allows philopatry and altruism to evolve at significant levels even in the absence of ecological constraints. Increasing constraints further enhances the proportion of philopatric (and thereby altruistic) individuals but not the level of altruism conceded. Ecological constraints are thus more likely to affect social evolution in species in which restricted cognitive abilities, large group size, and/or limited period of associative learning force investments to be made on the basis of spatial cues.

Gains from switching and evolutionary stability in multi-player matrix games

We investigate the coevolution between philopatry and altruism in island‐model populations when kin recognition occurs through phenotype matching. In saturated environments, a good discrimination ability is a necessary prerequisite for the emergence of sociality. Discrimination decreases not only with the average phenotypic similarity between immigrants and residents (i.e., with environmental homogeneity and past gene flow) but also with the sampling variance of similarity distributions (a negative function of the number of traits sampled). Whether discrimination should rely on genetically or environmentally determined traits depends on the apportionment of phenotypic variance and, in particular, on the relative values of e (the among‐group component of environmental variance) and r (the among‐group component of genetic variance, which also measures relatedness among group members). If r exceeds e, highly heritable cues do better. Discrimination and altruism, however, remain low unless philopatry is enforced by ecological constraints. If e exceeds r, by contrast, nonheritable traits do better. High e values improve discrimination drastically and thus have the potential to drive sociality, even in the absence of ecological constraints. The emergence of sociality thus can be facilitated by enhancing e, which we argue is the main purpose of cue standardization within groups, as observed in many social insects, birds, and mammals, including humans.

How Demography, Life History, and Kinship Shape the Evolution of Genomic Imprinting

In species subject to individual and social learning, each individual is likely to express a certain number of different cultural traits acquired during its lifetime. If the process of trait innovation and transmission reaches a steady state in the population, the number of different cultural traits carried by an individual converges to some stationary distribution. We call this the trait-number distribution. In this paper, we derive the trait-number distributions for both individuals and populations when cultural traits are independent of each other. Our results suggest that as the number of cultural traits becomes large, the trait-number distributions approach Poisson distributions so that their means characterize cultural diversity in the population. We then analyse how the mean trait number varies at both the individual and population levels as a function of various demographic features, such as population size and subdivision, and social learning rules, such as conformism and anti-conformism. Diversity at the individual and population levels, as well as at the level of cultural homogeneity within groups, depends critically on the details of population demography and the individual and social learning rules.