Luis-Felipe Zanna

Public Investment, Growth, and Debt Sustainability: Putting Together the Pieces

We develop a model to study the macroeconomic effects of public investment surges in low-income countries, making explicit: (i) the investment-growth linkages; (ii) public external and domestic debt accumulation; (iii) the fiscal policy reactions necessary to ensure debt-sustainability; and (iv) the macroeconomic adjustment required to ensure internal and external balance. Well-executed high-yielding public investment programs can substantially raise output and consumption and be self-financing in the long run. However, even if the long run looks good, transition problems can be formidable when concessional financing does not cover the full cost of the investment program. Covering the resulting gap with tax increases or spending cuts requires sharp macroeconomic adjustments, crowding out private investment and consumption and delaying the growth benefits of public investment. Covering the gap with domestic borrowing market is not helpful either: higher domestic rates increase the financing challenge and private investment and consumption are still crowded out. Supplementing with external commercial borrowing, on the other hand, can smooth these difficult adjustments, reconciling the scaling up with feasibility constraints on increases in tax rates. But the strategy may be also risky. With poor execution, sluggish fiscal policy reactions, or persistent negative exogenous shocks, this strategy can easily lead to unsustainable public debt dynamics. Front-loaded investment programs and weak structural conditions (such as low returns to public capital and poor execution of investments) make the fiscal adjustment more challenging and the risks greater.

Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Low-Income Countries

This paper presents, for the first time, multi-dimensional indices of the quality of budget institutions in low-income countries. The indices allow for benchmarking against the performance of middle-income countries, across regions, and according to different institutional arrangements that deliver good fiscal performance. Using the constructed indices, the paper provides preliminary empirical support for the hypotheses that strong budget institutions help improve fiscal balances and public external debt outcomes; and countries with stronger fiscal institutions have better scope to conduct countercyclical policies.

The Macroeconomics of Medium-Term Aid Scaling-Up Scenarios

We develop a model to analyze the macroeconomic effects of a scaling-up of aid and assess the implications of different policy responses. The model features key structural characteristics of low-income countries, including varying degrees of public investment efficiency and a learning-by-doing (LBD) externality that captures Dutch disease effects. On the policy front, it distinguishes between spending the aid, which is controlled by the fiscal authority, and absorbing the aid - financing a higher current account deficit - which is influenced by the central banks reserve accumulation policies. We calibrate the model to Uganda and run several experiments. We find that a policy mix that results in full spending and absorption of aid can generate temporary demand and real exchange rate appreciation pressures, but also have a positive effect on real GDP in the medium term, through higher public capital. Full spending with partial absorption, on the other hand, may stem appreciation pressures but can also induce adverse medium-term real GDP effects, through private sector crowding out. When aid is very inefficiently invested and there are strong LBD externalities, aid can be harmful, and partial absorption policies may be justified. But in this case, a welfare improving solution is to defer spending or - even better if possible - raise its efficiency.

Business Cycle Fluctuations, Large Shocks, and Development Aid; New Evidence

We examine the cyclical properties of development aid using bilateral data for 22 donors and over 100 recipients during 1970‒2005. We find that bilateral aid flows are on average pro-cyclical with respect to business cycles in donor and recipient countries. However, they become counter-cyclical when recipient countries face large adverse shocks to the terms-of-trade or growth collapses - thus playing an important cushioning role. Aid outlays contract sharply during severe donor economic downturns; this effect is magnified by higher public debt levels. Additionally, bilateral aid flows are higher in the presence of IMF programs and are more counter-cyclical for recipient countries with stronger institutions.

The Short-Run Macroeconomics of Aid Inflows: Understanding the Interaction of Fiscal and Reserve Policy

We develop a tractable open-economy new-Keynesian model with two sectors to analyze the short-term effects of aid-financed fiscal expansions. We distinguish between spending the aid, which is under the control of the fiscal authorities, and absorbing the aid-using the aid to finance a higher current account deficit-which is influenced by the central banks reserves policy when access to international capital markets is limited. The standard treatment of the transfer problem implicitly assumes spending equals absorption. Here, in contrast, a policy mix that results in spending but not absorbing the aid generates demand pressures and results in an increase in real interest rates. It can also lead to a temporary real depreciation if demand pressures are strong enough to threaten external balance. Certain features of low income countries, such as limited participation in domestic financial markets, make a real depreciation more likely by amplifying demand pressures when aid is spent but not absorbed. The results from our model can help understand the recent experience of Uganda, which saw an increase in government spending following a surge in aid yet experienced a real depreciation and an increase in real interest rates.

Some Misconceptions about Public Investment Efficiency and Growth

We reconsider the macroeconomic implications of public investment efficiency, defined as the ratio between the actual increment to public capital and the amount spent. We show that, in a simple and standard model, increases in public investment spending in inefficient countries do not have a lower impact on growth than in efficient countries, a result confirmed in a simple cross-country regression. This apparently counter-intuitive result, which contrasts with Pritchett (2000) and recent policy analyses, follows directly from the standard assumption that the marginal product of public capital declines with the capital/output ratio. The implication is that efficiency and scarcity of public capital are likely to be inversely related across countries. It follows that both efficiency and the rate of return need to be considered together in assessing the impact of increases in investment, and blanket recommendations against increased public investment spending in inefficient countries need to be reconsidered. Changes in efficiency, in contrast, have direct and potentially powerful impacts on growth: “investing in investing” through structural reforms that increase efficiency, for example, can have very high rates of return.

PPP Rules, Macroeconomic (in)stability and Learning

Governments in emerging economies have pursued real exchange rate targeting through Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) rules that link the nominal depreciation rate to either the deviation of the real exchange rate from its long run level or to the difference between the domestic and the foreign CPI-inflation rates. In this paper we disentangle the conditions under which these rules may lead to endogenous fluctuations due to self-fulfilling expectations in a small open economy that faces nominal rigidities. We find that besides the specification of the rule, structural parameters such as the share of traded goods (that measures the degree of openness of the economy) and the degrees of imperfect competition and price stickiness in the non-traded sector play a crucial role in the determinacy of equilibrium. To evaluate the relevance of the real (in)determinacy results we pursue a learn ability (E-stability) analysis for the aforementioned PPP rules. We show that for rules that guarantee a unique equilibrium, the fundamental solution that represents this equilibrium is learnable in the E-stability sense. Similarly we show that for PPP rules that open the possibility of sunspot equilibria, a common factor representation that describes these equilibria is also E-stable. In this sense sunspot equilibria and therefore aggregate instability are more likely to occur due to PPP rules than previously recognized.

The Design of Fiscal Adjustment Strategies in Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland

Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland face the serious challenge of adjusting not only to lower Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) transfers because of the global economic crisis, but also to a potential further decline over the medium term. This paper assesses options for the design of the needed fiscal consolidation. The choice among these options should be driven by (i) the impact on growth and (ii) the specificities of each country. Overall, a focus on government consumption cuts appears to minimize the negative impact on growth, and would be appropriate given the relatively large size of the public sector in each country.

PPP Exchange Rate Rules, Macroeconomic (In)Stability, and Learning

In order to maintain competitiveness, governments in developing economies seem to have pursued purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rate rules, by adjusting the nominal devaluation rate in response to real exchange rate deviations from an intermediate target. This article shows that these rules are likely to induce macroeconomic instability, as they generate sunspot-driven fluctuations that are in fact learnable by agents in the Expectational-Stability sense. It finds that the existence of these “learnable sunspots” depends, among others, on open economy features, including the degree of openness and the degree of exchange rate pass-through to consumers import prices.

As You Sow so Shall You Reap: Public Investment Surges, Growth, and Debt Sustainability in Togo

This paper presents an analysis of the public investment scaling-up strategy for Togo using a dynamic macroeconomic model that explicitly analyzes the links between public investment, economic growth, and debt sustainability. In the model, public capital is productive and complementary to private capital, generating positive medium and long-run effects to increases in public investment. The model application indicates that a very large increase in public investment would have positive macroeconomic effects in the long-run, but would require unrealistic increases in the tax burden to cover recurrent costs and ensure debt sustainability. More modest increases in public investment would require more feasible increases in the tax burden, particularly if the efficiency of tax collection is improved. The model simulations also emphasize the importance of improvements in the efficiency of public investment to reap welfare gains. However, even if the macroeconomic implications of public investment scaling-up can be favorable in the long-run under certain assumptions on rates of return and efficiency of investment, the transition period is challenging and exposes the country to increased risk of unsustainable debt dynamics. The model was also used to assess the growth projections underlying the standard Excel-based debt sustainability analysis for Togo.