Wolfgang Steinel

Social motives and strategic misrepresentation in social decision making

In 4 experiments, the authors studied the influence of social motives on deception and strategic misrepresentation. In a newly developed information provision game, individuals faced a decision maker whose decision would affect both own and others outcomes. By withholding information or by giving (in)accurate information about payoffs, participants could try to influence others decision making. Less accurate and more inaccurate information was given when the decision maker was competitive rather than cooperative (Experiment 1), especially when participants had a prosocial rather than selfish value orientation (Experiments 3 and 4). Accurate information was withheld because of fear of exploitation and greed, and inaccurate information was given because of greed (Experiment 2). Finally, participants engaged in strategic misrepresentation that may trick competitive others into damaging their own and increasing the participants outcomes.

Unfixing the fixed-pie: a motivated information-processing approach to integrative negotiation

Negotiators tend to believe that own and others outcomes are diametrically opposed. When such fixed-pie perceptions (FPPs) are not revised during negotiation, integrative agreements are unlikely. It was predicted that accuracy motivation helps negotiators to release their FPPs. In 2 experiments, accuracy motivation was manipulated by (not) holding negotiators accountable for the manner in which they negotiated. Experiment 1 showed that accountability reduced FPPs during face-to-face negotiation and produced more integrative agreements. Experiment 2 corroborated these results: Accountable negotiators revised their FPPs even when information exchange was experimentally held constant. Experiment 2 also showed that accountability is effective during the encoding of outcome information. Negotiators appear flexible in their reliance on FPPs. which is consistent with a motivated information-processing model of negotiation.

How intragroup dynamics affect behavior in intergroup conflict: The role of group norms, prototypicality, and need to belong.

This study explores the role of intragroup dynamics in intergroup conflict. In a computer-mediated negotiation experiment (N = 107), we investigated how a group representative’s standing in the group, group norm, and the representative’s need to belong influence behavior in intergroup negotiations. We hypothesized that the extent to which peripheral representatives adhere to group norms is contingent on their need to belong, whereas prototypical representatives behave in norm-congruent ways regardless of their need to belong. In support of this idea, results showed that prototypicals behaved more cooperatively when the group norm prescribed cooperation rather than competition. By contrast, peripherals only adhered to the group norm when they had a high need to belong. These findings suggest that peripherals only represent the interests of their group when doing so furthers their self-interest. We discuss implications for theorizing about prototypicality, social exclusion, and conformity to group norms.

Second language idiom learning in a paired-associate paradigm: Effects of direction of learning, direction of testing, idiom imageability, and idiom transparency

In a paired-associate learning (PAL) task, Dutch university students ( n = 129) learned 20 English second language (L2) idioms either receptively or productively (i.e., L2-first language [L1] or L1-L2) and were tested in two directions (i.e., recognition or production) immediately after learning and 3 weeks later. Receptive and productive performance was affected by direction of learning. This finding parallels findings from PAL experiments on L2 individual-word learning. On a productive test, productive learners had a sizable advantage over receptive learners, whereas on recognition, receptive learners outperformed productive learners. Two idiom characteristics, imageability (capacity to evoke a mental image) and transparency (overlap between literal and figurative meaning), as assessed in a norming study by an independent sample ( n = 80), qualified these findings. Indicating the importance of dual coding in idiom learning, imageability predicted performance, and receptive learning was particularly inefficient for low imageable idioms. Transparency was a weaker predictor of performance and only affected recognition. This study is based on the first authors MA research. We would like to thank the four anonymous SSLA reviewers for their helpful comments on this manuscript. Any errors or omissions remain our own.

Effects of Experience and Advice on Process and Performance in Negotiations

This experiment (N = 68 dyads) tested the influence of experience and advice on behavior and joint outcomes in integrative two-party negotiations. Dyads in an advice condition received short tactical advice to question fixed-pie assumptions and to exchange information. Afterward, they negotiated once. Dyads in an experience condition negotiated twice in successive rounds. Finally, dyads in an experience-and-advice condition negotiated twice and received advice prior to the second negotiation. Dependent measures were negotiation behavior, negotiation duration, joint outcome, and judgmental accuracy. Results showed that the combination of advice and experience led dyads to apply more problem solving and fewer contentious strategies, which mediated the higher joint outcomes that these dyads reached in shorter times. Experience or advice alone was not sufficient to make negotiators use different strategies or to exploit the integrative potential of the negotiations better than they did before they received advice and/or gained experience.

Determinants of Prosocial Behavior in Included Versus Excluded Contexts

Prosocial behavior (PSB) is increasingly becoming necessary as more and more individuals experience exclusion. In this context it is important to understand the motivational determinants of PSB. Here we report two experiments which analyzed the influence of dispositional (prosocialness; rejection sensitivity) and motivational variables (prosocial self-efficacy; prosocial collective efficacy; trust; anger; social affiliation motivation) on PSB under neutral contexts (Study 1), and once under inclusion or exclusion conditions (Study 2). Both studies provided evidence for the predicted mediation of PSB. Results in both neutral and inclusion and exclusion conditions supported our predictive model of PSB. In the model dispositional variables predicted motivational variables, which in turn predicted PSB. We showed that the investigated variables predicted PSB; this suggests that to promote PSB one could (1) foster prosocialness, prosocial self and collective efficacy, trust in others and affiliation motivation and (2) try to reduce negative feelings and the tendency to dread rejection in an attempt to reduce the negative impact that these variables have on PSB. Moreover, the few differences that emerged in the model between the inclusion and exclusion contexts suggested that in interventions with excluded individuals special care emphasis should be placed on addressing rejection sensitivity and lack of trust.

Negotiating for Better or Worse: Changing Pie Sizes Affect Negotiation Relationships

How do parties in ongoing repeated negotiation relationships react to changing circumstances? We argue that situations that become more beneficial (i.e. offer potentially higher outcomes to both) can affect negotiators´ relationships in two distinct ways. On the one hand, negotiators may see improving circumstances as more to share, which should lead to increased trust. On the other hand, negotiators may see it as more to fight about, which should decrease trust. We argue that social motivation (i.e., negotiators having a prosocial or pro-self motivation) may be a moderator, and explore this research question in a five-week repeated role-play negotiation experiment (N = 208). Contrary to our predictions, trust tended to increase in increasing and in decreasing sequences, maybe because participants did not recognize decreasing sequences as such. Implications for future research are discussed.

Prosocial behaviour, inclusion and exclusion: why and when do we behave prosocially? / Comportamiento prosocial, inclusión y exclusión: ¿cuándo y por qué adoptamos comportamientos prosociales?

Abstract Two experiments analysed the influence of inclusion versus exclusion on prosocial behaviour. In Study 1, evidence for the social reconnection hypothesis was found. In Study 2, a cross-over interactive effect is demonstrated: excluded individuals tended to be more prosocial when their competence was affected than when their popularity was affected. However, included people were more prosocial than excluded people when their popularity was affected, but they were less prosocial when their competence was highlighted. Besides, Study 2 has shown that affiliation motivation mediates the effect of exclusion on prosocial behaviour, and thus: (1) excluded individuals endorse lower levels of affiliation motivation with their rejecters than included individuals do with individuals who have included them; and (2) individuals with higher levels of affiliation motivation engage in higher prosocial behaviour levels when the behaviour is oriented to people with whom the chance to reconnect exists, but not when it is oriented to people with whom there is no possibility for future affiliation.

Too good to be true: Suspicion-based rejections of high offers

It is a common belief that high offers are more readily accepted than low offers. In contrast to this general notion, the current set of studies shows that there is a limit to the beneficial effects of making high offers and that becoming too generous may backfire. This paradoxical finding is observed when offers are made in an ambiguous situation of asymmetric information. In three studies, we found that when bargaining opponents had private information over the total amount that was to be distributed, participants became suspicious about high offers (i.e., offers that were beneficial to themselves), but not about low or equal offers. Due to suspicion, participants rejected high offers more often than equal offers.

Deception and False Expectations

Deception is a common bargaining tactic that has also often been described as a form of unethical behavior. One reason why deception could be considered unethical is that it may evoke false expectations in others. In the current article we investigated false expectations that may be raised by using deception in an ultimatum bargaining setting. In particular, we investigated whether lying about your own outcomes is evaluated differently than lying about the outcomes of another party. In two experiments, we demonstrated that people judge a lying opponent less harshly when he or she lied about his own outcomes instead of the outcomes of another party. In addition, in our third experiment we demonstrate that people prefer are more likely to lie about their own outcomes than about those of another party.