Manfred Stadler

R&D dynamics in the product life cycle

This paper presents a model of a firms R&D behavior over an entire product life cycle. Beginning with the search stage, modelled as a patent race, firms raise their R&D expenditures until one firm succeeds with a technological breakthrough in creating a new product, market. The following R&D behavior of the successful entrepreneur, devoted to incremental product and process innovations, varies in a characteristic way over the new products life cycle. Under reasonable conditions, R&D activities rise in the early stages but decline when the market matures. Overall, supply and demand factors combine to determine the R&D time-path.

Equity versus Efficiency? Evidence from Three-Person Generosity Experiments

In two-person generosity games, the proposer’s agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer’s choice of the pie size. In three-person generosity games, equal agreement payoffs for two of the players are either exogenously excluded or imposed. We predict that the latter crowds out - or at least weakens - efficiency seeking. Our treatments rely on a 2x3 factorial design, differing in whether the responder or the third (dummy) player is the residual claimant and whether the proposer’s agreement payoff is larger, equal, or smaller than the other exogenously given agreement payoff.

Demand pull and technology push effects in the quality ladder model

This paper extends the standard quality ladder model of innovation and quality growth by allowing for heterogeneous industries. This enables us not only to deal with the Schumpeterian hypothesis about market power and innovation, but also to analyze industry specific demand pull and technology push effects. In accordance with the empirical evidence, we show that perspective of large market power, favorable technological opportunities and high demand expectations as well as the economy-wide endowment with qualified labor, unambiguously spur innovative activity.

Engines of Growth: Education and Innovation

Summary The paper presents a dynamic general-equilibrium model of education, quality and variety innovation, and scale-invariant growth. We consider endogenous human-capital accumulation in an educational sector and quality and variety innovation in two separate R&D sectors. In the balanced growth equilibrium education and innovation appear as in-line engines of growth and government can accelerate growth by subsidizing education or by enhancing the effectiveness of the educational sector.

Keynesianische Aspekte der modernen Wachstumstheorie

Das wissenschaftliche Interesse von KEYNES galt vor allem kurzfristigen okonomischen Problemen und Fragestellungen. Fur seine Abneigung, sich auf langerfristige Spekulationen einzulassen, wird immer wieder sein Aphorismus zitiert, wonach wir langerfristig alle tot seien. Gleichwohl findet sich z.B. in der General Theory 1 eine Reihe von Auserungen uber Modifikationen und Implikationen seiner Analyseergebnisse fur eine langerfristige Perspektive. Sie betreffen zum einen die Vergroserung des wirtschaftspolitischen Spielraums bzw. die auf lange Sicht bessere Vereinbarkeit wirtschaftspolitischer Ziele (s. ASIMAKOPULOS 1991, S. 136), zum anderen die langfristige Problematik einer Stimulierung der Investitionstatigkeit:

Asymmetric Information in Simple Bargaining Games: An Experimental Study

Abstract Bilateral bargaining situations are often characterized by informational asymmetries concerning the size of what is at stake: in some cases, the proposer is better informed, in others, it is the responder. We analyze the effects of both types of asymmetric information on proposer behavior in two different situations which allow for a variation of responder veto power: the ultimatum and the dictator game. We find that the extent to which proposers demand less in the ultimatum as compared to the dictator game is (marginally) smaller when the proposer is in the superior information position. Further we find informed proposers to exploit their informational advantage by offering an amount that does not reveal the true size of the pie, with proposers in the ultimatum game exhibiting this behavioral pattern to a larger extent than those in the dictator game. Uninformed proposers risk imposed rejection when they ask for more than potentially is at stake, and ask for a risk premium in dictator games. We concentrate on proposers, but also explore responder behavior: We find uninformed responders to enable proposers’ hiding behavior, and we find proposer intentionality not to play an important role for informed responders when they decide whether to accept or reject an offer by an (uninformed) proposer.

Risk and the Role of Collateral in Debt Renegotiation

In his basic model of debt renegotiation, BESTER [1994] argues that collateral is more effective if high risk projects are financed. This result, however, crucially depends on the definition of risk. Using the second-order stochastic dominance criterion introduced by ROTHSCHILD AND STIGLITZ [1970], we show that it is not a projects high risk, induced by a high probability of default, that makes collateral more effective. Instead it turns out that, given the expected return, the probability of default has no impact on the collaterals effectiveness. Moreover, a higher risk of the project caused by a higher loss given default makes the use of collateral even less effective.

Blindfolded vs. informed ultimatum bargaining: A theoretical and experimental analysis

Abstract This paper analyzes blindfolded vs. informed ultimatum bargaining where proposer and responder are both either uninformed or informed about the size of the pie. Considering the transition from one information setting to another suggests that more information induces lower (higher) price offers and acceptance thresholds when the pie is small (large). While our experimental data confirm this transition effect, risk aversion leads to diverging results in blindfolded ultimatum bargaining where task-independent strategies such as ‘equal sharing’ or the ‘golden mean’ are implemented more frequently.

Market Structure and Innovation Races / Marktstruktur und Innovationsrennen

Summary Based on an extended game-theoretic innovation-race model, we derive some Schumpeterian hypotheses of the impact of technological rivalry, market power, technological opportunities and demand expectations on the timing of product and process innovations. Using innovation data at the firm level in the German industrial sector, we estimate various versions of an econometric specification of the model with dichotomous innovation data by using a univariate binary probit model with qualitative regressor variables estimated applying indirect inference. Our empirical results are consistent with the derived hypotheses that intense rivalry, favorable technological opportunities and high demand expectations spur innovative activity, while the effect of market power is ambiguous. Zusammenfassung Auf der Grundlage eines erweiterten spieltheoretischen Innovationswettlauf-Modells leiten wir einige Neo-Schumpeter-Hypothesen über den Einfluss der Wettbewerbsintensität, der Marktmacht, der technologischen Möglichkeiten und der Nachfrageerwartungen auf die zeitliche Unternehmensplanung von Produkt- und Prozessinnovationen ab. Mittels Firmen-Innovationsdaten aus dem Verarbeitenden Gewerbe in Deutschland schätzen wir mehrere Varianten einer ökonometrischen Spezifikation des Modells. Aufgrund des dichotomen Charakters der Innovationsdaten schätzen wir ein univariates binäres Probit-Modell mit qualitativen Regressor-Variablen durch indirekte Inferenz. Die empirischen Ergebnisse bestätigen die theoretisch abgleiteten Hypothesen, dass eine hohe Wettbewerbsintensität, günstige technologische Möglichkeiten und hohe Nachfrageerwartungen die Innovationsaktivitäten fördern. Ein eindeutiger Effekt der Marktmacht lässt sich nicht nachweisen.

Innovation, Imitation und Marktstruktur

In diesem Beitrag wird der Innovations- und Imitationswettbewerb zwischen zwei Unternehmen in einem spieltheoretischen Modell dargestellt. Unter der Annahme eines perfekten Patentschutzes wird zunachst bestimmt, bei welchen Marktkonstellationen die Konkurrenten mit ihren F&E-Ausgaben nach einer verbesserten Produktionstechnologie suchen, bzw. sich mit dem erreichten technologischen Niveau zufriedengeben. Abgeleitet wird ein evolutionarer Prozes des technologischen und strukturellen Wandels, der fruher oder spater in einen Bereich stationarer Marktstrukturen mundet. Anschliesend wird der Einflus von Imitationsmoglichkeiten auf die F&E-Aktivitaten der Unternehmen sowie auf die stationaren Marktstrukturen analysiert. Ein innovationshemmender Imitationseffekt last sich vor allem fur gleichwertige und fur sehr unterschiedliche Produktionsbedingungen der beiden Unternehmen feststellen. Der Bereich stationarer Marktstrukturen verschiebt sich durch die Imitationsmoglichkeiten in Richtung symmetrischer Konstellationen.