Lukas Koning

Believing shapes seeing: The impact of diversity beliefs on the construal of group composition

Previous research has suggested that diversity effects depend on how group members perceive their group’s composition. However, what determines how diversity is perceived is unclear. We argue that the way in which group members construe their group’s diversity is shaped by group members’ beliefs about the value in diversity. Focusing on groups with objective subgroups, we show in two studies that the more group members value diversity, the more likely they are to construe their diversity in terms of individual differences and the less likely they are to construe their diversity in terms of subgroups. We also show that diversity construal is only affected by diversity beliefs during intellectual tasks (where diversity matters), but not during physical tasks.

Emotion is for influence

Functional approaches to emotion are rapidly gaining in popularity. Thus far the functions of emotions have been conceptualised and studied mainly at the intrapersonal level of analysis, the key question being how individuals are influenced by the emotions they experience. Relatively little is known about the interpersonal effects of emotions; that is, how one persons emotions influence other peoples cognitions, attitudes, and behaviours. We propose that a primary function of emotion at this interpersonal level of analysis is to engender social influence. Our analysis is informed by emotion as social information theory (EASI; Van Kleef, 2009). This theory posits that emotional expressions produce interpersonal effects by triggering affective reactions and/or inferential processes in targets, depending on the targets information processing and the perceived appropriateness of the emotional expression. We review supportive evidence from various domains of social influence, including negotiation, leadership, attitude change, compliance, and conformity in groups. We consider the viability of emotional expressions as tools of social influence, discuss the functional equivalence of various forms of emotional expression, and address implications for theorising about emotion regulation and the functionality and evolution of emotion.

Do groups exclude others more readily than individuals in coalition formation

The present research compared interindividual and intergroup coalition processes. We examined whether groups are more likely to form small coalitions than individuals, and whether this tendency would depend on the social value orientation of the coalition party. Consistent with our hypothesis, results revealed that proselfs formed more small coalitions in intergroup settings than in interindividual settings whereas prosocials formed a similar number of small coalitions in both intergroup and interindividual settings. These and complementary findings add credence to the claim that people who are self-oriented are more likely to exclude others to maximize their own payoff and that such processes are especially pronounced in intergroup settings.

Motivated cognition in negotiation

As people live side by side in ever-growing societies, conflicts of interests seem almost inevitable. Conflicts may appear at a large scale involving many people (for example, a conflict between nations) or at a small scale involving just two people (for example, two partners bickering over the daily chores). Inherent to all conflicts is their potential to escalate. Conflicts between nations can escalate into wars and conflicts between partners can turn into fights. Such escalations are often costly to all parties involved. A war, for example, may result in a large loss of lives. It is clear that escalation of a conflict is something one wants to avoid. Negotiations offer a more constructive way to solve conflicts. Given the potential benefits, it should be no surprise that negotiations have been a focal topic in economic and psychological research. Negotiating can be described as a social interaction in which two or more parties in conflict seek a better outcome through joint action than they could realize independently (Lax and Sebenius, 1986). It is important to note that this definition stresses both a conflict of interests and interdependency.

Emotions as guardians of group norms: expressions of anger and disgust drive inferences about autonomy and purity violations

ABSTRACT Other people’s emotional reactions to a third person’s behaviour are potentially informative about what is appropriate within a given situation. We investigated whether and how observers’ inferences of such injunctive norms are shaped by expressions of anger and disgust. Building on the moral emotions literature, we hypothesised that angry and disgusted expressions produce relative differences in the strength of autonomy-based versus purity-based norm inferences. We report three studies (plus three supplementary studies) using different types of stimuli (vignette-based, video clips) to investigate how emotional reactions shape norms about potential norm violations (eating snacks, drinking alcohol), and contexts (groups of friends, a university, a company). Consistent with our theoretical argument, the results indicate that observers use others’ emotional reactions not only to infer whether a particular behaviour is inappropriate, but also why it is inappropriate: because it primarily violates autonomy standards (as suggested relatively more strongly by expressions of anger) or purity standards (as suggested relatively more strongly by expressions of disgust). We conclude that the social functionality of emotions in groups extends to shaping norms based on moral standards.

Deception and False Expectations

Deception is a common bargaining tactic that has also often been described as a form of unethical behavior. One reason why deception could be considered unethical is that it may evoke false expectations in others. In the current article we investigated false expectations that may be raised by using deception in an ultimatum bargaining setting. In particular, we investigated whether lying about your own outcomes is evaluated differently than lying about the outcomes of another party. In two experiments, we demonstrated that people judge a lying opponent less harshly when he or she lied about his own outcomes instead of the outcomes of another party. In addition, in our third experiment we demonstrate that people prefer are more likely to lie about their own outcomes than about those of another party.